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Abstract 
This thesis examines exchange rate pohcles m AfrIca, using data from 1980 to 
2005. Africa's economic growth failure has been characterised as a 'disaster'. Among 
the Identified culpnts are inappropriate exchange rate policies. For a quarter of a 
centmy now, African economies have introduced exchange rate based stablhzation 
progranunes to restructure their economies. The thesis used different empirical tech-
niques to mvestigate various aspects of exchange rate pohcies in AfrIca. It first uses an 
econometric model along With statistical analysis to venfy whether the countries prac-
tlse what they report in terms of exchange rate regimes. The results corroborate other 
findings that countries' de Jure regime could be different from de facto. 
Threshold cointegration analysis was used to explore long-run relationship be-
tween reserves and exchange rates. The results show that, after accounting for thresh-
old effects, there is a long-run relatlonship between reserves and exchange rates in 
these countries. This supports the empirical technique of using reserve changes as 
indicators of exchange rate interventions in developing countnes. 
Determmants oflong-run real exchange rates were examined based on a trade re-
lation model. The econometnc methodology uses vector error correction mecharusm 
(VECM), within which the traditional detem!inants of real exchange rates in develop-
ing countries are considered. The outcome indicates that these vanables are significant 
in the countries conslderd. 
The thesis further mvestigates sources of real exchange rate fluctuatIOns m a 
sample of African countries. The work was motivated by a stochastic open economy 
macroeconomic model and the econometnc estlmation was carried out within a tri-
variate structural V AR model. The findings suggest that demand shock accounted for 
most of the variations m real exchange rates. Supply shocks were, to a large extent, 
significant in countries whose supply-side refonns seem to be effective. 
Does exchange rate regnne matter for terms of trade shocks m developmg coun-
tries? This is what chapter seven explores. It investigates how African countries cope 
with terms of trade shocks under different exchange rate regimes. The results mdi-
cate that there IS not much difference between countnes with a floating regime and 
those with a fixed regime. A further investigation on exchange rate pass-through was 
undertaken and the findings indicate that exchange rate pass-through IS very low in 
these countries, which could not induce 'expenditure sWitching'. Function of nominal 
exchange rates as an insulator of the real Side of the economy is inhibited. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and An Overview of the 
African Economies 
1.1 Introduction 
1 
The finanCial cnses of the 1990s reempbasised the important role exchange rntes 
play in the economic activitIes of a country. For about a quarter of a centllry, under 
the Bretton Woods system, countries had fixed therr currenCies, albeit mtermittent 
adJustInents allowed, within a narrow range. Friedman (1953), while cntlcizing the 
system, argued that in a world where price rigidity extsts, fleXIble exchange rates can 
bnng about relative price adJustInent. According to thts view, maintaining a flexible 
exchange rate system, in which market forces play an mlportant role, would help a 
country to achieve a 'desired' exchange rnte equilibrium. Economists have identIfied 
international payments, price levels and mterest rates as the most important economic 
variables that are linked to exchange rates. 
The African economies bad received a good econoIDlc ratIng from the experts 
in the 1960s. Enke (1963) had put Africa's growth potential altead of Asia's while the 
then World Bank Chief economist, Kamarck (1976) Identlfied a number of AfrIcan 
countnes with a clear potential of attaining more that 7% annual growth rate. The 
continent has many countries With natural resources that range from agricultural to 
mmeral resources. South Africa is anlOng the leading exporters of mmeral resources 
in the world and houses 40% of the global gold reserves. Botswana IS the leading 
producer of diamonds. Important oil exporters on the contInent mc1ude Libya, Nige-
ria Algeria, Angola, Egypt, and Gabon. Algeria is the second largest gas exporter and 
rnnked fifth in terms of world gas reserves. Morocco has about 70% of the world' 
phosphate reserve and accounts for about 50 % of the country's income. 
2 
However, by the middle of the 1970s, the forecast prospects turned out to be a 
mirage. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that Africa's economic history is a perfect 
match of classical defimtIon of tragedy. The continent is characterized by such unful-
filled potential along with catastrophic consequences. Real GDP per capita of many 
Afncan countries did not grow for about a generation (1965-1990) Many countries 
experienced real negatIve growth, includmg those Identmed With positive potential 
growth by the World Bank Chief. To illustrate the seriousness of the issue, com-
pare Asian with African countries, specifically Nigeria and Indonesia, and Ghana 
and Thailand. These economies share econOmlC structural similanties; Nlgena and 
IndoneSia depend on oil while Ghana and Thailand are agrarian economies. In the 
1960s the income per capita m Nigeria was higher than that of Indonesia, but by the 
1990s, Indonesia's income was three times higher than that of Nigeria. Similarly, 
Ghana's income was higher than that of Thailand, but by the 1990s, Thailand was 
among the best performing economies while Ghana was battlmg to regain ItS past 
income level (World Bank, 1994). 
1.2 The African Economies 
As eYldent from Table 1.1, African economies range from $214 million (Sao Tome 
and PrinClpe), the smallest to $527 billion (South Africa), and the biggest in terms 
of GDP (PPP) There are effectively two monetal)' unions in the continent that are 
both known as the franc zone which peg their currency to Euro, WAEMU' in west 
and eAMU' in central Africa. There is a formal exchange rate arrangement within 
countries of southern Africa that mcludes Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia whose 
currencies centred around the South African currency, the Rand. 
I Refer to sectlon 3 3 and table 3 I for detslled ruSCUSSlon on the monetaIy arrangement 
2 Ibid 
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4 
The continent produces mamly primary products, agncultural goods, and ntin-
eral resources, winch make the countries econormcally rusadvantageous. Bleaney 
and Greenaway (2000) have noted that two arguments have been put forward in re-
spect of the rusadvantages associated WIth productIon of primary products as main 
exports. These are the Presbisch-Singer thesIs, which postulates that prices of pri-
mary products are on long-run downward trend compared to the prices of manufac-
tured goods. The second one is the argument that exports of the prunary products 
yield unrehable revenues due to the volatIlity of their prices. Sachs and Warner 
(1997) and Sala-i-Martin's (1997) findings suggest that the share ofpnmary prod-
ucts of a country's exports is negatively related to her economic growth could be 
supportive to tins argument. However, Australia's large share of primary products m 
its exports poses a challenge to the vahruty of the suggestIon. 
Some African economies were agriculture based m the 1960s, but by the mid-
dle of the 19708 and the early 1980s, mining and od production became dontinant 
sector. For example, Algerian economy was dormnated by agnculture m the 1960s, 
but since the 1970s the country depends on oil and gas revenues. Petroleum, natural 
gas and petroleum products constitute 97% of her exports and 25% of her GDP m 
the 1990s. Botswana's exports were mainly beef in the 1960s and the 1970s. How-
ever, by 1980 diamond accounted for about 40% of the total exports winch steadily 
rose to 80% by 1999. The Nlgenan economy was dominated by agricultural sector 
m the late 1960s. The ruscovery and subsequent exportation of oil in the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s, suddenly od became the dominant sector. Since then, oil has 
been accountIng for about 90% of the total exports and remained the mam source 
of government revenue. By 1974, the government revenue from od rose to 80%. 
This nused econormc growth to about 25% m 1977 from 12% in 1971. However, 
it also came WIth economic consequences. For example in NIgeria, oil revenue was 
largely absorbed by government expenrulure m provision of infrastructures, improv-
mg transportation and SOCIal services. Roads, ports and educational opportunitIes 
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were significantly expanded. However, the policies were not designed with long-run 
econOInlC Implications of financial viability and sustamability. The exchange rate 
policy allowed the domestic currency to appreciate resulting in deterioration of inter-
natIonal competitiveness whose impact particularly on agncultIIral sector was devas-
tating. Oil proceeds were used in importing tradable goods and soon the oil revenue 
cannot handle all the needed Imports. As a result of the revenue shortfall, the govern-
ment resorted to foreign borrowing at variable interest rates and short term maturity. 
In spite of all these, the domestic currency, Naira was allowed to continue to appre-
ciate in face of evidence of excessive over-valuation. The government faced by this 
harsh economic conditions, introduced austerity measures in 1982, which according 
to many analysts, were too cosmetIc to alter the econOInlC trends. As a result, the 
GDP recorded -6.7% annual growth in 1983, non oil sector grew by -9.3% and even 
the petroleum sector recorded a -2.5% growth. The cumulative effects are large ex-
ternal and fiscal imbalances. Her level of indebtedness denied her access to foreign 
capital. 
African countries introduced Import substitutIon progrannne as a strategy of 
industrialIZing their econOInles m the 1960s and the 1970s. Consequent to these 
policies, the public economy became very large With government enterpnses partic-
Ipatmg m most of the economic activities. The mdustries were overprotected from 
the foreign competitIOn for domestic market of their finished products whIle at the 
same time they were allowed access to cheap foreign exchange. This was essential 
for the policy as the industries relied substantially on imported equipment, raw mate-
nals and spare parts. The inefficiencies inherent in tins pattern of economic arrange-
ment became evident at the end of the 1970s that called for change in economic 
policy. However, liberalIZation and privatIZatIon of these mdustries were welcomed 
with stiff opposition by both government officials and labour UnIons. As privatIZa-
tIOn would result m unernployment and Its attendant social unrest. In Ghana, strong 
presence of the public enterprises m every sector of the economy m t1Ie 1960s and 
6 
the 1970s was remforced by the socialist policies adopted. Consequently the burden 
of inefficIent and unprofitable public enterpnses, coupled with the external shocks of 
the 1970s, become unbearable to the government. 
Botswana and South Africa have been the best of the continent's economies. 
Botswana's annual average GDP growth for the period between 1993 and 2000 was 
about 7%, wlule exports had increased by over 40% within the same penod. In gen-
eral, annual GDP average growth was about 14.5% between 1966 and 1998 Herper 
capita income was $7000 m 2002 (World Bank, 2002). The government's efforts to 
dIversifY the economy yielded little success. Public sector is dominant and employs 
most of the labour force. The country's foreign reserve grew and strategy to man-
age It became difficult. In 1988, a World Bank-designed strategy for mvestmg the 
reserves was adopted. Tourism is becoming an important industry next to mining. 
It accounts for about 12% of GDP in 2005. Agriculture constitutes 2 8% and It IS 
mostly beef exports. The non-mimng sector grew by 8.9% between 1998 and 1999. 
ForeIgn investment has been steadily growmg over the last decade. Pnvatization of 
public enterprises was also pursued with the View to ease financial burden on the 
government and to develop a pnvate sector economy. Inflation was maintamed at a 
single digit for most of the last two decades. The country's stock exchange recorded 
mcrease in trading, attracting transactIons, partIcularly from foreIgn investors. The 
financial sector has sound regulation and SUperviSIOn; theIr products are comparable 
WIth international ones. The economic freedom index has ranked the country 38th 
freest economy in the world, WIth 68.4 per cent in 2007. 
South AfrIca IS the largest and most developed economy on the continent, with 
GDP of about $530 billion as at 2005 and was ranked 27th m the world (The World 
Bank, 2005). South Africa IS the largest producer of gold and platmum in the world 
and also exports diamond and coal. The mmeral sector IS the major foreign exchange 
earner for the economy. The manufacturing sector also leads in specialized areas like 
raIlway rolling stock, synthetic fuels and mming equipment and machinery. Agncul-
7 
ture accounted for 3.4% in 2005. The government introduced a new economic poltcy 
in 1996, tagged 'GEAR', an acronym for growth, employment and redistribution. 
The poltcy aimed at aclueving a sustainable annual GDP growth of 6% and creat-
ing 400,000 new jobs annually. The results were at best, InIXed. The policy brought 
about macroeconomic stability, but failed in many key areas. Inflation which had 
run in double digits for over 20 years was brought down to about 6% in 2000. The 
country's exports rose to 29.1 % of her GDP in 2001 from 5% in 1991. South Africa 
has a very developed financial sector with a stock exchange ranked 16th in the world 
m terms of market capitalization in 2005. Her banking system is of mternational 
standard With an effective central bank, the South African Reserve Bank. 
Many African econOlnles performed very well in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
However, the 1970s oil shocks exposed the vulnerability of the weak economic polt-
cles pursued by these countries in the past. The Egyptlan economy was among the 
best performmg economies on the continent, but by the end of the 1980s, the econ-
omy had manifested serious economic down turn. The mflatlon rate was as high as 
20% while fiscal and current account deficits were 15 and 8% of her GDP, respec-
tively. Kenya had entered the decade of the 1980s with more favourable conditions 
than any sub-Saharan African economy. Her sound economic structure m the 1970s 
was due to appropriate macroeconOlnlC policies adopted m the 1960s. The sound 
agricultural poltcy led to an average annual GDP growth of 6.6% m the 1960s. This 
performance contmued m the 1970s where the growth rate was 4% Savings and m-
vestlnents were very high relatlve to her per caPita, mcome. However, the situation 
soon changed and the economy started showmg evidence of a need for major ad-
Justlnent programme. The economic performance of the 1970s was reversed by two 
main factors, fiscal indtscipltne and external shocks. 
Moroccan economy is dependent on agriculture, which is IughIy mfluenced by 
rainfa111evels and the phosphate industry. The GDP per capita of the country grew 
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by 47% in the 1960s and figure doubled in the 1970s. The avarage annual growth 
came down to 8.2% and 8.9% in the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively. 
After a dismal performance briefly in the late 1960s, Tanzania's GDP picked 
up m the early 1970s WIth an average growth of 5% per annum. External shocks of 
the 1970s and the severe drought cu1minated mto an economic declme and rnacro-
econonnc unbalances in the early 1980s. Real GDP contracted along with declme 
m agncultura1 output. Agnculture accounts for over 50% of the country's GDP and 
75% of her exports. The sector also proVIdes employment to about 80% of the labour 
force. Foreign exchange controls existed With high premium between the official and 
the black markets of about 100%. 
The Tunisian economy has been traditionally dominated by oil, phosphate, 
agriculture and tourism. The economy experienced unprecedented growth in the 
1970s. TIns was due to higher pnces of phosphate and oil, coupled with nse in 
tourism industry. Tunisia's revenue dwindled, due to slump in the oil pnces. This 
followed by accumulation of foreign debts, which igrnted foreign exchange cnses. 
The cnses were VIbrated through the economy. Thus, the economic growth recorded 
m the 1970s has not only become unsustainable m the 1980s, but the whole economy 
plunged into recessIOn 
The Ugandan economy is agrarian, in which agriculture proVIdes employment 
to about 80% of the country's labour force and generates 90% of the export earnings. 
Mmmg was an important mdustry in the 1960s, contributed about 30% of the coun-
try's exports, but its importance has waned down since The economy had undergone 
serious and sustained down-turn from the nnd-1970s to the 1980s. The industrial 
sector was relatIvely small and donnnated by public enterpnses while financial sec-
tor was fully regulated. A fixed exchange rate regime coupled With high domestIc 
inflation resulted in the domestIc currency real appreciation. This led to negative 
consequences to the country's exports. Declme m pnces of primary products in the 
9 
1970s and 1980s, wluch constltute the countJy's exports, further compounded her 
econonnc problems. 
The external sector of African econonnes had been regulated and controlled 
in the 1970s and the early 1980s. These were in form of lugh tariffs, quotas and 
restrictions of capItal flows As a result, black markets offoreIgn exchange flourished 
WIth varymg degree of premium. The prerruum ranges between 3.39% m Franc zone 
to 2,5916 % in Uganda between 1960-2003 (Karbo, 2006). In most African countnes, 
the financial system IS m full control of the governments and ceilings are placed 
on mterest rates untll recently. Agenor and Ucer (1999) look into exchange rate 
market reform in developing countries among wluch are Afncan countries. One of 
the features of exchange rate market restrictions in developmg countnes found was 
the development of parallel or black markets for exchange rate. This, as argued by 
a number of authors, leads to distortion and variety of econonnc costs. Recently, 
efforts to address or reunify the markets have been started in a number of developing 
countries embodied m exchange rate market reforms. 
1.3 The Reforms 
There were major economic changes in developing economies from the mid-1980s, 
when a number of them adopted more flexible exchange rate regimes. The percent-
age of developmg countries that maintain peg regime fell from 73% to 23% from 
1978 to 1994 (ColllDS, 1996). Between 1981 and 1991, a number of African coun-
tnes had devalued their currencies by about 40% and this was thought to be the cause 
of improvement of per capita income of 2.3 % (World Bank, 1994). Like most de-
veloping econonnes, the 1970s Oll shock, wluch was accentuated by inappropriate 
domestic poIices, was a factor m introducmg some form of macroeconomic adjust-
ment programmes by African countries. Hoffinaister, Roldos and Wickham (1997) 
observe that dismal performance of African economies was due to both mternal and 
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external factors. The fonner includes low level of human capItal, the administrative, 
legal and institutional framework, financial pohcies and structural policies. The latter 
refers to adverse extemal envrronment that includes tenns of trade shocks and for-
eign interests The structural refonns adopted by the African econOlmes m the 1980s 
were based on the IMF and World Bank models. They were undertaken with the view 
to re-orienting the economies to be private sector led via market mechantsm (Rein-
hart and Tokatlidis, 2000) LIberalizatIon of interest rates, reductIon of reserve re-
quirements, removal of credtt allocations, privatized publicly owned banks and other 
financial institutions, establishment and nurturing of security markets were carried 
out. New comprehensIve regulations that would suit the new economic environment, 
openness of the economy via current account and capItal accounts transactIOns also 
fonn part of the progrant. However, the libera1ization effort seems to be inadequate 
in mobilizing saving and investuIent fimds McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) state 
that financial repreSSIOn discourage savings and reduce investuIent fimds and leads 
to misallocations of resources. Removal of interest rate ceihng induces Jngh sav-
ings Implicitly assumed here is that savings are responsive to mterest rate changes. 
Remhart (1996) had shown that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution between 
savmgs and consuntption depends on the level of perntanent mcome or the wealth of 
the country. 
The AJgenan government introduced economic liberahzation prograDIDles in 
the 1980s. The prograntme recorded only a margmal success. The private sector, 
because of its fragihty, could not provide genume econOmIC stimulus. In 1994, an 
IMF structural refonn prograDIDle was adopted WIth a great level of seriousness. The 
refonn had improved the macro-econOmIC pIcture of the country, altltough privati-
zation of inefficient government companies resulted m htgh unemployment and the 
dwmdlmg of the sector. As a result of the refonns, tlte AJgenan economy has gener-
ally improved. The private mdustnes had gained substantIal momentum, but public 
industries are still important. Fiscal prudence, as part of the package yielded a fiscal 
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balance in the mid 1990s from a deficit of about 8 7%. InflatIon, which was in double 
figures for most of the 1990s, receded to a smgle ruglt and the authorities were deter-
mmed to keep it at 3% (IMF, 2002). The countty's external debt has fallen where the 
foreign debt to GDP ratIo reduced from 72% in 1996 to 59% in 1999 due to repay-
ment on schedule. By 2006, the ratio had declined to 3.5% and further reduction IS 
being forecast Efforts to diversIfy the economy has also YIelded posItive results, as 
in 1998 and 1999, the non hydrocarbon sectors grew by 5.5 and 2.5%, respectively. 
The FDI net inflow mto the countty was $ 624 million by the end of 1996. 
Egypt launched an ambItious stabtlizatIon programme m the 1980s. The dual 
objectIves of the programme were fiscal stabilization and a sustamable exchange rate 
regime. The programme emborues publIc sector reforms, elinIination of subsidies, 
privatization of public enterprises and lIberalization of the financIal sector. Trade lib-
era1tzation and investInent policies were also given prionty. Massive reductions in 
tariffs were undertaken. The programme recorded a modest success, but the 1990s 
financial crises that heigbtened capItal outflows worsened the countty's balance of 
payment posItion. However, the economic recovery regained momentIun shortly 
thereafter, WIth surge m stock market activities and output growth. The real GDP 
has been steadily growing from 3.2 in 2002 to 4 8% in 2005 (IMF, 2006). The cur-
rent account deficit that posed a serious problem in the late 1980s was replaced with 
surplus of 4.4% of GDP in 2003. Although, capItal account was stIll in defiCIt and 
FDI remained slow m 2003, but foreIgn borrowing was inslgmficant and mterna-
tional reserves remained stable, about US$14.5 billion for most of the 2005 and rose 
to US$17.3 bIllion by February, 2005. That was equivalent to 7.2 months oftmports. 
Foreign debts have become sustainable, constIrutmg about 30% of the GDP. Over all, 
the crecht ratIng of the countty IS currently very high. 
Consequent to the implementatIOn of economic reform programme, Ghana-
ian trade openness has also mcreased to about 40% in early 1990s, mrucatIng much 
greater integratIon with the rest of the world. The Ghanaian currency, the Cedi was 
12 
devalued between 1978 and 1979 by over 100%, which Husain and Faruqee (1996) 
argue that it was phenomenal, but was too late and too httIe to induce any meaning-
ful posItIve changes. TIns necessItated further devaluation of over 300% within the 
first year of the introductIOn of the econOmIC programme in 1983-1984 and the of-
ficial rate was maintamed within a 25% of the PPP rate. Foreign exchange auction 
was introduced in 1986, initially for selected sectors but gradually covered most of 
the trade transactions and subsequently, bureaux de change were hcensed, legaJizmg 
the parallel market. In the early 1990s the auction was replaced by the central bank's 
management of the exchange rate directly in the inter bank market. Consequent to 
the refonns unplemented, revenue rose from 6% of the GDP in 1983 to 14% in 1986. 
Fiscal dtscipline led to a stable monetary base and a fall in mfiatlon. Trade liberahza-
tion that was ainted at liberating the intports and promotes exports was also pursued. 
Interest rates were deregulated allowing a greater role for the market forces. 
The Kenyan government was compelled to secure IMF-structural adJustlnent 
loans in 1980 and 1982 wmch restored sense of StabIlity to the economy, albeit lit-
tle structural adjustlnent was undertaken. Consequently, further adJustlnent had to be 
carried out between 1986 and 1992. The programme almost covered every sector of 
the economy. Export retention policy, allowing the exporters inttlally in the nontra-
ditioual areas but later covered all the sectors, to retam the foreign exchange earned 
and can be traded freely withm the banking system. But exchange rate PremIum con-
tinue to constitute a problem to intporters who were discouraged from sourcing the 
needed foreign exchange from the markets as they feared agents who can access the 
official exchange rate market can undercut them in prices. Inlports were liberalized 
and many public enterprises were pnvatlZed. 
Morocco has been unplementing a World BankIIMF approved econOmIC re-
forms smce early 1980s. Exchange rate reforms were mtroduced and pnvatizatIon 
of public enterprises was carried out The exchange rate anchor, adopted coupled 
with sound monetary policy resulted m low inflation of about 2% in 2002. But some 
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economists were of the opinion that the policy also resulted in domestic currency 
bemg overvalued, an allegation dlsmissed by IMF (2006). The privatized sectors 
mclude teleco=unications, energy and transportations. The country has also sub-
stanbally hberalIzed her trade regimes and consolidated the financIal sectors. The 
reforms, according to the IMF (2006) have posibvely impacted on the country's pro-
ductiVIty and Improve her resilience to shocks, as experienced in 2005 drought and 
upsurge in energy costs. The country's foreign reserves stood at US$ 7 billion with 
sustamable foreign debts of US$ 19 billion in 2005. The country has signed trade 
agreement WIth the United States and the European Union The former was ratified 
in 2004 and the latter will come into effect in 2010. FDI has been continually grow-
mg over the years. For Instance, the total FDI in-flow into the country rose from US$ 
1.07 billion in 2004 to US$ 2.9 billion in 2006, an increment of about 200%. 
The NIgerian government mtroduced an IMF-supported strucb1ral adjustment 
progra=e in 1986, whose main package included exchange rates liberalIZation, pri-
vatization of the publIc enterpnses, deregulation of the financial sector and the liber-
alization of the external sector. Implementation started well with an impressive suc-
cess m refonning the exchange rate system and a number of public enterprises were 
pnvatized, as well as, new lIcenses for pnvate banks were issued. The main feature 
of the exchange rate reforms, was establIshmg market-oriented rate by introducing a 
floating exchange rate mechanisms. The system was introduced in two phases. The 
second tIer foreign exchange market introduced in phase one was merged with the of-
ficial rates. However, the two markets of foreign exchange existed, one in which the 
central bank detennined auction rate for government needs, official foreIgn exchange 
dealers and some selected Importers and others source theIr foreIgn exchange from an 
inter bank market whose rate was determined by market forces. But by 1989, the of-
fiCIal exchange rate was abandoned replacing It WIth an inter-bank foreign exchange 
market. 
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Tanzania adopted structural adjustment programme between 1982 and 1985, 
but recorded margmal success and by 1986 another reform programme had to be 
introduced. The programme was meant to address the weaknesses of the first one 
adopted m 1982. Trade hberahzation, new fiscal policy, financial sector reform and 
new exchange rate policies were implemented. A new foreign exchange act that 
proVIdes legtslatlve basis for the existence of exchange bureaux was enacted. The 
importance of the bureaux rose particularly WIth the government policy on exports 
retention and the central bank, Bank of Tanzania uses the bureaux rate to fix the 
official rate. This de-politiCIses the process of fixing the officIal exchange rate and 
the market forces play a large role in the determination of the rate. The GDP grew 
by 6.7% and 6.8% m 2004 and 2005, respectlvely. 
Tunisia introduced a structl!ral econOmIC programme in 1986, to ruVerslfy and 
hberahze the economy, allowmg greater role for market mechanisms. The pro-
gramme was to transform, fimdanIenta11y, the socialIst economy of the 1960s and 
1970s into a market oriented one. As a result, public enterprises were pnvatized 
and new tax regimes were mtroduced. Consequent of the reforms, the economy be-
came more ruversified with significant agriculturaI, energy, mimng, manufacturing 
and tounsm. The country has SIgned an association agreement with the European 
Union m 1998, which assisted the country in modernizing her economy and created 
employment opportunIties For many years now, the economy is domg well. Infla-
tion IS low, about 3.6% in 2005 and the government has been demonstratmg com-
mitment in adhering to fiscal discipline. Her foreign debts have reduced to US$ 18.7 
bIllion during the same period. FDI has also grown to US$ 634.7 mIllion in 2006 
The gradual openmg the capItal account came WIth double advantages of ruVerslfy-
mg balance of payment financing and creating new source of foreign exchange. The 
country's foreign reserve rose from 1.6 months of Imports m 1992 to about 3 months 
of Imports in 2003. ThIs reflects the economic sIZe and stabilIty in the current ac-
count. Increase in the reserves brought about rise in the ratio of reserves to short 
15 
term external debts from 52% in 1990 to 100% in 2003. As a result, the country has 
been recently ranked as the most competItive country in the region. Despite its good 
economic performance, unemployment, especially among the graduates continues to 
pose a challenge to the poltcy-makers. 
The Ugandan economic reform programme was introduced in 1986. Through 
its unplementations, public enterprises were privatized along with liberalization of 
telecommumcatIons, power generation and export onented crops sectors, like coffee, 
tea and cotton. A ltberal and flexIble exchange rate and a dISCiplined fiscal poltcy 
brought about stable exchange rates and inflations Consequently, the general macro-
economic indices improved Inflation has been a smgle digit phenomenon for about 
a decade. Fig11Tes for 2004 and 2005 were 6% and 7%, respectively. The Ugan-
dan stock exchange has increased m importance during the last two decades. Its turn 
over and market capitalizatIOn have more than double m the last five years. The main 
boost came from the government privatization programme. LiberalIZatIon of the fi-
nancial system was one of the Uganda's successful economic reforms Programme of 
the early 1990s. All mterest rates, mcludlng Treasury bill Yields, were allowed to be 
market -determined and financial institutions law that makes the central bank, Bank 
of Uganda (BOU), the regulator and supervisor of the banking system was enacted. 
BOU made an effort to discharge these responsibilitIes effectively, and as a result of 
these measures, the public confidence in the banking system was restored. Tlus led 
to stable growth in financial mtermediatIon from levels that were among the lowest 
in sub-Saliaran Africa. 
Currently, Africa has 17 capiial markets' With total capitalizatIon of$33 Billion 
m 2002. The per capita mcome IS rising faster than its populatIon growth. Despite 
ItS growmg importance, Afncan stock exchange markets were reported to have low 
correlatIOn with other global capital markets (Salami, 2002). The size of the African 
capital markets varies from country to country which is a reflection of the size and 
3 Refer to Table 1.1 for the detail 
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state of development and of the economies. In 2002, Egypt, Morocco, and Nigena 
constttuted about three quarter of the continents' capital markets size. Privatization 
of public enterprises by many governments boosted the actlVlttes of the stock markets 
and raised their market capitalization value. The policy also increased flow of FDI 
into the countries. 
In most Afncan countries governments are the main sources of foreign ex-
change that norma1\y obtain as proceeds of primary sector exports. For example m 
Algeria, proceeds of the exported hydrocarbon are usually surrendered to the central 
bank, the Bank of Algena which makes it poSSlble for the bank to be the dominant 
supplier offoreIgn exchange to the market. As a result the bank is able to maintain the 
nommal exchange rate within a bound it considers close to its equilibrium. Conse-
quent to econonuc refonns introduced in 1980s, a number of countries ISSUed hcense 
for operating Bureaus de Change thereby legalizing the parallel market. These coun-
tries include Ghana, NIgeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Tunisia. This resulted in lowering 
premium between official and parallel markets. The official and parallel market rates 
have converged in a number of countries, for example, in Egypt in 2004 and Nigeria 
in 2007. In Tunisia, the authonttes introduced an Inter-Bank Market for foreign ex-
change WIth the Central bank playing a large role in the transactton, but gradually the 
apex bank WIthdrew allowing a larger role for forces of demand and supply. Forward 
and swap markets were created, but up to now, the turn over m these markets is small 
relative to the spot market. Egyptian authonttes had unified the multiple exchange 
rate systems that existed and adopted a smgle and more flexIble regime. DomestIC 
debt markets have been mcreasing m the continent. The concept of domestic markets 
comes out offinancmg government budget deficits. 
Domestic or foreign borrowing or alternatively by drawing down the govern-
ment assets are the conventional means of financing government budget defiCItS. 
Choosing domestic or foreIgn financing depends on their relative costs (mterest), 
maturity penod, and risks (Christensen, 2005). Domestic debt market, which started 
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in the 1980s, has increased in importance from 11 % ofGDP in the 1980s to 15% in 
the 1990s. Markets for government securities vary in sIZe. Countries Wee Ethiopia, 
Kenya, MauritIus, NIgeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe rely 
heaVIly on domestic debt whereas Angola, Botswana, DmocratIc Republic of Congo, 
Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Pnncipe have eIther not utilIZed domestic debt or 
have just developed government secunty markets. GambIa, Ghana, Namibia and 
Seychelles are in between. Foreign participatIon in Afncan debt markets is lImited 
probably due to high country risk, underdeveloped trading facilities, and capital re-
strictJ.ons. Short-term instruments are the most dominant (3-months) winch could be 
attributed to the aforementIoned reason. The main problem of the domestic market 
development is the crowding effects of private sector crecht as reported by Chns-
tensen (2005). 
In spIte of Its importance to economic growth and development, capital mo-
bility could be problematic to developmg and emerging countries. Edwards and 
Rigobon (2005) stress that high capital mobility can be a source of macroeconomic 
instabIlIty and its reversal flow or sudden stop can be dIsruptIve. Indonesia was cited 
an example of a country whose opening up of her capItal account resulted in some 
degree of success in terms of growth and investlnent. The crechbllIty of the author-
ity was not dented as slight negatIve changes are treated WIth all senousness. The 
country was by this measure able to maintain capital flows and stabilize the econ-
omy under a band target exchange rate (Fox, 1997) However, the financial CriSIS 
that engulfed the country m August, 1997 raIses many questions about the validity 
of this argument. It is not surprismg that many authors even attributed major finan-
cial cnses of the emerging economies to this. TIns view seems to be even shared by 
the IMF, who recently supported the gradual openmg of capItal account in develop-
ing and emerging countries. Economists argue that short term restnctions on caPItal 
mobility would address the problem and in particular FDI Chile's experience in the 
1990s was normally CIted as a successful example. However, one may be tempted to 
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ask a questton that the restnctions should be on inflow or outflow of capital mobility. 
The Chilean case cited is on inflow, winch attracts only long-term capital investtnent 
(Edwards and Rigobon, 2005). 
Investigations into the main causes of African disastrous econonuc failure have 
been earned out by vanous authors. Several authors, including Easterly and Levme 
(1997), Fisher (1993) and a number of IMF reports identified an inappropriate ex-
change rate system as a major contributor. 
1.4 The Contribution ofthe Thesis 
The rum of this thesis is to proVIde an empirical investigation of exchange rate poli-
cies in Afuca since the beginning of the 1980s. Five mam Issues are investigated: 
1. Followmg the work of Frankel et al (2001), the appropnateness of the IMF 
classification of exchange rate regimes is investigated for the African countries. 
Operating a transparent regime has become more important with increasing 
mtegratlOn of the world economies. Usmg an inaccurate regIme in empirical 
analysis may lead to an erroneous conclUSIOn. In addition to an econometnc 
model, the study uses fonnal statistical tests of Bai and Perron (2003) and 
Harvey, Leybourne and Taylor (2006) to IdentifY regime changes in these 
countries. 
2 The second theme IS the relattonship between exchange rates and reserve 
changes, and whether use of the latter as a proxy for intervention, for the 
stab!llty of the exchange rates, is appropnate; exchange rate volatility was a 
common feature of the early floating period. This necessitated for mterventions 
by monetary authonttes to dampen the volatthty. Sourcing intervention data for 
empinca1 work has been problematic. It IS qUIte recently that central banks of 
developed countnes have started releasing therr interventIOn data. The problem 
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is more acute in developing countries. Therefore, authors resort to usmg reserve 
variations as a proxy for interventions. TIus practice is, however, criticised on 
the account that reserve variatIOns may be as the results of other transactions, 
wluch could not be classified as intervention activities. The thesis, using a 
threshold cointegration model, mvestigates exIstence of a long-run dynamism 
between the exchange rates and reserve changes. The ann here is to see if 
movements in foreign reserves can be taken as an indication of foreign exchange 
rate intervention in developing countries, particularly m Afuca The study also 
provides a clue on the pattern of exchange rate intervennons in these countries. 
3. The long-run determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rates of the 
principal African countries; idennfying detenninants of a country's real 
exchange rate is IIDportant for an mfonned policy decISIon. It IS more pertinent 
with African countries where inappropriate exchange rate pohcies have been 
Identlfied as a major contnbutor to the continent's economic crises. A vector 
autoregressIOn, VECM, analYSIS, based on a trade relation model of exchange 
rate determination, was used. 
4. Sources of variations m real exchange rates; the theoretical debate on tlus 
sources of real exchange rate flUctuatIOns lead to a two polarised groups of 
those of the equilibrium and the disequilibrium Real exchange rate movements 
have been explained by theones that focus on supply or demand factors, 
such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) or With ouly supply Side hmgmg on 
Harrods-Balassa-Samuelson hypotheSIS ofHarrod (1933), Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964). Dornbusch (1976) used Keynesian aggregate model to 
consider IIDpacts of fiscal shocks on real exchange rates, wlule Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1976) analysed this effect within an inter-temporal model of the open 
economy The empincal literature has also reported different results on sources 
real exchange rate fluctuanons for several countnes Monvated by a stochasnc 
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open economy macroeconomic model, a tri-variate structural VAR is used in 
identlfYmg the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations of a sample of African 
countries 
5. The effects of the terms of trade and exchange rate-pass through; it is argued 
that nominal exchange rate regime can have mitigating effects on the terms 
of trade shocks expenenced by a country. From 1950s when argument in 
favour offleXlble exchange rates started, a number of theories were developed 
supportIng the VIew that exchange rate policy can be an important econOmIC 
tool. EconOmIsts that had explored the choice of exchange rate regime under 
price rigidity setting argue that short run responses to real shocks would differ 
across exchange rate regunes. The argument is that when economies experience 
real shocks, countnes WIth flexible exchange rates regime can change relauve 
prices more quickly and smoother adjusnnent in terms of quantities (Broda, 
2004). Chapter seven explores how African countnes respond to terms of 
trade shocks under dIfferent exchange rate regunes. The role of nommaI 
exchange rates in adJusnnent process IS intrinsIcally assumed that exchange rate 
pass-through IS complete. Therefore, the second part of the chapter extunines 
presence of exchange rate pass-through. Analysis of how dIfferent exchange 
rate regimes help countnes to cope WIth terms of trade shocks is undertaken 
Wlthm a structural V AR framework. The analYSIS of exchange rate pass-through 
m these countries has been undertaken within a VAR framework. 
The countries covered in this sl!!dy vary from chapter to chapter, effectively 
dIctated by avaIlabIlity of data. Table 1.2 gives summary of countnes covered and the 
variables used in five prmcipal empmcal chapters. Chapter 4 has the least number; 
eight countries, whereas Chapter 7 has the highest, twenty two countries. 
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Table 1.2:Empirical Work Undertaken, the Variables and the Countries Covered 
Chapter TopIC Vanables Countnes Covered 
A1gena, Botswana, 
Chapter 3 Exchange rate regunes Nommal exchange rates 
CFA Zones!, Egyp~ Ghana, 
IdentIfications and andGDP 
Kenya, Morocco, NIgena 
classmcahons 
South Afnca, Tanzarua, 
de Jure V, de facto 
Turnsl8 and Uganda 
Exchange rates and Nommal exchange Algena, Botswana, Ghana 
Chapter 4 
mtemanonal reserve rates and Kenya, Morocco, Nigena, 
changes mtemabonal reserves South Afnca and Uganda 
Real effective exchange A1gena Botswana, E~ 
ChapterS Long-run detemnnants 
rates. reaImterest Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, 
ofreal exchange rates 
dIfferentials, foreign 8ld Nigena,South Afnca, 
real relatIVe GDp, ratIo Tanzama, TUDlsla 
Offoreign debts to GDP and Uganda 
Sources of real 
Chapter 6 Real exchange rates, Algena, Botswana, Egypt, 
exchange rate 
real relative GDP Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, 
fluctuattons Empmcal 
andCPI Nigena, South, Afnca, 
evtdence from 
and TanzanIa 
African countrIes 
In the first pari- Algena, Botswana, Bemn 
Chapter 7 Terms of trade and 
Real exchange Rates, Cameroon, Central Afnca, 
econonuc perfonnance 
CPI, real GDP, Term' Egyp~ EtluOPia, Gabon, 
under dIfferent regunes 
ofTrnde Ghana, Kenya, Libya, 
and the role of 
In the second part: MalaWI, Mauntama, 
exchange rate 
Nommal exchange MaunhUS, Morocco, 
pass-through 
rates, GDP, Od pnces, Nigena, Senegal, SI Afnca, 
Import pnces, CPI, Tanzama, Turusla, Uganda 
and Interest rates andZambta 
I CFA zones of Central and West Afhcan countnes, whtch 15 detaIled m Table 3 Ib 
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Chapter 2 
A Policy Review of the Exchange Rates and 
Regimes in Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
Exchange rate polIcies have undergone many changes over the last three decades in 
both developed and developing countries. Smce the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system many countnes have abandoned fixed regimes for more flexIble ones. Theo-
retical discussions on the importance of the exchange rate in a countIy's macroeco-
nomic adjustment came into the literature in the 1950s and the I 960s With the work 
ofFnedman (1953), Mundell (1962), Flemmg (1963) and McKmnon (1963). These 
authors Illustrate the role of different exchange rate regimes in addressing vanous 
shocks that an economy would face. TIris chapter provides a policy review of ex-
change rates and regimes in developmg countries and AfrIca in partIcular. The rest 
of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 looks at the evolution of exchange 
rate regimes in Africa. Section 2.3 is on exchange rate regimes and macroeconOmIC 
policy. Exchange rate regimes classification and verification is treated in Section 
24. SectIon 2.5 deals With determInants of exchange rates and regunes in develop-
ing countries and Section 2 6 is on real exchange rate target and exchange rate as a 
nomInal anchor. Section 2. 7 looks at the concept and measurement of real exchange 
rate misaltgnment, as well as, devaluation controversies. 
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2.2 Evolution of Excbange Rate Regimes in Africa 
Exchange rate regunes m Afnca evolved from the monetary arrangements that started 
around 1900s untt! the 1960s. The continent was chVIded effecuvely into the sterling 
and the franc zones (Abdel-Salam, 1970). In both areas of the connnent, currency 
boards were used. Sterling had three currency boards that mc1uded West Afncan 
Currency Board for the West African countrIes.' The Southern Rhodesia and the 
East African Currency Boards catered for the territories in Southern Afnca and East 
Africa, respectively.'6 The Boards issued quantity of money that was equivalent to 
the amount of Pound Sterling held by them. The Southern African Anglophones 
were tied to the Republic of South Africa, which was founded in 1910 (Masson 
and Pattillo, 2004). Apart from its land mass, South African economy has been the 
bIggest in the contment and had its currency, known then as South African Pound as 
far back as 1910. With the establishment of South African Reserve Bank in 1921, 
the currency was replaced with the Rand, which was also used as the currency of 
Botswana, (Bechuanaland), Lesotho (Basutoland), Swaziland, and Namibia (South 
West Africa). 
There was similar arrangement in the franc area but probably, less decentral-
ized like that of the sterling area. This could be due to geographical contmulty of 
the franc zones of West and central Africa. The currency, CFA was pegged to the 
French franc. However, by late 1950s to early 1960s, the sterling and the franc ar-
eas adopted chfferent approaches. The fonner adopted a more liberal approach by 
allowing each country to accept and introduce an exchange rate arrangement that 
the country believed best suited its econOIlliC sihlation. The franc area, on the other 
4 NIgena, Ghana (Gold Coast), SIerra Loon and Southern Cameroon, known then as Bnttsh Cameroon 
5 The Southern Afrtcan countrIes included MalaWI (Nyasaland), Zimbabwe (Southern RhodesIa) 
and ZambIa (Northern RhodesIa) 
6 The East Afrtcan countries mcluded Kenya, Tanzarua and Uganda 
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hand, maintamed the old regime but in a currency union fashion. Thts arrangement 
SurvIVed until today, as the CFA zones of West and Central Afnca. 
In contrast, the countries that made up the sterling area had given up the cur-
rency boards and established their own central banks. Subsequently, national curren-
cies were ISSUed. For instance, the Ghanaian Pound and the Nigerian Pound were 
later renamed Cedi and Naira in 1957 and 1959 respectively. The situation IS sinnlar 
in all the Anglophone African countries. 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in early 1970s, African 
Countries had lIDtlally continued pegging their exchange rate agamst the global cur-
rencies'. The choice was mostly influenced by histoncal rather than economic grounds. 
However, by the late 1970s, many have slufted away from the single peg to the bas-
ket peg, which constituted mainly the currencIes of therr tradmg partuers, and to 
the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) By mid-1980s, the trend changed towards 
fleXIble regimes. The change of polIcy was necessitated by economic turns down that 
have started takIng crises dimension m the contment. Consequently, some countries 
adopted crawling peg and crawling basket, in which their currencies were adjusted 
periodically based on 'pre-set criteria' that included changes in relative inflation. 
Many of these countries experienced a number of shocks to their economies lIke 
the rise m mtemational interest rates, a slump in econOmIC growth of the developed 
econOmIes and debt cnses. A serous macroeconomic adjustment of the economies 
became apparent. Consequently, many of them adopted the IMF-adjustment pro-
gramInes which had either devaluatIOn or introduction of a more fleXIble regime as 
part of the schemes. As at the end of 2005, apart from the member countries of the 
CFA zones and a few others like Botswana and Morocco that have Basket pegging, 
the countries adopted a more flexible regime. 
Algeria had basket peg regime from 1974 untIl 1994 when It moved to floating 
regime. Senes of devaluations were carried out which included those of July 1990, 
7 US dollar, Bntlsh Pound sterbng and French franc 
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September 1991 and March 1994. The current floating regime was introduced m Oc-
tober, 1994 (IMF, 2000). Botswana, which had particIpated m the Rand Monetary 
Union, introduced its currency, the Pula in 1976 and was pegged to the US dollar. 
Pula was later pegged to a basket which COnsIsts of the SDR currencies and South 
African Rand, m 1980. From 1980 to 1994, the pula was adjusted about nine times 
that included five devaluations, and the other three were revaluatlOns and technical 
adjustment. Egyptian pound pulled out of the sterlmg area in 1947 but remained 
linked to the British Pound unti11950. From then onwards, the Egyptian pound was 
Imked to the US Dollar. The currency was on crawling peg before It was pegged to 
the US dollar. In 2003, managed floating regime was adopted. Ghanaian pound re-
placed the West African pound in 1958. The Ghanatan cedi was introduced in 1965 
and the currency was pegged to the US dollar in 1971 not the Bntlsh pound to which 
the former currency, Ghanaian pound was linked to. The Cedi was devalued mter-
1llittentiy agamst the US dollar in order to reflect its real exchange rate value. PPP 
was used as a guide to achieve and maintain the countIy's competitiveness in its ex-
ports. A floating regime was adopted in 1986 along WIth macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes. Kenya was using the East Afrtcan slulling along side Tanzania and 
Uganda in the East African Currency Vmon unti11966 when the union was aban-
doned. Each countIy set up its central bank and subsequently Issued their currencies. 
Kenyan Shilling was pegged to the SDR during which several adjustments were un-
dertaken (1977-1993) and managed floating was finally adopted m 1993. Moroccan 
franc was operational from 1944 up to 1959 when Moroccan Drrham replaced it. The 
Dirham was first pegged to French franc but later to basket peg. NIgerian Pound was 
issued to replace West Afrtcan pound m 1959. Nairn, the current currency came mto 
effect in 1973 and was linked to the VS dollar. The Narra was pegged to a basket 
between 1976 and 986. Floating regime was adopted for the period between 1987 
-1993. A fixed regune was remtroduced in 1994, when the Narra was pegged to 
the US dollar. However, floating regime was reintroduced since 1999 and the cur-
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rency depreciated by 291 % at the begmrung of the float. South AfrIca, Tanzama 
and Uganda are reported as independent floaters by the IMF. South Africa had mi· 
tially pegged its currency, the Rand to the US dollar but adopted floatmg regnne m 
1979. Tanzaman shilling was issued in 1966 following the demise of the East African 
Monetary Union in which the currency was East AfrIcan shillmgs. The currency was 
pegged to the Bntish Pound until 1971 when it was pegged to the US dollar. Se-
ries of devaluations were carried out, especially in the 1980s until floating regime 
was finally adopted in 1985. Tunisian Dinar replaced the franc as a result of Tunisia 
pullmg out of the franc area. The currency was pegged to the French franc, and Euro 
since 1999. Uganda was also on peg regin1e when the Shillmg was repeatedly de-
valued until 1993 when she moved to floating regime Ugandan Shilling was pegged 
to the basket until 1980s when floating reglffie was mtroduced. The CFA zones of 
West and central Africa have traditIOnally pegged therr currencies to the French franc 
and since 1999 to the Euro. There are periodic reva1uatlOns but a major devaluation 
was carned out in January 1994 during which the CFA franc was devalued by 100%. 
Central Bank of West AfrIca and Bank of Central Africa were created in 1962 for the 
West and Central African CF A zones, respectively. 
2.3 Exchange Rate Regimes and Macroeconomic Policy 
Developmg countries continued to maintain fixed regime even after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system. The peg was either to a smgle currency or to a basket 
of currencies. The peg regin1e was periodically adjusted in some cases or it was 
fixed for long periods of time. This official parity has been maintained in collabo-
ration with other exchange controls. In 1976, more than 60% of all developing IMF 
member-countries operated peg regin1e. Gradually, these countnes srufted to flexible 
regin1e that by 1997, about 57% of these countnes were classified either managed or 
free floaters. However, many countnes in tffis group mtervened profoundly in their 
27 
currency markets to manage their exchange rates Operating mdependent floating in 
developing countries was largely inhibIted by hmited financial development and the 
large role plays by the publtc sector as a supplier of foreign exchange. 
Change of exchange rate poltcy is influenced by sources of instability faced 
by these countries. For example, shifting from single to basket peg is to dampen the 
effects of extema1 exchange rate instability while swItching to crawlmg from pegging 
is to handle a domestic source of instability. Developing countries were faced WIth 
a dIlemma m usmg exchange rate as a policy instrument For instance, nominal 
depreciation can improve the trade balance and the balance of payments, but it may 
cause rise m price level, wluch may cause inflation and as a result erode the external 
competItiveness. Fixed exchange rate regime on the other hand, may stabilize prices 
in the presence of a large current account defiCIt. However, it may not be viable if 
there is a shortage of foreign exchange reserves or an extema1 borrowing constraint. 
Generally these diSCUSSIOns are narrowed down to using exchange rate as an anchor 
or the policy should aim at achieving the 'desired real' exchange rate level. 
Macroeconomic adjustments become necessary when a country faces imbal-
ances between ItS intema1 (demand) and extema1 (supply) sectors that are reflected 
as deficits ID Balance of Payments (BOP), domestic inflation and sluggish economic 
growth. Sources of the imbalances could be domestically or externa1ly. Intema1 
causes could be from policies that raise demand and reduces growth ID productIve 
capability. The extema1 factors that can change the long-run equilibrium include ex-
ogenous foreign shocks, like worsening terms of trade, rise in foreign real mterest 
rates or slowdown ID world economic growth. Domestic supply shocks can also dIs-
tort the equilibrium. These can cause extema1 dIseqUllIbnum thereby dIstortmg the 
real exchange rate eqwhbrium. 
The role of exchange rate in macroeconomic polIcy has received prominence 
in the poltcy dIscussIOns for over the last fifty years. FriedJnan (1953) was among 
the early economists who advocated and undertook exposition of the ablltty of ex-
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change rate to act as an adjustment mecharusm in the face of internal and external 
Imbalances. Theories of exchange rate regune could be broadly grouped into four; 
the early hterature discusses the role of exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism 
Thls IS the crux of the theory of optimum currency area which was greatly influenced 
by the works of Mundell (1963), Fleming (1962) and McKinnon (1963). Literature 
in this area analyzes the ability of fixed or flexible exchange rate regime m adopt-
ing and adjusting to different economic conditions and shocks, both domestic and 
foreign. An area that is conducive to establish common currency area and monetary 
union also feature under this category. Issues such as benefits of flexible exchange 
rate in addressing disequilibrium and the costs and benefits of giving up the regime 
were also explored. The second class are those that evolved out in an effort to ad-
dress the chromc inflatlons expenenced m a number of emergmg and developmg 
economies. How an exchange rate regime could be adopted to address the mflation 
was the main diSCUSSIOn of the theory. The role and ability of exchange rate as a nom-
inal anchor was debated. The third class compnses those who concentrate on how 
a country can adopt and maintain a competitlve and favourable exchange rate. The 
IMF exchange rate-based stabilization programmes fit in here. The target of this ap-
proach is to have an exchange rate that is very close to supposedly real exchange rate 
equilibnum so that sustamed growth could be achieved and roamtained. The fourth 
group bad evolved since the advent of the financial cnses in some countnes m ASia, 
Latin America and Europe. The strand of the hterature m this area explains the diffi-
culty of maintaming intermediate exchange rate regime in the period of high capital 
mobility. The theory of corner solution or bipolar, that is, countries have ouly two 
options; either to fix or float therr currencies was the roam focus of this group. 
The Exchange rate as an adjustment mecharusm mfluences the demand for and 
supply of exports and imports and the demand for and supply of foreign currency 
thereby addressmg a country's mtemal and external disequilibria. There is no con-
sensus, either theoretically or empmcally over the effects of different exchange rate 
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regimes on macroeconomic performance in emerging and developmg countnes. Re-
lationships between over-valuation of currencies and currency cnses, efficacies of 
nominal devaluations m inducing real devaluations, relevance of MarshaIl-Lemer 
condItIon m some models particularly those that are based on inter-temporal analy-
sis and the effects of devaluations on those economies are some of the contentious 
areas m the field. As from the begmning of the 1980s, developing countries have 
started to adopt exchange rate flextbilIty as part of therr macroeconomic adJustlnent 
programmes. The main reasons for that differ from country to country and region to 
regIon. However, the combmed effects of the international economic environments 
that include the 1970s oil shocks and the 1980s debt crises are believed to be among 
the factors that prompted the developmg and emergIng countnes to adopt the more 
fleXIble regime. This was based on the belief that a flextble exchange rate is superior 
m addressing external and internal unbalances through the sWItching effects. The 
Second view explains !bat this shift sterns from the argIJrnent !bat there is exclusive 
mutuality between capital mobility and the fixed exchange rate. Thirdly, the politi-
cal dIfficultIes m maintaining fixed exchange rate regime by authonties. By adoptIng 
more flexible exchange rate, a country reduces the politIcal risks associated WIth de-
valuations since the exchange rate regimes is 'de-politicized' (Edwards, 1999). 
Azam (1997) investigates macroeconomic adjustlnent introduced in the CFA 
zones in the 1980s and the 1990s. He finds that devaluations, as part of the pro-
gramme, seem to be effective in some of the member-countries as economic growth 
has picked up m those countries, bnnging about some degree of macroeconomic sta-
bility. De-Grauwe and Schnable (2004) explain that the role of exchange rate to 
economic growth has not been conclusive in both theoretical and empirical literature. 
W1nle econOmiC theory does not provide precIse relatIonsmp between exchange rate 
stability and prospects for economic growth, the empirical literatllre proVIdes a mixed 
result. Mundell (1995), Bailliu, Lifrance and Perrault (2003) and Ghosh, GuIde and 
Wolf (1997) find that stability m exchange rates plays a sigIUficant role in econoffilc 
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growth while Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2000) find that countnes that adopted more 
flexible exchange rate regimes tend to grow faster. However, Calvo and Misbkin 
(2003) contend that there is no exchange rate regime that can insulate an economy 
from macroeconomic instabilities. An economy can frur better or worse under a given 
regime dependmg on its mstltutions and structural characteristics. They also reiter-
ate the view expressed by Frankel (1999) that there IS no smgle exchange regime that 
is suitable for all countries, but rather, regime choice should be based on a particular 
country's economic characteristics, institutions and political culture. 
2.4 Exchange Rate Regimes Classification and 
Verification 
Exchange rate regimes of all countnes are reported by the IMF 'Annual Report on 
Exchange Rate Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions', published annually by the 
fund. The publicatIOns have evolved over the years smce 1950 when the reports were 
introduced. Those that covered 1950-1982 had reported only two regimes; peg and 
floating, but the regimes were extended to four m reports that covered the penod of 
1983-1998. These are pegs, lirmted flexIbility, managed and free floatmg. The fund 
had identified and reported nme regunes since 1999. The nine exchange regimes 
can be grouped into three broad categories; FIXed, intermediate and Floating. Ta-
ble 2.1 reports these regunes. However, doubts were cast on the credlblhty of these 
pronounced regimes. This led to a number of researches in the area and the con-
cept of de jure and de facto classifications IS the product of that effort. De Grauwe 
and Schnable (2004) explam that various attempts have been made ID classifYing ex-
change rate regimes as de jure (announced by the governments) or de facto (what the 
actual system is). Many authors are of the opimon that countries do not follow what 
they say and this made de facto classlficatlon more appeahng to researchers. Meth-
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ods use to venfy de facto exchange rate regimes employed different indicators that 
include exchange rate volatJ.iity, changes in foreign reserves and interest rates. 
Early works on the impact of exchange rate regunes on these variables were 
based on the officially announced, de Jure regunes and most of theIr findmgs on im-
pact of dtfferent alternative exchange rate regimes on macroeconomic variables were 
inconclusive. Many authors claim this could be due to the fact that such studies were 
based on de jure classification which, in many cases dtffer from de facto regime in 
many countnes. For example, Levy-Yeyati et al (2005) argue that a number of coun-
tries that report flexible exchange rate regime, intervene so much in foreign exchange 
market that, ID reaitty, will not look dIfferent from those who pegged their currencies. 
Fischer (2001) explains that announced exchange rate regune by monetary authori-
ties could be inaccurate for a number of countries. Even countries, which may look 
like playing according to the rules of the announced regunes, are likely to temper 
with It durmg dIfficult times. 
Table 2.1: Currency ArrangementslExchange Rate Regimes 
SINo Three Groupings Nine Groupings 
a) Currency Union 
1. Fixed 
b) Currency Board 
c) Truly Fixed 
d) Adjustable Pegs 
a) CrawJmg Pegs 
2. Intermediate b) Basket Pegs 
c) Target Zones 
3. Floats 
a) Managed Floats 
b) Free Floats 
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Previous work on venfication of de Jure exchange rate regimes includes Frankel 
et al (2001), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005) and Frommel and Schobert (2006). These works use ruff er-
ent methodologies but their find!ngs are similar in supporting the view that countries 
do not follow the announced regimes. Calvo and Remhart (2002) analyzed exchange 
rates behavior of both developed and developing countries by statistical analysis of 
exchange rate and foreign reserve volatilities and interest rates variability. Their find-
ings suggest that a number of countnes, wluch report floating exchange rate regune 
were not, m realIty, floatmg as they mtervene either in the exchange rate market or 
via interest rate to stabilize the exchange rate. They conclude that there IS generally 
'fear offloating'. The 'fear of floating', according to the study was not limited to the 
developing countries but also with some of the developed countries. The study in-
cludes five Afncan countnes that reported floating exchange rate regunes which were 
found not floating'. 
Frankel et al (2001) developed an econometric model that Identifies rufferent 
exchange rate regimes that mclude s11Ilple and basket pegs and free and managed 
floating regunes. Unlike other methods that broadly IdentIfy and claSSify exchange 
rate regunes into fixed or floating, this approach can identify and verify most of 
the exchange rate arrangements reported by the IMF. Another advantage of this ap-
proach is that it had not tied exchange rate reg11Ile IdentIficatIon to foreign reserve 
volatility Therr results indicate that de Jure may differ from de facto. Frommel and 
Schobert (2006) applied the Frankel et al (2001) and Levy-YeyatI et al (2005) mod-
els to eastern European countries and therr results have also confirmed the assertIOn 
that countnes do not play accord!ng to the rules of the announced regimes. Therr 
results mrucate that Central and Eastern European countnes of Slovenia, Romania, 
Czech and Slovak were not followmg the announced regime for the period studied. 
8 The countnes are Egypt, Kenya, Nlgena, South Afnca and Uganda 
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But in contrast, Poland and Hungry were confirmed to be operating regimes that are 
consistent with de Jure regimes. 
In the same vein, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) utilize 'natural classification' 
model and found that '45 % of the officially announced peg' were in reality not 
pegged and should have been classified as linnted flexibility or managed floating. 
This, therefore, indicates the existence of both 'fear offloating' and 'fear of pegging' . 
Levy-Yeyati et al (2005) based their analysis on behavIOur of three classifying 
variables; changes in nominal exchange rates, volatility of the exchanges and volatIl-
ity of international reserves. The underpunring assumptton is that fixed exchange 
rate IS asSOCiated With Ingh volattlity of mternationaI reserve. This IS explamed by 
monetary authority's intervention in the foreigo exchange market to smoothen out 
fluctuations due to changes in demand and supply of the foreigo exchange. Floating 
regimes are expected to be associated With Ingh volatility in nominal exchange rates 
and less volatIlity m fore!go reserve. The research uses cluster analysis in identifying 
exchange rate regime as flexible, dirty floattng, crawlmg peg, fixed and inconclusive. 
Regimes that exhibit high exchange rate volatility and volatility of exchange rate 
changes and low volattlity of forelgo reserve are classified as flexible. Dirty floaters 
are those that exhibit high volatility in all the vanables wlnle crawlmg peggers are 
characterized by high exchange rate volatility and fomgo reserve but low volatility 
exchange rate changes; fixed exchange regime rate has low exchange rate volatility 
and volatility in exchange rate changes With high forelgo reserve volatility. An in-
conclusive case is where low volatility IS recorded in all the three variables. Testing 
this model =pincaIly, Levy-Yeyatt et al (2005) find that countries do not only suf-
fer from fear of floating but also identified 'fear of peggmg' as indicated by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004). 
Factors identified to be responsible for fear offloating, particularly in the crises 
ndden countries of Asia was liabIlity of dollarization, output cost associated With 
fluctuations of exchange rates, melastic supply of funds at ttmes of crises, probl= 
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about lack of credibility and loss of access to international capital markets. Liabil-
Ity of dollarizatlOn refers to a situanon where countries have large foreign-dommated 
obligations in therr balance sheet. Such countries cannot afford to devalue their cur-
rencies sharply as domg so would make their loan hability to nse relanve to domestic 
currencies, winch WIll result in decrease m investlnent and economic activities that 
may lead to financial crises (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). 
2.5 Determinants of Exchange Rates and Regimes in 
Developing Countries 
Modem theories of exchange rate detenninanon are those that succeeded the elasnc-
ity models that are generaIIy referred to in the literatl!re as the modem asset theories 
that are based on the existence of capItal mobihty. These theories are less relevant 
to developing countries, particularly those in Africa, as capital mobulty is relatively 
Iow. Early work on exchange rate det=non m developing countnes were based 
on PPP or Its variant. Inadequacies of the PPP brought about crinclsms of this ap-
proach. In addressing issues raised, economists resort to developing models of ex-
change rate determination in which a number of macroeconoffilc variables are in-
corporated. The main sigmficant vanable identified for developmg countries include 
terms of trade, measures of openness, size of the fiscal balance, productivity and in-
terest rate dIfferentials relanve to their tradmg partners. MacDonaId and Rlccl (2004) 
est=ting determmants of South African real exchange rates, found that in addItIOn 
to above, commodity price were the main explanatory variables. Sinillar results were 
found by Dnne and Rault (2003), who used panel data to investigate long-run de-
termmants of exchange rates m developmg countnes of Afuca, Latin America and 
Asia. Other srudies that find support for these variable in developing countries in-
clude Aron, Elbadawi and Kahn (I997), Candelon, Kool and Veen (2007), Frankel 
(2007), Gelband and Nagayasu (1999) and PiragIC and Jameson (2005). 
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Related here is literature on sources of macroeconomic fluctuations Hoflinais-
ter, Roldos and Wicham (1998) investIgate sources of macroeconomic fluctuations 
in sub-Saharan Afnca by explonng the relatIve Importance of internal and external 
shocks. They find that domestIc shocks explam output fluctuations more than exter-
nal shocks. ThIs IS more so in the non-CFA countnes than ID CFA countries. One may 
be tempted to thmk that this is so, probably because the countries are under fixed ex-
change rate regime, but it could be due to the characteristics of the econOmIes. Terms 
of trade and world interest shock have more impacts ID CFA countries than in non-
CFA countries. Real exchange rate movements are driven more by external factors 
in the CFA countnes than in non-CFA countries. 
The chOIce of exchange rate regime is theoretically, narrowed down to eIther 
fixed or flexible exchange rate regime. However, this seems to be more complex 
in practice Early theories of exchange rate regime focused on SItuation ID which 
being a member of a currency union was optimum in relation to economic charac-
teristics. The charactenstics are openness, labour mobility and the size of the econ-
omy. (Mundell, 1963; Fleming, 1962; McKinnon, 1962). The Mundell-Flemmg 
model suggests that the choice of the exchange rate regime should also be based on 
the nature of the shock and degree of mobility of capital (Flood, 1972; Frankel and 
Aizenman, 1983) An optima! currency area IS denoted as a region that IS optImal to 
establish a single currency. The area should be characterized by degree of openness, 
rugh labor mobihty and abihty to make fiscal transfers that is optimal to establish a 
sIDgIe currency and a single monetary pohcy. The ments of fixed exchange rate be-
come larger with the level of degree of economic integration thereby reducing the 
merits offloatmg exchange rate regimes. 
There are broadly two arguments in respect of fixed exchange rate. One in its 
favour which stems from the belief that it is capable of maintaining stable economy 
with low mfiatlOn that would bring about economic growth. The second approach 
emphasIZes the dIfficulty of maintaming fixed exchange regime, particularly in an 
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economic environment that is integrated with international capital markets. Gener-
ally, the argument for fixed exchange rates IS based on fostermg a stable macroeco-
nOInlC envrronment by mamtaining low inflation, stable pnces and wages. Stable 
prices proVlde entrepreneurs WIth a scenano for long horizon planning and invest-
ments that would enhance productivity and stable growth path. Mussa et al (2000) 
summarize economic conilltlons that would favour some degree of fixity in a coun-
try's exchange rates. These include low integration WIth the global caPItal markets; 
share of the country's trade with another country to whose currency IS considered to 
be high; the two countries face similar economic shocks; the readtness of the peg-
ging country to forego its monetary independence in exchange for pegged country's 
monetary credibility and the pegging economy's finanCIal system rely heavily on the 
pegged currency. Others are attractiveness of exchange rate stabilization due to high 
inflation; there is fiscal policy flexibility and suStamabllIty and flexIbility of labour 
markets, as well as, possession of high foreIgn reserves. 
Fixed exchange rates are canvassed for rectlfication of noInlnai shocks like 
those to the demand for money. The explanatIon IS that noInlnai shocks cause infla-
tIon and that may have effects on the floatmg exchange rate m terms of depreciation 
and transform nominal shock into real one. Fluctuations of exchange in demand for 
and supply of money would be accommodated WIth mmnnum volatIlity by adopting 
fixed exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange rate regimes reduce transaction costs, ex-
change rate nsks due to uncertainty that would hinder trade and investlnent. Another 
advantage of the fixed exchange rate is that it gives a nominal anchor for monetary 
policy whereas, the floatlng exchange rate Yields monetary mdependence policy to 
the country. 
A number of authors have tried to explain drlIiculty m mamtammg pegged ex-
change regime. Two approaches can be Identified on the subject Jeanne (1994) calls 
them 'speculative attack' models and 'cost-benefit' models. The former explains that 
the demise of a regime depends upon depletIOn of foreign reserves that the monetary 
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authonties have been using in maintaining the pegged regune. This is the pattern 
that was modeled by Krugman (1979) and Its extensIOns. The latter, on the other 
hand, argues that the government can freely choose to adjust the exchange rate m 
situation where it deemed that benefits of such pohcy offset the costs, like unemploy-
ment. However, as argued by Chang and Velasco (2000) and Velasco (2000) none 
is considered entrrely adequate to explam recent collapses of the mtermediate ex-
change regimes cited above. In spite of ddficu1ty m mamtainmg the regime, there are 
still arguments that favour adoption of intermediate exchange rate regime for devel-
oping countries due to therr underdeveloped capital markets as well as small foreign 
exchange markets, which may limit accelerated capital outflows relatively. 
However, countnes that choose fixed exchange rate regime, should have a 
sound financial system that whose superv!SlOn and regulatlons are very strong. Ab-
sence of such envrronment would make the economy vulnerable to financial crises 
With an easy conversion of the currency crises into bankmg crises. Addltionally, 
the country should have enough reserves that can be used to address instability that 
can occur in the fOreign exchange market. Frankel et al (2001) observe that, since 
countnes would hke to enJoy capital mobility i.e. desire for financial integration IS 
globally lmportant, the optlon left to countnes is either to surrender exchange rate 
stabthty or monetary independence. They further argue that this does not preclude 
the possibility of sacnficing both or to pursue each of the policies by halfproportlon. 
However, credlbility on the side of the monetary authorities is crucial to forestall 
currency speculatlve acUVltles. 
Currently, however, economists do not seern to favour the argument that ex-
change rate vanabihty bnngs about transacuon cost and consequent dechne m trade 
and investment for two reasons; first, exchange rate risks can now be hedged through 
the forward exchange rate market, and secondly, empirical work have not suggested 
a substantlal negatlve effects on trade and mvestlnent could arise due to exchange 
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rate volatility. lbis IS st1l1 subject of debate, particularly, in the developing countries 
where financial markets are underdeveloped. 
In contrast, the floating regune is canvassed for its ability to allow for macro-
economic adjustment in the face of external and intemal shocks. Further argument 
hinges on the reason that smce mamtainmg fixed or managed float is to be difficult, 
countries should move to more flexibility. Flexible exchange rate would be more ef-
fec!1ve in the face of real shocks that affect productivity and balance of payments 
as a result of shift in demand and supply. Varymg nominal exchange rate proVides 
a swift way of solving the problem and deals With the effects on employment and 
output. The main argument in favour of floating exchange rate regime is monetary 
independence. In the face of external shocks, deva1ua!1on can address the imbalance. 
For mstance If there is a declme in a foreign demand for a country's exports, a mon-
etruy expansion would result into devaluation and thereby improving the country's 
competitiveness. It is also argued in the hterature that terms of trade shocks would 
not have devastatmg effects on an economy that adopts a fleXIble exchange rate. For 
example Edwards and Yeyati (2005) who investigated tlus phenomenon, find that, 
terms of trade shocks were magmfied in countnes that maintain fixed exchange rate 
whereas, the shocks were better absorbed under the flextble exchange rate regime. 
Size of a country matters in the choice of exchange rate regime as a small coun-
try cannot influence global economic activity and it would therefore be a pnce-taker 
while a big economy can exert some mfluence on econonnc activity including deter-
nnnmg pnces of traded goods. A small economy is therefore predicted to fare better 
under the fixed than flexible regime. Further arguments are: a small and undiversl-
fied economy could require some kind of smoothening mechamsm that can even out 
fluctuatIOns m global market prices to cushion the effects on the country's output, in 
general, and exports, m particular. Therefore, fixed exchange rate regune could be 
more appropnate for such economy. 
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Degree of intematJ.onal mtegratJ.on also plays a crucial role. In countnes that 
are fully mcorporated into the financial markets, fixed exchange rates can be frus-
trated by capital mobility. Since the advent of the financial cnses in the 1990s, econo-
trusts have started to reconsider the merits of soft pegging (pegging-hut-adjustable 
exchange rates). The general inchnation is the Vlew that countries should adopt po-
lar or corner solutions That is, to adopt a rigidly fixed or a freely floating exchange 
rate regime. The 1990s saw a phenomenal increase in capital mobility, particularly 
towards emerging and to a lesser extent, developmg countries. The inflows of capital 
investJ.nents into these countries, more especially, in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America ware unprecedented. 
The mtennedlate exchange rate regimes i e in-between the fixed and float-
ing regimes, were prevalent in emerging and developmg countries. This is called by 
different names in the hterature. Such exchange rate arrangement has become vulner-
able because of its attractiveness to speculative attacks (ElChengreen and Hausmann, 
2000). A strand of the literatJ.ire argues that the regime is difficult to maintain partic-
ularly in the present day world characterized by financial integration For instance, 
It was maintained that the emerging countries that have suffered financial crises had 
differed m fundamentals and geographica1locations. The affected countries included 
MexiCO: 1994, Thailand, Republic of Korea and Indonesia: 1997, BraZ!l· 1999, 
Turkey and Argentina in 2001. However, the common featJ.ire in all the countries 
was the precedence of the intennediate exchange rate regune to the occurrence of the 
crises. Almost all the countries affected had expenenced a sudden stop of capital in-
flows and large capital outflows, which resulted in dlscardmg the existing exchange 
rate regunes to a more flexlole one. Another feature that was observed IS that none of 
the emerging countries that had adopted transparently tight exchange rate pegs that 
were affected by the crises, for example, Israel and Clule. This made the hteratJ.ire to 
point an accusing finger to exchange rate regune among the culprits that caused the 
crises (Frankel, 2003). The mam argument in the hteratJ.ire is that the econotrues that 
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have been incorporated into the global financial markets do not seem to have a lllid-
die ground between floating and fixed exchange rate (Tavlas, 2003). These countries 
can only adopt floating or credible fixed regime. However, a doubt was cast by some 
authors, who wondered if exchange rate regime alone can avert such crises. Accord-
ing to them, macroeconomic poliCies in general play an Important role m forestalling 
crises (Wagner, 2000). It was argued that in the South East Asia countries the crises 
were prompted by a sudden stop and a reversal of capital inflows into these countries. 
Arguments for the mtermedtate exchange rate regime stem from the view that 
the arrangement is capable of mamtainmg an economy With Iow inflatIon and sus-
tained growth of output and employment. The former reflects the nominal anchor 
view while the latter originates from the real approach arguments'. The real target 
IS expected to be achieved through periodical adjustments that would maintain ex-
change rate equilibrium and consequently, the economy's competitiveness. However, 
the argument in favour of the intermediate becomes hollowed out when destablhz-
ing role of capital mobility is considered. The theory oftri-le= is cited as reason 
why countries find It difficult to maintam intermediate regimes in a world with high 
capital mobihty. According to the principle of tri-lemma a country must sacnfice 
one of the three desirable objectives; exchange rate stability, financial market mte-
gration and monetary independence. The theory argues that these policies cannot be 
pursued pari passu. In essence, the theory of tn-lemma suggests that a country that 
has exchange rate stability and monetary independence as its obj ectIve, should adopt 
free floating, but some degree of capital restrictions should be imposed. A coun-
try that wants to achteve full finanCial mtegration and monetary mdependence, such 
country should adopt free-floating regime. However, a country that wants to main-
tain finanCial integration With the rest of the world and enjoys exchange rate stability, 
that country should resort to fixed exchange rate regime. To elaborate the principle 
of the tri-lemma, authors argue that the gold standard survived vis-a-vis capital mar-
9 See secnon 2 7 for detail dISCUSSIOn of these poltCles 
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kets because monetary independence was not an object of the monetary authority. 
It, however, disintegrated when monetary mdependence became one of the monetary 
authorities' targets. The Bretton Woods system on the other hand chose pegged ex-
change rate with monetary independence. However, when capital mobility became 
increasingly important, the system collapsed (Frenkel et ai, 2001). Obstfeld and 
Shambaugh (2004) investigated the theory and found some empirical support. 
The tri-Iemma theory debates, seem to be fortified by the recent currency cnses 
m some emergmg economies in the 1990s and 2001-2002. With high caPital mo-
bihty, the only durable regime IS either hard peg (Currency unions, Dollarization 
or currency Boards) or Floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). It is observable that 
all countnes that were affected by the financial crises have in some varymg degree 
practiced fixed or pegged exchange rate regime (FIsher, 2000). The VIew that it is 
only bipolar or corner solution that works m the modem global economy was further 
strengthened by the currency arrangements of the advanced economies that adopted 
the bipolar (floatmg and monetary umon). If countnes were open to international 
caPital flows then they would find maintaining intermediate exchange rate regime 
not feaSible. However, such countries can adopt varying degree of fleXIble exchange 
rate regimes. 
Fisher (2001) attnbutes the dmtintshmg of the soft peg to two reasons; one IS 
the mcreasing private sector mobihty to the emerging markets m the 1990s. Two 
IS that the pohtical econOIDlc dIfficulty of mamtaining the soft pegging which leads 
to crises. What about the role of capital controls? He suggests for further research 
on exchange rate regtme that would be suitable for developing countries that are not 
fully integrated into the global financial system and that they lack developed financial 
mstltutions. Frankel (1999) contends that choice of exchange rate regime depends on 
an indiVidual country's circumstance, which behes the notion that globally countries 
are either floating or fiXIng therr exchange rate. He further suggests that there IS no 
single exchange rate regtme that is best for all countries and, in fact a smgle regune 
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cannot be tbe best for a country at all tunes. The practical tbmg to do is to assess 
which economic environment a country faces at a given time. If a country IS faced 
by external disturbances floating exchange rate would be best SUited at that time. 
In addition to economic charactenstics and size of tbe economy otber determmants 
of tbe exchange rates regIme choice for a country are tbe extent of exchange rates 
misalignment, political costs of devaluation, problems associated witb managing a 
more flexible rate, wscipIinary effects of a nominal exchange rate anchor. 
2.6 Real Exchange Rate Target and a Nominal Anchor 
There are mainly two approaches to tbe choice of exchange regime in countries witb 
high inflation. These are real target approach and nommal anchor approach. The Real 
target approach states that tbe nominal exchange rate is a policy tool and is adjusted 
intermittently or recurrently as required by tbe internal or externallffibalances. For 
example, tbe currency is depreciated when country's current account is in deficIt. The 
assumption here IS that tbe nominal depreciation wiIl bring about real devaluation, 
which wiIl negatively affect imports and positively affect exports. ThIs approach is 
based on tbree premises, tbere is stickmess m wages and tbe pnces of non-tradable 
good, it is expected that tbe real devaluation would have impacts on demand and 
output patterns; tbe economy is vulnerable to real shocks. The real target approach 
was adopted by a number of tbe developmg economies on tbe premise that it aims at 
bnnging tbe nominal exchange to approXImated real exchange rate panty. This would 
enhance tbe countries' competitiveness and improve balance of payment POSItiOns. 
Mexico, Thailand, Korea and Brazil were among tbe countnes that had adopted this 
approach from 1960s tbrough to 19805 and 1990s. In some cases, PPP was used 
as a gUIde for tbe pohcy makers in adjustments of tbe nommal exchange rate. For 
example, Clule practised this between 1985 and 1992 Wltb some degree of success 
(Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh, 1995 and Mishkin and Sclnnidt-Hebbel, 2001) 
43 
However, there IS seemed to be a pohtlca1 difficulty and unwillingness for pol-
icy makers to maintain this regime. Adjustments to reflect the exchange rate real 
target are associated with procrastinations even when the need becomes very appar-
ent. The financial crises affected countries of Asia are Cited as example of difficulty m 
managing this soft peggmg m the face of international financial integration. Specula-
tive activities would heighten the collapse of the regime and finally full-blown finan-
Cial crises expenenced in the 1990s (Frankel et ai, 2001). An additional shortcoming 
of the approach Cited IS ItS potential for introducing macroeconomic instability. lbis 
is because the economic agents would continue to review their expectations, which 
would be reflected in the general economic actiVity (Uribe, 2003). lbis is consistent 
With Dombusch (1982) model in which the model predicts that demand could be held 
constant but InStability is likely to be introduced from the supply side through prices 
and output. Calvo et al (1995) show that devaluations to maintam real exchange rate 
have only temporary effects and therefore, there is a problem of sustaining the policy 
using this method. 
Related to real exchange rate target is the exchange rate-based stabilization 
policy, which many African countries adopted m the 1980s. Dombusch (1997) ex-
plams that exchange rate-based stabilization is characterized by three phases Useful 
phase; when It helps stabilize the economy; the second phase; when the domestiC 
currency appreciates m the face of reluctance from the authority to do something; the 
third phase; when appreciation becomes so apparent that a major devaluation must 
be done. Delays in introducing stabilization poliCies at an early stage that may come 
from a political stalemate brought about by disagreement Within the socioeconomic 
groups of the country concern (Alesina, 1991). If stabilization poliCies are not intro-
duced at the third phase, economic CriSIS becomes inlmlnent. 
The nommal anchor approach suggests that a country's currency should be an-
chored to or pegged credibly to another low inflation country's currency. The prac-
tismg country will be importing low mfiatlOn. For the success of this policy, four 
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conditions are necessary; there should be a disciplined credit creation, specmcally 
in public sector (in the absence of this even If there is no speculation the country's 
reserve will be depleted); there must be credibility in the foreign exchange market 
particularly as It relates to the exchange rate cOmmitment, there must be credibility 
m the labour market such that rigidities in wage should not prevent real adjustment. 
lbis gives the policy credibility and the workers and finns have less mflatlon nse 
in future at a given output. The result would be that the country would be able to 
mamtain low level of mflatlOn. TIus was the case in the Europe in the 1970s and in 
the eastern European countries in the 1990s. However, arguments are advanced in 
the literature that m most cases mflation has not been successfully stemmed in those 
countries that adopted the nommal anchor. Prices and wages still maintained upward 
trend even after the exchange rate was fixed as suggested by the proponents of the 
approach. It is argued that under this circumstance, pegging the exchange rate would 
result m the appreciation of the domestic currency (Edwards, 2001) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) explam that exchange rate as a nommal anchor m 
a country that experiences lugh inflation has empirically shown to exlublt boom-
recession cycle, wluch sharply contrasts with the money-based stabi1ization that pro-
duces recession-boom cycle. They summarize the mam findmgs of various authors 
who worked m the area smce the 1960s when the approach was adopted in Latin 
America up to the 1990s which indicate that a rise in economic activity was recorded 
at the begnming of the implementation of the policy. Then followed by contrac-
tionary symptoms that were heightened by real appreciation of domestic currency 
and worsenmg balance of trade. The lllitlal economic boom comes along With real 
depreciation of the home currency that would be the source of current account deficit 
and finally the BOP crises (Calvo and Vegh, 1999). TIus lured some economists to 
suggest that policies that utilize the exchange rate as a nommal anchor generally lead 
to BOP crises. The optimal exit strategy was explored by a number of works, wluch 
suggested that after 1llitial fixing then a more flexible system to be introduced (Dom-
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busch, 1997). Edwards (2001) observes that this regime presents the country WIth a 
costly adjustment in the face of negative external shocks such as worsening terms of 
trade. 
2.7 Misalignment ofthe Real Exchange Rate and 
Devaluation Controversies 
Real exchange rate misalignment occurs when a country's real exchange rate deviates 
from what is considered an equilibrium real exchange rate for a consIderable penod. 
An undervalued or overvalued currency is as a result when the currency is lower or 
higher than this level, respectively. The former is expected to act as a catalyst for 
lugher production of tradable goods as the country's competitiveness is enhanced 
vis-a-vis its trading partners. The latter conversely, lunders such productions as the 
balance is tIlted towards the other side (Razin and Collins, 1997). Early works on 
measunng real exchange rate was based on the PPP. Tlus was based on influence of 
nomma1 pnces on the balance of payment. The PPP approached was argned to be bi-
ased and in some cases, the bIasness would be very large (Masters and Ianchoric1una, 
1998). Consequently, most recent works try to go beyond the PPP and mcorporate 
other variables such as terms of trade, real mterest rate, productivity growth, degree 
of openness, government expendtture, and international interest rates. 
When misalignment is detected more especially as regards to over-valuation, 
revaluatIOn in forms of nominal devaluatIOn of the currency is usually canvassed 
in the literature to enhance the country's competitiveness. Nevertheless, there are 
controversies surrounding the effectiveness of nominal devaluation in mducing real 
devaluation and the question of the effects of devaluation on the macroeconomic 
variables of developmg countries. 
Gyunah-Brempong and Gyapong (1993) detect exchange rate Inlsahgnment m 
Ghana and that it has negative effect on the country's economic growth This is con-
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sistent with the result ofBleaney and Greenaway (2000), who reported that exchange 
rate misalignment had impacted negatlvely on mvestlnent in sub-Saharan Africa. De-
varajan (1997) analyses CFA zone by calculating real exchange rate rrnsalignment 
and found that the zone's currency, the CFA had been over-valued dunng the period 
before 1994. The devaluation of 1994 resulted in real exchange rate undervaluation. 
This is consIstent with Azam's (1997) findmgs that econorrnc growth had pIcked up 
very fast ID the zone after the devaluation. Holmes (2002) IDvestlgates relatlonship 
between exchange rate and domestic inflation. The findings suggest that nominaI 
effective exchange rate has positive role on inftatlon of the countnes studIed 
The concept of devaluation in the orthodox open macroeconomics is well doc-
umented. It is considered a pohcy tool that can address current account crises ID the 
face of Its currency appreclatlon Devaluations were preceded by perceived overvalu-
atlons of real exchange rate (Uribe, 2003). ExpansIonary macroeconOlDlc poliCIes are 
capable of causing real exchange appreciation (Razzak, 1995). For instance, smne 
African countnes' real exchange rate apprecIations were attnbuted to such poliCIes 
that were pursued for about 30 years. There are two ways through whtch norrnnaI 
devaluations can improve balance of trade; first is by making the countnes exports 
cheaper, thereby improving its competltlveness Secondly, it makes unports more 
costly, and this results in decJming demand for imports. The latter may not be the 
same ID all countries as It depends on the constItuents of the unports (Babamam-
Oskooee and Mlteza, 2002). This argument is based on the premIse that norrnnaI de-
valuatlon leads to trade balance improvement via real exchange rate devaluation. Em-
pirical results on this are mixed. Some authors argue that nominaI devaluations have 
inIpact on the real devaluatlons ouly ID short-run and, to some extent, ID medium-run, 
but not ID long-run. However, Razzak (1995) finds that nominaI exchange rate de-
valuatlons in some Afncan countnes YIelded to short run and long-run real exchange 
devaluatlons. 
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Impact of devaluation on economic activities can be detennined from a tem-
poral (elastlcity approach) or consumption smoothing (inter-temporal). Devereux 
(2000) argues that the role of devaluatlon as explained here IS based on a temporal 
approach but If mter-temporal approach is adopted the case may change. Inter tem-
poral approach emphasizes the role of consumption smoothing and mvestment as an 
explanatlon for current account dynamics. Therefore, the approach models the role 
of technology and the caPital markets explicitly. It was based on this that Devereux 
(2000) models the inter-temporal analysis, extending Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
model. The model introduced the concept of 'short run pricing-to-market' which 
refers to a pricing structure whereby the pnces are set by some firms in both pro-
ducers' and buyers' currencies contrary to the Obstfetld Rogoff (19995) He shows 
that a monetary expansion under floating regime when prices are temporarily sticky 
unproves the current account. When export prices are set in exporters' currencies, 
response to devaluation m this circumstance could be dominated by expenchture 
sWltchmg. Thus improving the current account position prOVIded Marshall- Lemer 
condltlon holds. Under this condition, consumption smoothing has no role as PPP 
holds at all times and real interest rates are the same. In a situation where the price-
to-market strategy was dominant, devaluation would not improve the current account 
and Marshall-Lemer conchtion becomes irrelevant. The effects of devaluation in such 
a scenario depend on the consumptlon smoothing. Inter-temporal approach price-to-
market would result into PPP deviations and the interest rates across the countnes. 
Improvement of caPital account depends on the elastlClty of inter-temporal substItu-
tion. It would improve if the elasticity is less than unity. remam constant if It is equal 
to uruty and worse off if It is more than unity (Devereux, 2000). 
Another section of the literature argues that devaluatlon can lead to contrac-
tionary (Edwards, 1986). Contractionary devaluation refers to costs associated with 
devaluatlon that results m declme m outputs. Devaluation m orthodox stabilizatlon 
program aims at expenditure switching that would ultimately improve current ac-
----------------- - - -----------------------
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count of the relevant country. Theoretically, the argument that devaluatIon results m 
contractionary runs is two folds. First, the nominal devaluation can affect aggregate 
demand winch may neutralize the trachtional argument of expenditure switching ef-
fects. Rising prices due to devaluation would affect the aggregate demand, which in 
turn affects aggregate outputs. Secondly, it may affect mcome distribution. It can re-
chstnbute mcome from those with Iow marginal propensity to save to those with high 
marginal propensity to save thereby affecting the aggregate demand and outputs. 
Effectiveness of devaluation as a means of addressmg current account prob-
lem depends on structural characteristIcs of the economy. Its effects are channeled 
through the real exchange rate or on domestic imports expenchture (Katseh, 1983). 
In the latter, it was assumed among other things that goods and assets are perfect sub-
stItutes, the country is a pnce taker, and wages and prices are flexible. A developing 
country, winch exports prunary goods and imports intermechate goods for domestIC 
production, their elasticlties for demand and supply are both approximately zero. In 
this case, devaluation may not improve its balance of trade. It may be even worsen-
ing when mtermediate goods are involved in the production of the export goods. The 
results would be a decline in exports (Katseli, 1983). 
Stuches on some developed econonnes show that devaluation has positive im-
pact on the economies, whereas some work on developing countnes mchcate that 
devaluation has contractlOnary effects on outputs and investlnent. Gyalfason and 
Radetzki, (1985) specifically, find that devaluation has negative effects on output in 
the short-ron, expansionary effects in the medium-nm and neutral in the long-run. 
For tax policy, devaluation supposes to provide mcentives to production, and this 
)'lelds high tax revenue from export tax. But this IS to a large extent depends on 
the role of lIDportS in the production of exports It should be noted that devalua-
hons mcreases foreign debts m terms of home currency, thereby making repayments 
more costly. Where the foreign denommated debts are high in the balance sheet, tins 
may lead to a financIal crisis. On the investlnent side, it is argued that private sav-
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mgs would rise due to increase in exports, and provides mvestment funds. Empirical 
works on the effects of devaluations on the current account are not only mconclu-
sive, but some of the results are puzz1mg. For instance, Edwards (1988) finds that 
the period following devaluatIOn m some developmg countries, was characterized by 
negatIve current account POSItIOns and nse in foreign assets stock. He explams that 
the latter could be as a result that these devaluations were part of IMF-sponsored sta-
bilizatlon programmes and short term and medium term funds are associated With 
them, winch improve mflow of foreign assets into the countries. 
50 
Chapter 3 
Exchange Rate Regimes Identification and 
Classification in Africa: De jure Vs De facto 
3.1 Introduction 
Exchange rates are among the most important variables that dictate flow of goods, 
capital and services between countries. The exchange rate influences inflation and 
other macroeconoInlc vanables that mclude output growth and unemployment. Con-
sequently they play a crucial role m the balance of payment of every country. As a 
result, choIce and mamtenance of an appropnate exchange rate regIme for a country 
is important for general macroeconomic management in fostering and mamtaimng 
competitiveness. IMF Article IV, section 2(a) requires each member-country to re-
port to ilie fund Its exchange rate arrangements. Recently, however, scepticism on 
the credibilIty of the exchange rate regime reported by these countries, and what the 
countnes do has been expressed by a strand of lIterature A number of authors argue 
that regimes that countries report usually differ from what they practIce and thIs may 
have implications for empirical analysis. 
ThIs chapter venfies exchange rate regimes of sample of Afncan countnes. 
10 The Identification and verification of de facto exchange rate regIme IS important 
for African countries for at least three reasons. FIrst, to be able to assess the im-
pact of polIcy changes on the economy it is Important that the correct exchange rate 
regime should be used. The fact that prevIOUS empmcal investigations of the Impact 
of dtfferent alternatIve exchange rate regtmes on macroeconomic variables were in-
conclusIve, suggest that such studies were based on de jure regimes, winch dtffer m 
10 A ymion of tins chapter was presented at the European EconOmICS and Fmance SOCIety Confer-
ence in Sofia, May 2007 
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many countries from de facto regime (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005). Second, 
one of the factors identified that contributed to the financial crises from the 1990s, 
was lack of credtbilIty on exchange rate regunes operated in these countries. Veri-
fication and identifying exchange rate regimes operated by a country addresses the 
credibilIty Issue (FrankeI et aI, 2001). The mtermediate regune has been a subject of 
controversy since the advent of the financial cnses in the 1990s. A strand of the lit-
erature argues that the regime is difficult to maintain particularly in the present day 
world of financial integration. 
lbirdly, an argument from the literature IS that exchange rate based stabiIiza-
tlOn policies normally results in the Balance of Payments (BOP) crises. The sug-
gested link between the exchange rate dynamics and the BOP cnses is the credtbility 
problems that emanate from the exchange rate policies. Many African countries had 
adopted exchange rate based stabiIization programmes in the 1980s and the 1990s, 
whtch makes the study relevant. In addttion, mcentive to renege on the exchange 
rate regime is more attractive to developing countries than the developed ones. It is 
observed that countries abandon their regimes when they are faced with economic 
difficulty. Analyzing deveIopmg African countries would shed lIght on the argu-
ment, as most of these economies expenenced a cyclical down turn in the 1980s and 
the 1990s. 
The chapter makes two distinct contributions to the existmg lIterature. First, it 
focuses on Afncan countnes, which have been largely overlooked by previous stud-
ies. This is an important gap in the literature, especially as many of these countries 
have used exchange rate-based stabllIzatlOn polIcies. Second, in addttlOn to usmg 
the official declared breaks m regime, it tests statJ.stlcaIly for structuraI breaks using 
both the CUSUM statistics and two fonnaI tests for structuraI breaks developed by 
Bai and Perron (1997, 2002) and Harvey, Leybourne and Taylor (2006). 
The oplllion that de jure regtme can dtffer with de facto has gained support 
from empirical literature undertaken in the field. Levy-Yeyati et al (2005), FrankeI et 
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at (2001), Frommel and Schobert (2006) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and a very 
recent work ofFrankel and Wei (2008) have all found evIdence that many countnes 
do not follow their announced regimes. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 
explains the model utilIzed in the study and Section 3.5 IS on data and methodology 
wlule the results are discussed in Sect10n 3.4 and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 The Model 
The the model follows that ofFrankel et at (2001) and Frommel and Schobert (2006) 
in that reserve changes are not part of the model. Thts is because models that have 
utilized foreign reserve variations as a key element in identifying a regtme that a 
country follows are defiled by the fact that variations in foreign reserves, particularly 
in developing countries cannot be solely due to foreign exchange mterventlon. Gosh 
et at (2002) argue that there are other factors which can cause foreign reserve volatil-
ity apart from exchange rate regime market stabilizatlon, especially in developmg 
countnes. These mclude payments of bulk purchases (hlce oil or aircraft) and foreign 
debt servicing. Such transactions can result into sigmficant movements m foreign 
reserves and yet they are not related to foreign exchange market transaCtlonsll • 
Secondly, the general formulation of the Frankel et aI's model 'nests' many 
different regimes that include free and managed fioatlng, simple and basket peg, 
crawlmg peg and crawlmg basket. This has largely incOlporated all the regimes cur-
rently reported by the IMF's 'Exchange Rate arrangements and RestrictIOns'. 
The model assumes that a country's exchange rate consists of N foreign cur-
rencies, rate of crawl and an error term, taking the followmg form: 
St = c+ d· t+ <I>(W"S"t) + et (3 1) 
11 The next chapter investIgates these cnticisms 
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where S" the dependent vanable, is the spot exchange rate of domestic currency in 
terms of a numeralre. On the nght hand side, S.,t, are the spot exchange rates of major 
currencies also measured m terms of the same numeraire used for the dependent 
vanable; d is rate of crawl, and w" are the weight given to the major currencies 
included in the analysis. Followmg in Frankel et al (2001) <p takes the following 
form: 
N 
<p(W"S.,t) = (Ew"S.,t) (3.2) 
=1 
Several studIes use dIfferent currenCIes as a numeralre for the domestIc and foreign 
currencies. FrankeI and WeI (1995) and Frommel and Schobert (2006) use SDR 
while Frankel (1993) use consumer basket of domestic goods and Frankel and Wel 
(1994) use SWISS Frank. This study uses SDR as the numeralre. 
Table 3.1: Model of Exchange Rate RegImes Classifications 
Exchange Rate RegImes N d W. R2 
Simple peg 1 0 1 for the currencyto which it is pegged 1 or close to 1 
weights are constructed eIther 
Basket peg >1 0 based on trade or GDP of the 1 or close to 1 
mam trading partlIers, but sum to 1 
Crawlmgpeg 1 >0 Same as in sinIple peg 1 or close to 1 
Crawlmg basket >1 >0 Same as in basket peg 1 or close to 1 
Managed float >1 >0 Same as in basket peg o or close to 0 
Free float >1 0 Same as in basket peg o or close to 0 
The model addresses different alternative reginIes such as sinIple peg, basket 
peg, crawJmg peg and crawlmg basket. Others are target zones, managed floatIng and 
free floating. Table 3.1 summarises exchange rate reginIes idetifies by the model. In 
54 
case of simple peg N = 1 and basket peg has N > 1, whereas for crawlmg peg 
d > 0 and N > 1 and d > 0 for crawling basket. In a theoretICal peg, i. e. perfect 
peg it is expected that vanation m the currency to which It is pegged would YIeld an 
R2 With no error tenn. Since an exact peg IS not prachcally realiStiC, an R2 that is 
close to 1 indicates a peg regime. TIlls is also the same With basket peg. Managed 
and free floating can be venfied by testing d or w, are dIfferent from O. Therefore 
fa!lure to r""ect that d = 0 or W. = 0 mdIcates situahon of pure or managed floating 
regime. In this situahon, the error tenn is expected to account for all the vanance in 
the exchange rate and the R2 would be close to O. As for crawling peg, the random 
error cannot be zero and R2 too cannot be equal to 1. The same situatIOn IS expected 
of crawlmg basket. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
Tables 3.2 contains the countnes covered for tins study along With their reported 
regime and other structural characterishcs. Columns 2 and three are the reported 
regtmes by the IMF and the findings of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) It is evident that 
countries whose regtmes are reported by the IMF as either managed or free floating 
were found not floating by the study. For all the countries covered, a monthly data 
of domestic and main foreign currencies for 1981: Ml to 2005: M12 were used. 
The data are sourced from the IMF International Fmanclal Statishcs Database. The 
foreign currencies' weights were constructed using GDP data from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database. Figure 3.1 shows log of domestic currencies measure 
in terms of the numerarre and the Idenhfied de jure regnnes as announced by the 
authonties. Logs ofCFA zones of Central and West Africa exhibit the same pattern. 
TIlls is because the zones have the same exchange rate poilcles. 
A logantbmic transformahon was earned out on the exchange rate series and 
subjected to stationanty tests. Non-stationanty or presence of unit root m senes 
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would normally lead to spunous regression. It can be tested by augmented DIckey 
Fuller (ADF) (1979, 1981), the Plnllips Perron (PP) (1988) and the KPSS tests of 
Kwiatkowski, Philips, Schrnidt and Shin (1992) were used. The augmented DIckey 
Fuller takes the fonn of this: 
p 
AYt = 'l/JYt-I + L a,AYt_I + ut (3.3) 
1=1 
The null hypothesIs that the senes contain a unit root is tested against the alternative 
hypothesIs that the series is stationary. In essence, if the null hypothesis is rejected, 
it means that the senes are statIonary. Empirically, if the test statIstIc is greater than 
ADF critical values, one is expected to faIl to reject the null. That IS the series has 
umt root whereas if the test statistic is less than the ADF critlcal values, the null is 
rejected with a conclusion that the series has no unit root. In other words, the series 
is statIonary. 
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Table 3.2 
Countries Covered and Their Exchange Rate Regimes 
SlNo CountIy Declared Regune1 Calvo & Reinhart's Findings2 
I Algeria Managed Floating 
2 Botswana Pegged to a Basket 
3 CFAZones3 Monetary Union 
4 Egypt Managed Floating Not Floating 
5 Ghana Managed Floatmg NotFloatmg 
6 Kenya Managed Floating 
7 Morocco Pegged to a Basket 
8 Nigena Managed Floatmg Not Floating 
9 South Africa Free Floatmg NotFloatmg 
10 Tanzania Free Floating 
11 Tunisia Crawling Peg 
12 Uganda Free Floatmg Not Floating 
1 From the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangemeot and Restnctioos 
2Caivo and Reinhart (2002) 
3Compnses of two monetary wuons of Central (CAMe) and West AfrIcan countnes 
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Figure 3.1 
NatIonal CurrenCIes Measured in Terms of the Numeraire Under DIfferent Regnoes 
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The ADF is CritiCIZed for a nwnber of madequacles. Perron (1989) argues that 
the ADF test can lead to a rejection of null hypothesis that the series has no unit root 
in the presence of break in Its mean or trend as the sample size increases. Size of 
the ADF test IS also argued to be sensitive to the presence of outliers (prances and 
Haldrup, 1994). ThIs was shown to be capable of producing 'spurious stationarity'. 
The Phillips-Perron (PP) tests, although is sin!ilar to the ADF tests, It has m-
tegrated an automatic correction to the degree of freedom (OF) procedure that ad-
dresses the autocorrelated reslduals. The null and the alternative hypothesis are the 
same With those of ADF and generally the tests yield the same conclusion as the ADF 
test. It is an IIDprovement over ADF test but It was also cntiqued to suffer from the 
most of the inadequacies labelled against the ADP. The test regression for the PP test 
is the AR(l) process as follows: 
LlYt_1 = ao + 7Y'-1 + et (3 4) 
the coefficient 7, corrects the t statistic to account for the senal correlation in et. 
The KPSS tests which address the shortcommgs of the ADF, has ItS null and 
the alternative hypothesis exchanged from those of the ADP. The null hypothesis has 
that the series is StatIOnary as agamst the alternative that the series is non-stationary. 
The general form With trend is given as follows: 
, 
X t = C+ 1'+ k I), +'1), (3.5) 
=1 
In the above, if the senes is not stationary and conversely, the senes is StatIOnary If 
k = 1. Therefore, fonna1ly the hypothesis are Ho . k = 0, and HI : k f O. 
After the urnt root tests, the generalized model estmIated was based on first 
differenced as the unit root tests revealed the domestic and foreign nominal exchange 
rates mcluded are 1(1) and it IS m the followmg form: 
N 
Lllog S, = C + L W,Lllog S", + et (3.6) 
=1 
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where t::.log St IS the first difference of the log of nominal exchange rate of the coun-
try measured in terms of the numeraire, the SDR, W" is the weight of currencies 
included t::.log S.,t are the first dIfference of the log of major foreign currencies m-
cluded and eh is an error term. 
In case of a fixed exchange rate regtme (includIng the currency union of the 
CFA zones), the WeIghts w. = 1, on the currency to which the exchange rate is 
pegged and 0 on all other foreign currencies. For example, in the case of WAEMU 
and CAEMC, that IS the CFA zones of West and Central Africa, would have 1 on 
French franc for all observation prior to 1999 and Euro as from 1999 wlule the re-
maining foreign currencies would have O. 
The sub-periods for countries that experienced dJ.fferent exchange rate regimes 
were idenllfied and the estimations were carried out based on the sub-penod sample 
in order to ventY that de jure exchange rate regime was the same WIth de facto. Serial 
correlation LM tests were conducted to augment DW tests in order to ascertam the 
presence of serial correlation or not. It is computed from an auxiliary regressIon for 
the residuals of their estimated regression. The test statistlcs is gIven thus: 
p 
et = Xt"( + cE a8~-8) + Vt (3.7) 
=1 
It has the null that there is no senal correlation against the alternatlve there is serial 
correlatlon. 
Log hkehhood ratIO tests were conducted in testlng the indIvidual coefficients. 
Error correction models were constructed for currencies that were found to have long-
run equihbnum. Error correction model combines first differenced and lagged levels 
of cointegrated vanables. It takes the following form: 
(3.8) 
The term, Yt-I - 'YXt-1 IS the error correctlon term If Yt and Xt are cointegrated 
WIth cointegrating coefficient '1, Yt-I - 'YXt-1 the error correction term will be 1(0), 
although the constituents are 1(1). In equation (3 8), '1 defines the long-run relation-
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ship between x and y, and (31 explains the short run relationslup between changes in 
x and y. It 1S therefore, the speed of adjustment back to eqU111brium. 
Finally structural break tests were conducted to confirm the regime shifts sug-
gested by the Frankel et al (2001) model. The breaks ID the structural coeffic1ents 
are caused by large economic shocks, which could emanate from externa1 sources 
or from domestic monetary regime changes. Structural change on parameters could 
only be meanmgful w1thm the context of a gtven model (Hansen, 200 I). It is sug-
gested in the theory that changes in exchange rate regimes are caused by expecta-
non about present and future fundamentals and news in the fundamentals. Structural 
breaks in the exchange rate regimes are therefore, due to exchange rate regime shifts. 
A structural break signifies a regime change. However, regime chOlces are often 
made under circumstance that the regime 1S not viable but the authonties may con-
slder cost of changing 1S too dear (Julm and Mauro, 2002). Three dlfferent tests12 
were carried out; commutative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM), Bai-Perron 
(BP)" and Harvey-Leybourne-Taylor (HLT)14 tests The CUSUM test of Brown, 
Durbin and Evans (1975) 1S based on the residuals of equatlOn (3.6). The techruque 
is suitable for time senes and does not require pnor specification of when the struc-
tural break is experienced. The test 1S given as": 
T _(r) "'" CUSUMT = E 'Ut /uu (3.9) 
t=K+l 
where it, 's are residuals obtained from the model and ,i 1S the res1dual vanance. It is 
usually plotted for T = K + 1.. ..... T for checkIng structural changes ID a model. If 
12 I have also carned out a test developed by Vogelsang and Saygmsoy (2007) but the test dJd not 
work well However, I WISh to thank TImothy Vogelsang, who has muruficently gIven me the Gauss 
codes used for the test TIns could be due to the fact that the test is for a smgle break not here where 
multIple breaks are expected. 
13 The Gauss codes used here are the modifed version downloaded from Perron's website 
14 I acknowledge DaVld Harvey for hIS magnannruty ID proVldJng the codes used for !Ius test VIa my 
supervisor 
15 This follows Lutkepohl's (2004) specificatIon 
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the CUSUM wonders too far from the zero line, is an evidence for structural break. 
The null is that the coefficients of the model are stable in every penod while the 
alternatlve is that they are not. The common practice is that if a test with significance 
level of about 5% is obtained, the conclusion is the rejection of stability if CU SU MT 
crosses the Imes ±O 948 [v'T - K + 2(T - K)/v'T - KJ. The test is proposed to 
detect a non zero mean of the recursive reslduals as a result of slnfts in the model 
parameters. 
The BP model COnsists of a linear regression With m breaks or m + 1 regimes 
in the following form: 
t = T,-I + 1,. ,T, (3.10) 
J = 1, ... , m+ 1 HereVtis the observe dependent variable at time t, Xt and Zt, winch 
has p x 1 and q x 1 are vectors of covariates while f3 and 8 (j = 1, .. m + 1) are the 
corresponding vectors of coefficients; Ut is the disturbance term at time t.The break 
points are clearly treated as unknown. 
Finally, the lILT model is given as: 
Yt - x;f3 + V"~ (3.11) 
Vt = PtVt-1 + Ct, t = 1, ... , T, 
x;f3 is deterministic kemel With X, a (k + 1) x 1 a fixed sequence whose first element 
is 1 throughout. Therefore (311) always has an mtercept. Four hypotheses were 
considered Wlthm the above model. First, Vt is 1(1) throughout the sample period 
This allows for both umt root and local to umt root behavIOur to be covered withm 
1 (1) context. The second hypotheses IS that Vt is 1 (0) changing to 1 (1); the third one 
is that Vt is 1 (1) switching to 1 (0); and finally Yt is 1 (0) throughout. Where changes 
in the series of nominal exchange rate are detected, it is assumed that a regime change 
has taken place. The four tests statistlcs will be used in determining the direction and 
the frequency of the changes. 
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3.4 Estimated Results and Discussion 
The weights of the countries covered are constructed and reported in Table 3.3. The 
weights are calculated based on identified sub-periods on the countries' exchange 
rate polIcies. Introduction of Eum in 1999 was treated as a sub-period as countries 
that used to peg their currencies to a single European currency or basket had changed 
to the Euro. In the case of Botswana and South Africa, 1994 was treated as a sub-
period. This was the period that apartheid rule ended. The justification for including 
Botswana IS the dominance and importance of South African economy. 
The unit root tests were conducted using the ADF, pp and KPSS and the results 
are reported in Table 3.4, which frul to reject the null that the series have unit root, 
i.e. non-stationary, ID the case of ADF and the pp tests and reject the null, i.e. the 
senes are stalionary ID the case of the KPSS, at the conventional level of significance. 
This means that as expected with exchange rate series, they are non stationary 1(1) 
processes, and subsequently, equation (3.6) was eslimated on first differenced for 
each of the countries covered in this srudy (refer to Table 3.2)16. 
16 In case of the currency UnIon of West and Central AfrIca, the estimatIon IS done for the zones 
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Table 3.4' Umt Root Test Results 
Variables ADF pp KPSS 
LogAlgenan Dmar .0 8241* .0 8114* 2.0089·'" 
Log Bnush Pmmd -32860* -33093* 20089** 
Log Botsw.ma Pula -15832* -I 5823* 03149** 
Log CAC CFA -15832* -15823* 20863** 
LogEg)(lb1ll POUJIl .04490* .04771* 1.8822** 
LogEtrO .0 6602* .0 6358* 17645** 
LogFrendl Franc -3.1391* -31731* 01453** 
LogGha1aIanC<d! -1.9158* -16621* 19381** 
LogGennanMa:k -1.3796* -14903* 11783** 
LogllallanlJra -18606* -18625* 13179** 
LogJapane.,Yen -17927* -18170* 14809-* 
Log Kenyan Shlbngs -16653* -18213* 20068** 
LogMorocc:anDrhlln -25437* -25328* 03787*-
LogNigenan Nara -1.1419* -1.1330* 20350** 
Log SouthAfr RarxI -21291* -213528* 20349** 
LogTamarnanSlulhngs -20520* -20080* 19(X)6·· 
LogTmlSlan DIIIlI' -3.1925* -31384* 19537** 
LogUgaOOan Shlllngs -21900* -22698* 05151** 
Log U S Dollar -10157* -10763* 12132*-
Log west Athcan CF A -15146* -15130* 17686--
• iliJed to n',Icctpre;e~eofumtrootunderconvcnnond.larel ofStgll1flClIlCc 
•• Rcp;:ted the mill hypoIhem 1hatlhe senes bavenourut lOOt 
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As reported in Table 3 5, the results for Algena indicate that the de jure regime 
was not the same with defacto for the sub-period ofl981-1994. DeJure regime for 
the period was basket peg but with none of the coefficients17 are significant coupled 
with a low R2, the results suggest that the countIy was on a managed or even a 
free float. However, the results for the sub-period of 1999-2005 mdtcate that de 
jure regime was the same with de facto; a managed float. That is, both the de jure 
and the de facto were the same for the sub-period. Further test using log likelIhood 
ratJ.o tests have confirmed the same's. The CUSUM test in figure 3.2 has confirmed 
that there was no slgnrlicant regime change for the penod. The BP tests results 
reported in Table 3.1 0 suggest that regune change has taken place in February 1986 
and November, 2000. The policy records, however, indicate that these are devaluation 
episodes not regime shifts. 
Botswana, which pulled out of the Rand monetary union m 1976, had basket 
peg as Its deJure regime for 1981-2005. However, the results reported m Table 3 5 
and 3 6 suggest otherwise. The results pointed to a simple adjustable peg to the South 
African Rand. Furthermore, the structural break tests of Bai and Perron (1997 and 
2003) and CUSUM tests indicate that no regime shifts had occurred during the sam-
ple period This is because it was only South African Rand that was sigruficant and 
the high R2 appears to be from that currency alone as fwther results on other ma-
jor foreign currencIes have confirmed. The coefficient of the South African Rand is 
about 1 and all other coefficients are close to zero for all the sub-penods. A long-run 
relationship between the currency and the South African Rand was found. Table 3 8 
contains results for the long-run relationslnp and the error correction model with a 
sigruficant error correctJ.on term. The results could be explamed in the light of dom-
inance of South African economy in the region and the dependence of Botswana 
economy on South Africa (about 80% of her imports for the penod 1981-2005 are 
17 The results has not changed even when penods of devaluatIons that occurred were taken care of 
by incorporatIng a dummy vanable 
18 See table 3 6 for the log hkebhood ratIo tests results 
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from South Africa)". The second reason could be the existence of the Rand Mon-
etary Union in the region, m which not only other small countries of the regIOn are 
members but also their economies have been historically tied to South Africa for over 
a century. These, therefore, made the South African currency, the Rand as a regional 
currency. 
The Egyptian pound was pegged to the US Dollar from 1981 to 2002 after 
which managed float was introduced. For the fixed regune period, the Dollar was not 
only significant but it has high coefficient of almost 1. However, the R2 seems to be 
very small, as less than 10% was explained by the mode!'". Probably this was due to 
the economic crises that manifested in the late 1980s and the subsequent introduction 
of economic reform poliCies m the early 1990s. The monetary authorities may be 
finding It difficultto defend the currency m the late 1980s and early 1990s. As result, 
several devaluations were undertaken and the currency was allowed to crawl Within 
a wide band. It is difficult to identify a regime that a country operates when the 
country adopts a regune withm a Wlde band. Therefore, the model was unable to 
Identify de facto regune. Other studles also failed to identify de facto regimes for 
some countries, for example, Frankel et al (2001) and Frommel and Schobert (2006). 
However, the results for the sub-penod of2003-2005 mdICate that de jure regime was 
the same With de facto regune. The log hkehhood ratio tests results have indicated 
rejection of the null that the coeffiCients are significantly different from zero. The 
structural break test of CUSM could not detect any regime change for the period. 
However, the BP tests suggest that there was a regime shift in 1985, but the identified 
break was devaluations rather than regime change. This therefore, confirms that de 
facto regune was free or managed floating 
,. Computed from the Bank of Botswana stabsbcs 
20 There was no slgruficant improvement even when the numerous devaluatlons that took place Wlthm 
the sub-penod were takeo care of. 
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Table 3.5: Estimates For 1981-1998 
'ab-period W· W" W" W" W·, W" W" R' DW 
1981·1994 -0001 0011 -OOts -0025 00" -0007 
.22 20 (001) (0011) (0 021) ((1037) (0037) (00» 
Alacr.a 
1995-199' 0034 0064 0036 0136 -0 Oil -OOU .26 .. (0034) (0 039) (009) (0176) (0 103) (00'8) 
1911-1993 0001 0002 -0001 .OOOS 0001 .01 0779' ... 
" (OOOS) (OOOS) (0 Oil) (0018) (0018) (0 QU) (0044) 
1981-1993 0673' ... 
" Botn"au 
(0037) 
1994-1998 0002 0002 o Oil .002 0025 0001 I 018' 
."' 12 (0005) (0006) (0014) (0026, (0016) (001) (001) 
1994.1998 07.-
."' " 
(003) 
1911-1998 0.52' 00' IS (02IS) 
ElYp! 
1981_199. 0017 00 .... • 0034 -0012 0091 -0002 .09 IS (0013) (0014, (0036) (0052) (0041) (0 037) 
19&1.1986 .0049 .013 .0 OS ... o ISI 012. ~" .02 20 (0126) (0126) (0298) (03.S4, (0 of.,) (0717) 
Gballl 
1986-1998 0002 002. ~OI 0006 0001 0051 .11 20 (0016) (0017) (0049) (0075) (0063) (0 031) 
1981-1993 -0002 0013 001 -0031 0027 -0001 • 12 " . (0009) (0007) (OOOS) (003S) (0034) (0028) 
Km,. 
1994-1998 0039 o Os) 0208- o 22S 00"9 -0091 .16 17 (0029) (0034) (0084) (01"6) (0092) (0 OS9) 
Moroeeo 1981-1998 -OOOS 0003 -0003 0042- o OOS 0022-
'" 
17 (0002) (0003) (0 008) (0011) (001) (0008) 
1981·1986 ·006 -0118" -009S - 383" -0 U8 -0127 .,. 17 (OOU) (00"9) (0108) (0122) (0 162) (02SI) 
1986·1993 -00 .... ·OOSI ·0036 -06- 012 .. ... ,1< 17 (OO"S) (00"7) (0128) (0182) (0179) ~I} 
Nicer .. 
199"·1998 0000 0024- 0000 _0001 0005 -0003 ... 16 (0001) (0001) (0 002) (0003) (0002) (0001) 
1994 1998 0997- ... 
" (0 009) 
1981·1993 o 01S 0008 0004 0001 o Oil 0042 00. 17 
Sootll (001) (0011) (0 028) (0003) (0039) (0031) 
Afnca 
199 .. 1998 0001 0031 0017 ·00" o OS" -0018 ". 19 (0013) (0016) (0038) (0 On) (00"2) (0028) 
1981-198S 0026 0036 0094 -0011 o OS3 -0001 00. 
" (0033) (0 0S9) (0084) (0101) (0097) (0128) 
T8IIZallll 
1986.199' 0002 0033 0021 0095 .00 .. 1 .0029 .16 
'" (0 Oil) (002) (OOS4) (0081) (0067) (00 .... ) 
1981-1998 o .. n-
." 20 
TIIIID" 
(004S) 
0005 001' 0008 o OS9· 0019 018" 1981·1991 (0003) (0003) (0008) (0011) (001) (0008) 061 19 
1981-1993 ·001" -0031 0096 -0079 -002 ~ 1 001 21 (0061) (0066) (017) (002) (0.236) (019) 
U,lIl1d. 
1993·1998 0016 ·0003 0011 .003 .006" 0003 ") 22 (0018) (0021) (0052) (0091) (0057) (0031) 
WAEMU 1981·1998 01103· 09' 21 (0037) 
CAEMC 1981.1998 o 90s· 09' " (0037) 
'LM Ieltresaltl C .. l to ,,,«I !he 1III0!h" !here 11110 un" eonelabOIl bUIthere.1I110 Improvem eDlevea .... hell. 811 AR(I) 
WII mcladed 
·SlllllfleIDt 11 S% levd OCllllIlflence 
68 
Table 3.6: Estimates For 1999-2005 
Sab-period w· w'" w" W'. wSR R' DW 
Algeria 1999-2005 -001 -0007 -0013 .0 001 014 23 (0005) (0004) (U 022) (0001) 
1999-2005 001 ·0003 OD24 0000 0838' 069 22 (OOOS) (0005) (U 029) (0001) (0068) 
Botswana 
1999-2005 0623' 068 23 (U 048) 
1999-2002 0013 0024' 001 0000 04 2.2 (0006) (0005) 0.001 90001) 
EIOP' 
2003-2005 ·0039 -0027 -0079 0077 03 09' (0034) (0038) (U 087) (0046) 
Glu"" 1999-2005 ·0006 002' 01. .0000 069 17 (006) (004) (022) (0001) 
Km,.. 1999-2005 ·0013 0019' 0.005 0000 037 17 (0005) (0004) (U 021) (0001) 
Morocco 1999-2005 -0017' -0014' -0023" 0000 06 19 (0002) (0001) (U 021) (0000) 
>O.ma 1999-2005 -0052' -0032' -0127' ..() (ti3* 98 18 (0005) (0003) (002) (0001) 
South 1999-2005 0015 ·0003 -0016 .0000 002 2.2 Afn", (0015) (0009) (U 056) (0000) 
Tamarua 1999-2005 ·0003 0017' -001 0000 028 16 (OOOS) (0003) (U 021) (0001) 
Turus. 1999-2005 -OOIS' ·0012' ·0015 0001" 057 21 (0002) (0001) (001) (0000) 
U ...... 1999.-2005 ·0012 001S' -0016 0000 0.27 18 (0007) (0004) (U 026) (0001) 
1999-2005 -0027' -0028' -0049' 0001" 09 2.2 (0002) (0001) (U 007) (0000) 
WAEMU 
1999-2005 0035 002 IS (0025) 
1999-2005 ·0006 -005 -0048 .0 00' 007 19 (000') (002) (U 021) (003') 
CAEMC 
1999-2005 .() 013 000 16 (0025) 
• StgruficaDtat S%level ofstgruftcant 
•• slgD1f"lCant at JOO,,", 1ew:1 of sIgnificant 
#Evc:o wbenAR(l)was meluded, tbcrcsuks have not lIIlproved 
viP-weight of Japanese Ycn 
WUs... wa@J1tofUntedSlattsDollar 
WW'- Wetght ofBntlsh Pound 
wro -WClghtofEum 
v/'R"WcIghtofSwIhAfncan Rand 
vlF ., wClght of French Franc 
WOw"" \\eIght ofGCl"Ill8n Malk 
WL-WClghtof ltahan LIl1I 
WAEMU=West Afncan CFA 
CAEMO= Cettml Afi1can CFA 
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Table 3.7: Log Likehhood Ratio Results 
Currency Algeria Egypt Ghana South Africa 
1981·1994 1999·2005 2003·2005 1999·2005 1986·1998 
FI,US Ft,so Ft,32 Ft,69 Ft, .. ? 
LLR LLR LLR LLR LLR 
w" 04505 03095 04728 03555 
w GM 2 3018 1 6727 24015 1 8930 
W'L 00604 10075 
00634 1 1483 
W,. 00496 39364 1 3207 o 5511 00040 
o 0521 40847 1 5020 05892 00045 
w V' 1 2078 4 1291 04984 58957 38372 1 2645 42796 05742 60697 4.2464 
w·r 02920 03856 08223 1 1567 02036 03066 04091 09425 1 2313 02341 
WEV 04436 27618 1.7319 
04704 30723 1 8360 
The results for Ghana suggest that the sub-penod 1981-1986 whtch had basket 
peg as de jure was a floatmg regime as none of the currencies were significant and the 
R2 IS almost zero. ThIs remains so even when devaluations were taken care of. But 
the managed floating regime's results for the other sub-period confirm de jure regmIe 
as de facto. The coefficients of all the major foreign currencies included were not 
significant and the R2 is about 0.1. The log likelihood ratio tests results point to the 
fact that de facto regIme was floatmg. The Structural breaks tests of Do an (2003) also 
identify 1986 03 as the best breakpomt. The Bai and Perron results pomt to a break 
in January 1994, which does not seem to reflect a regime change but a devaluation. 
However, the CUSUM tests identified a break m 2004. 
------ - - ---
Table 3.8 
Estimated Potentially Cointegrating Equationand Test for Cointegration 
Yt = "to + 'YI + Ut 
Cartrnl Afiica 
CFAZcne 
west Afiim CFA 
ZDre 
CodIideJt 
A 
Yo 
A 
YI 
A 
Yo 
A 
YI 
A 
Yo 
A 
YI 
FstimatedValue 
-0.0145 
0.7970 
0.9999 
3.9120 
08201 
4.4576 
AIFTEston 
Re!iduals 
-13.2950" 
-129380* 
.EsfunateAFmrCcmcticnMxk:t 4v, = Po +fJ..Dx, + f3.z(yt-l -/Xt-I)+u, 
Cartrnl Afiica 
CFAZcne 
WestAfiim CFA 
ZDre 
A 0.0016 
Po (0.0014i 
A 0.669 
PI (0.356) 
A -0.1376 
P2 (0.0398) 
1\ 7.57&CE 
Po (5.72&08) 
A 0.999 
PI (289M6) 
A -1.0513 
P2 (0.0816) 
A -7.68B09 
Po (5.75B-08) 
A 1.0000 
PI (289B{)6) 
A -1.0519 
P2 (0.0819) 
*Rejeds mill of 1Ul-&ati0DaIY at 5"10 
Is:arxlard errcrs in parentlrsis 
~71 
Ar:!J R=O.70 
VN=1.95 
Ar:!J R2:0.98 
DW= 
70 
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In case of Kenya the results identified managed floating regune contrary to bas-
ket peg announced as de jure for the sub-periods ofl981-1993, but for the sub-period 
of 1994-1998, the results have showed that the managed float regune announced was 
being followed. In essence, the de Jure and de facto were the same. us Dollar is 
slgmficant for the period 1999-2005 but with low coefficient and R2, about 0.37, de 
facto regime seems to agree with deJure. Although the BP tests have concurred to the 
non-existence of a break, the CUSUM tests detected a shift in January 2000. How-
ever, the HLT tests seem to suggest that regime changes had taken place during the 
period, but the breaks detected could be the numerous devaluations undertaken rather 
than regime s1nfts. 
Morocco has basket peg for the whole period ana1yzed as her de Jure regime. 
The reported results indicate that de facto for sub-penod of 1981-1998 was managed 
floating. However, results for 1999-2005 appear to be an adjustable basket peg with 
Japans Yen, Britlsh Pound and the US dollar. Both the CUSUM and the BP tests 
seem to agree with the model that no regime change was recorded. The HLT test also 
indicates no regime shifts occurred durmg the period. 
Results for Nigena, have contradicted de jure regime for 1981-1986 and 1999-
2005 sub-periods. For the fonner, de jure regune was basket but the results suggest 
managed float whereas de facto regime for the latter appears to be basket pegging 
Instead offloatmg that was reported as de jure. The remainmg other two sub-periods 
were identified as floating and fixed regimes which are consistent with de jure. The 
simple peg regime penod of 1994-1998 was the period when economic sanity was 
introduced m forms of new financmllaws and regulations. The de jure regime and de 
facto for this penod seem to be the same. Nevertheless, the CUSUM tests detected a 
regime change only in Apnl2004 wh!le the BP and lILT tests indIcate non-presence 
of a break, therefore, corroborating the model. 
Figure 3.2a: Structural Break Tests: CUSUM 
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Figure 3.2b: Structural Break Tests: CUSUM 
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South Africa, which has reported floating regime for the penod, de facto seems 
to be consistent With de jure as per the findings. The results suggest the floatmg as 
announced. This conforms to the structural break tests of the CUSUM, BP and lILT, 
which suggest no regune change that occurred during the period. 
As indicated by the results, Tanzania's exchange rate regime for 1981-1985 
was managed floatmg whIch contradIcts de jure regune, a fixed exchange rate regune. 
The last sub-period indicates that US Dollar was significant and the R2 is higher than 
the two first sub-periods. Since other currencies sull remain insignificant, de facto 
regime could be managed float. Results for the penod 1986-2005 have agreed with 
dejure of managed floating The BP tests have Identified a regime change m 1985:01, 
whIch was treated as a sub-period by the model. 
The results for Tunisia do not suggest a significant variation from de jure, I.e 
crawling peg. This IS particularly so with the first sub-penod of 1981-1998. For the 
sub-period of 1999-2005 defacto regime was adjustable basket peg. The Structural 
beak tests also Idenufy these breaks. The Doan (2003) test suggests September 1986 
as the best break point, whtle Bai and Perron tests indIcate that January 1985 was 
the breakpomt consistent with the estimated model. The structural break tests of Bat 
and Perron (1997, 2003) are not helpful in thts case. Doan (2003) tests suggest break 
points in 1981 and the Bat and Perron test mdicates two breaks in January 1985 and 
July 1997. The breaks detected are devaluations not regime change. However, the 
CUSUM tests agree With the model that there was no shIft in the regime. 
Like most of the results reported above for 1981-1993 sub-period, Uganda's 
de facto regime was not the same with de jure. De Jure, for the period was a peg 
regime but the results suggest either managed or free float. The other sub-penods 
have both de Jure and de facto as floating, although us Dollar is slgmficant in the 
last sub-period The CUSUM dId not detect any break and therefore concurring with 
the model. Doan (2003) tests have picked the devaluations periods. 
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Table 3.9 
De jure and De facto Mrican Exchange Rate Regimes in Sub-Periods 
Ofrdaly Announced The Findings Country Sub·Period Reglmeo'IMF (De'acto) Qassifications (Dejure) 
1981 MlI· 1994 MIO Pegged to 1I1e basket Managedlf"", !hat 
A1gena 1994 MOl ·1998M12 Managed floatmg Managedlf"", !hat 
I 999MOI -200sMI2 Managed floatlOg Mamged. flootmg 
1981MOI-1993M012 Pegged to a basket Pegged to S. A. Raod 
Botswana 1994 MlI -1998 MI2 Pegged to a basket Pegged toSA Rand 
1999 MlI -200S MI2 Pegged to a basket Pegged toSA Raod 
1981 MlI- 1998 MI2 Pegged to the $? inconclusive 
Egypt 1999 MOI- 2002M12 Managed floatlDg Mamged floatIng 
2003 MlI-200S MI2 Managed floatmg Mamged floattng 
1981 MOI-1986 M08 Pegged to the S? Managedlf"'" !hat 
Ghana 1986 M09-1998 MI2 Managed floatIng Managed'!"", !hat 
1998 MOl-200S MI2 Managed floatIng Managed'!"", !hat 
1981 MOI-I993 M09 Pegged to ba9ret Managed.float 
Kenya 1993 MIO-I998 MOl Managed floatlOg Managed !hat 
1999 MOI-200S MI2 Managed floatIng Managed !hat 
Morocco 1981 MOI-I998 MI2 Pegged to a basket Managed !hat 1999 MOI-200S MI2 Pegged to a basket Managed !hat 
1981 MlI - 1986 MI2 Pegged to a basket Managed !hat 
Nlgena 1987 MlI - 1993 MI2 Fhabng Free float 1994 MlI- 1998 MI2 Pegged to the $? Pegged to the $? 
1999Ml2-200S MI2 Managed floatIng BasIa:tpeg 
1981 MOI-I993M 12 Fhabng floabng 
Soudt Aft.:a 1994 MOI-I998 MI2 Fbatmg Floatmg 
1999 MOI-200S MI2 Fhabog Floatmg 
1981 MOI-198S MI2 Peg Managed !hat 
Tanzama 1986 MOI-I998 MI2 Fhabng Float 
1999 MOI-200S MI2 FlJabng Float 
TuruSla 1981 MOI-I998 MI2 Qawhngpeg Oawhngpeg 1999 MOI-200S MI2 Qawhngpeg Oawhogpeg 
1981 MOI-I993 MIO Peg Managed'!"", !hat 
Ul1i1nda 1993 MII-I998 MI2 Fbatmg Managedlf"", !hat 
1999 MOI-200S MI2 FlJabng Managed !hat 
WAEMU 1981 MOI-1998 MI2 Pegged to FF# Pegged to FP# 1999 MOl-200S MI2 PeggedbEuro Basket peg to $1 
CAEMC 1981 MOI-I998 MI2 Pegged to FF# Pegged to FP# 1999 MOl-200S MI2 PeggednEuro Managed !hat 
?UnJted States Dollar 
#French Fmnc 
:l:ThlS IS an apartheid era 
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Table 3.10: Bai and Perron (1997,2003)'5 Structural Break Tests 
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Table 3.11: Structural Break Test Results Using Doan (2003) 
As in Bai and Perron (2003) 
SlNo Country Best One Break-Point Best Two Break-Point 
1990.11 
1 Algeria 1989.08 
1991:09 
1984 09 
2 Botswana 1985 12 
198505 
199006 
3 Egypt 198908 
199011 
198309 
4 Ghana 198603 
1984 03 
199302 
5 Kenya 189109 
199306 
198307 
6 Morocco 1985 10 
1984 02 
198608 
7 Nlgena 198612 
1986.12 
198506 
8 South AfrIca 1986,05 
1985:12 
198603 
9 Tanzarua 198609 
198609 
1981 04 
10 TumS18 1981.04 
1981'07 
1981 05 
11 Uganda 1981 06 
1981 07 
1993'12 
12 WAEMU 199901 
199401 
1993 12 
13 CACMU 198202 
199401 
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The CFA zones of Central and West Africa's results show that de Jure and de 
facto for 1981-1998, after adjusting for 1994 devaluations, are consistent. That is 
the CFA was pegged to the French Franc for the sub-period. However, the WAEMU 
results for the second sub-period of 1999-2005 not only suggested dtfference between 
de jure and de facto but also pomt to a slnft in the currency of reference. de facto 
regime seems to be a basket peg with Japanese Yen, US Dollar and the British Pound. 
For the Central Africa CFA, the results indtcates that de facto regime for the same 
penod appears to be either managed float or even free float, but the CUSUM tests 
Seetn to contradict the above as indicated there was no regune change for the penod 
Long-run relationship between the Central and West African CFA and the French 
Franc for 1981-1993 was found. The reported results m Table 3.8 mdicate that the 
error correction terms for both zones are significant. 
Table 3 9 summarizes the results obtained from the model and compares them 
with the declared regunes for each of the sub-period. It is clear from the foregoing 
that there are situations where de facto is the same WIth de jure and there are SItuations 
where the two differ. Some countries reported peg regime whereas their de facto 
regime was otherwise while others reported floating regimes and the results indicate 
that they were not floatiog. Therefore, there is both 'fear of floatiog' and 'fear of 
peggiog' as reported by Calvo and Reiohart (2002) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), 
respectively. 
The long-run relationships were found for CFA zones of West and Central 
Africa and Botswana. The mability to estabhsh long-run relationslnp for other coun-
tries may be due to relative short penods of the regimes and frequent regime changes. 
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Table 3.12a: Harvey-Leyboume-Taylor Tests for Changes in Persistence 
MS. MP,. MX" MS. I.E. MlC'. MS. ME". MlC'. 
c::oumy T 10010 10"10 10"10 10"10 ~ 10"10 10"10 10010 10"10 MS. MP,. MX" MS.' • MX". MS". ME". MX". 5% 5% 5% 5% ,% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Mm 243 1.23 18.97" 004 000 004 006 001 0.23 
Ca;e OOS 001 029 0.00 000 0.00 000 000 000 
Algma 300 TnnI 001 000 0.00 016 000 OOS 004 000 004 
Ca;e 000 000 0.00 0.01 000 000 000 000 000 
Mm 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 000 
Ca;e 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 
-
300 TnnI 062 004 035 000 000 000 0.15 000 OOS 
Ca;e 016 000 0.06 000 000 000 003 000 001 
Mm 000 000 0.00 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 
Ca;e 0.00 000 0.00 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 
I'g)Jt 300 TnnI 000 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 0.00 
Ca;e 000 000 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 000 000 0.00 
Mm 000 000 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 0.00 
Ca;e 000 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 0.00 
am. 300 TnnI 000 000 0.00 006 0.00 004 OOS 000 003 
Ca;e 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 
Mm 000 000 000 015 0.01 019 000 000 000 
Ca;e 000 000 0.00 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 
I<l>1)3 300 
'fun! 3244" 22.44" 7471· 1.04 014 110 1926· 971· 3768* 
Ca;e 1987* 1032' 3914' 030 002 0.23 1074" 3.81' 16.73" 
Mm 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 
Ca;e 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 
Mxocoo 300 TnnI 000 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 
Ca;e 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 
Mm 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 000 
Ca;e 000 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 000 000 000 
Nigma 300 TnnI 000 000 0.00 075 0.13 149 OU 001 OU 
Ca;e 000 000 000 014 001 017 002 000 001 
Mm 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 000 
South Ca;e 000 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 
Afnca 300 TnnI 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 000 
Ca;e 000 000 0.00 000 0.00 000 000 000 0.00 
Mm 000 000 000 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 
T..".... 300 Ca;e 000 000 0.00 0.00 000 000 000 000 000 TnnI OOS 002 030 0.50 001 026 0.23 000 0.10 
Ca;e 001 000 003 0.04 000 001 003 000 0.00 
~tgmfrsrqec1J.m 
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Table 3.12b: Harvey-Leybourne-Taylor Tests for Changes in Persistence 
M5,. M;. ~ Ml'm ME'm MX"m MlM m ME"'m MX"m 
Comby T 1<1'10 1<1'10 1<1'10 1<1'10 '''' 
1<1'10 1<1'10 1<1'10 1<1'10 
M5,. MP,. ~ M5,." ME'm MX"m MlMm ME"'m MX"m 
5% 5% 5% 5% 
'" 
5% 5% 5% 5% 
Mm 0.00 0.00 000 0.21 0.03 044 0.01 0.00 0.01 
G!se 0.00 000 000 001 0.00 001 0.00 000 0.00 
TUIIlSIa 300 
TreIlI 0.22 005 0.78 0.30 0.03 041 200 145 6.86 
G!se 0.12 0.02 0.35 005 0.00 0.04 102 0.46 253 
Mm 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
G!se 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Uganla 300 
TreIlI 0.33 011 0.88 0.'1:1 0.00 0.(X; 754' 0.72 6.93 
G!se 0.10 002 0.18 001 0.00 0.00 179 o.fJ7 094 
Mm 0.0! 001 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 
G!se 0.01 0.00 000 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
c/AfiICl 300 CFA TreIlI 0.00 0.00 000 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
G!se 0.00 000 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 0.00 
Mm 0.00 0.00 000 0.82 0.31 2(x; 0.13 0.03 Q.21 
G!se 0.00 000 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.01 
W/AfiIClIl 300 CFA TreIlI 0.00 0.00 000 0.49 0.00 0.78 0.11 001 Q.lO 
G!se 0.00 0.00 000 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.01 
"SJglllfus "<I""'''' 
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3.5 Conclnsion 
IdentIfication and verification of selected African exchange rate regunes were carried 
out utllIzmg the econometric model developed by Frankel et al (2001) and structural 
break tests of BP and lILT. The study finds that de Jure regunes m Algeria, Egypt, 
Nlgena (for 1993-1998), South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and the CFA zones (for 
1981-1998) were the same with defacto. However, results for Botswana, Morocco, 
Nlgena (for 1981-1986 and 1999 - 2005) and the CFA zones (for 1999 - 2005) sug-
gest that de jure regimes were not the same WIth de facto. The results also mdicate 
that countnes sometime follow their announced regimes, but they tend to deviate 
from de jure regimes during difficult times. These highlight the inadequacies of de 
jure regimes in empirical analysis. In spIte of Its shortcomings, de jure classIfica-
tion can be useful in forward loolang modelling. The classification emphasizes the 
significance of central bank pronouncements as an indicator for private sector's ex-
pectations. ThIs IS because de facto classification is backward looking. A counter 
argument to this IS that, tins IS so only when the policy is credible, which IS a prob-
lem WIth many monetary authonties m developmg countnes. 
The use of structura1 break tests also indicates the problem that structural breaks 
in the mean of the change of the exchange rate time series, often seem to occur inde-
pendently of regime changes. This adds support to the view that although the de jure 
regime may be an announced mtended regime, the de facto classification itself, may 
not be very useful, since statistically stnJctural breaks seem to occur within the same 
de facto regimes. This suggests that policy-makers and analysts should focus on the 
pattern of the actual exchange rates, rather than be content WIth broad classIfications 
of regimes. 
Chapter 4 
Foreign Exchange Rate Intervention and 
International Reserves 
4.1 Introduction 
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Foreign exchange mterventions are transactions or announcements issued by a mon-
etary authority of a country, With an mtention to influence the exchange rate of that 
country VIS-a-VIS her main trading partners. Foreign exchange mterventions were 
not considered as an economic policy option at the beginning of the floating era in 
the 1970s, and the consensus then was in favour of zero intervention or pure floating. 
However, the floating industnahzed currencies experienced a high degree ofvo1atihty 
m both nominal and real exchange rates in the 1970s, which prompted a shift by both 
econonnsts and pohcy makers to the one that favours intervention (Samo and Tay-
10r,2001). Foreign exchange mterventions are found across regnnes m developed, 
emerging and developing economies. In the fixed exchange rate regime, according 
to the textbook elucidation, the monetary authontIes intervene in order to defend the 
domestic currency against foreign currencies with the aim of maintaining a given 
exchange rate Such interventions are carried out irrespective of the countries' fun-
damentals (Neely, 2007). There is a mixed opimon on the impact of the interventions 
on the exchange rate by both researchers and policy makers. Authors like Batlhe 
and Osterberg, (1997), Beine, Laurent and Lecourta (2003), Frankel (2003), Edtson, 
Cashin and Liang (2006) and Fratzercher (2006) found that mterventions come With 
or even cause lugh exchange rate volatility. Agwlar and Nydalh (2000) also found 
that interventions do not in general dampen exchange rate volatlhty. Kim and Sheen 
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(2002), Dommguez (2006) Hillebrand and Scbnabl (2003), Fatum and King (2005), 
on the other hand, found mixed effects. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2001) observe that developing countries seem to be more 
tolerant of foreIgn reserve fluctuations than exchange rate volatihty. 1hls means that 
as a country experiences exchange rate fluctuations, the authorities use thelT reserve 
stock to intervene in the foreign exchange market WIth the purpose of dampening 
exchange rate volatihty. TIns therefore, suggests that the two series may seem to 
have a long-run relatlonslup. Many empirical studies have used reserve volatility as 
a proxy for intervention. However, this approach has been cnticized because reserve 
volatility, as argued by these authors, cannot be attributed solely to foreIgn exchange 
interventlons. It is against this background that this chapter sets to investigate the 
relatIOnship between exchange rates and the foreign reserves in some Afncan coun-
tries. The specific ainJ of the chapter, therefore, is to empmcally investlgate the 
relationslup between the two, WIth specific reference to the appropriateness, or oth-
erwise, of using reserve volatility as an mrucator of interventions, more especially, 
m developing countries. The main contributlons are: empIrical mvestlgatlOn of rela-
tionship between exchange rate and reserves in developing countries, where there is 
acute problem of sourcmg data on mtervention; secondly, effects of reserve changes 
on exchange rate and VIce versa; and thrrdly the interventions pattern of Afiican 
countnes. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
oVerVIew of foreign exchange mterventlOns and Sectlon 4 3 discusses the types of m-
terventions Section 4 4 looks at the intervention policies m developing and emergmg 
econoIDIes while SectIOn 4.5 discusses exchange rate regimes and foreign reserves. 
Section 4 6 sets out the econometnc framework of the model. Section 4.7 ruscusses 
the estimated results while Section 4.8 concludes. 
--- ---------------------------------------------------
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4.2 Foreign Exchange Interventions in Theory 
Monetary authontles intervene in the exchange rate market to alter the direction of 
the exchange rates or to dampen exchange rate volatIlity that is normally associated 
WIth fioatmg exchange rate regimes. Foreign exchange interventions were part of the 
Bretton Woods system in which they were carried out whenever the exchange rate 
was considered to have deviated from the parity bands. However, after the collapse 
of the system in the early 1970s, interventions are carried out at the discretion of the 
monetary authorities. However, by 1977 the IMF Board issued three mam guiding 
rules for intervention polIcies for ItS member-countnes, which are. 
• countries should not use the exchange rate as an instnmlent to obtam 
greater competitive advantages than others, or to prevent balance of payment 
adJustlnents; 
• interventions should be done WIth the intention of smoothening out excessIve 
volatility or to address 'disorderly market conditions'; and, 
• whtle intervening, countries should consider other countries' exchange rate 
mterests. 
There are many reasons offered for foreign exchange mterventions in the ht-
erature, which include exchange rate misalignment, the dampening out of exchange 
rate volatihty, signalling and accommodating monetary policy, reserves buildmg and 
supply of foreign exchange to the market. Intervention to address misalignment hap-
pens when the authorities perceive that the country's currency is driven away from 
its 'equilibrium' by the market forces resulting in currency over or undervaluation. 
Monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market to reverse the effects 
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of deterioration in the country's trade deficit. In theory, an overvalued currency will 
make foreign goods and services relatively cheaper, stimulatmg imports, while do-
mestic goods will be relattvely more expensive to foreigners, thus reducing exports. 
lbis means that a country that experiences an apprecIating currency can lead to a ns-
ing trade deficIt. If that trade deficIt is VIewed as a problem for the economy, the 
monetary authorities may be pressured to intervene to reverse the nsmg trade deficIt. 
Such transactions are aimed at driving the exchange rate back to its equilibrium. 
Interventions are also used as a means of dan!pening out exchange rate volatil-
ity. It is argued in the hteral!!re that excessive volallhty can threaten proper and or-
derly functioning of the market and consequently affect consumption and investment. 
Disorderly market condItions are characterized by abrupt fluctuatIOns and excessive 
exchange rate volatility. International trade and mvestment decisions are much more 
dIfficult to make if the exchange rate value is changing rapIdly, as both trade trans-
actions and international investments, often depend on the exchange rate that will 
prevaIl at some point in the ful!!re. If the exchange rate changes rapIdly, up or down, 
agents will become more uncertain and investments WIll likely fall. Consequently, 
monetary authorities intervene m the foreign exchange market to restore orderly func-
ttonmg of the market. 
Foreign reserves accumulation may be a reason for intervention where it in-
volves buying up foreign currencies that the country uses as foreign reserves. For-
eign exchange reserves are typically accumulated over tme and held in the event of 
intervention or other transactions are required. The supply of foreign exchange to the 
market could be another reason for the monetary authorities' participation in foreign 
exchange market. Central banks m developing com,.tries are the maID suppbers of for-
eign exchange to the market through their mterventlOns. Another related argument 
for mterventlOn IS the need for active reserve management by the monetary authon-
ties m wluch foreIgn exchange assets that have relatively higher expected rel!!rns are 
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purchased wlule those that have relatively low expected returns are dIsposed Such 
actiVIties would be eqUIvalent to systematic foreign exchange intervention. 
The effectiveness of intervention in the long-run depends on the macroeco-
nomic policies that underpin it. Foreign exchange intervention is not an independent 
policy per se, therefore it may not induce permanent change in the exchange rate, es-
pecially when the objectives conflIct with the macroeconomic policies. It should be 
used m conjunction to other macroeconomic policies to address imbalances Within 
the economy, if the desired effect is to be aclueved. 
4.3 Sterilized Interventions 
The stenlized intervention aims to neutrahze the effects of changes m the domestic 
monetary base that came about as a result of the interventions. This occurs when au-
thontles offset Its intervention effects by disposmg its assets in order not to affect the 
country's money supply. In this circumstance, the authonties either concurrently, or 
shortly thereafter, take measures to counteract the lmpacts of the change in foreign 
assets holding on the domestic monetary base. The intended objective of a sterilized 
intervention IS to cause a change in the exchange rate while at the same time not af-
fecting the money supply, and hence, to leave interest rates unaffected. Because a 
change in the money supply will affect the average interest rate m the short-run and 
the pnce level and inflation rate, m the long-run. Smce central banks are nonnally 
entrusted to mamtam domestic pnce stabihty, or to assist in maintaining appropriate 
interest rates, a low unemployment rate and GDP growth, foreign exchange inter-
vention can interfere With one or more of these goals. Consequently, the monetary 
authontles stenltze their interventions in order to avert occurrence of contradIction 
with their domestic monetary policies. 
Since the sterilized interventions do not affect the exchange rate directly, dis-
CUSSIOns about ItS effectiveness are nonnally done within channels through wluch the 
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policy affects the exchange rates. According to Mussa (1981), there are three chan-
nels through which sterilIZed mterventJ.ons affect the exchange rate: the portfolio, 
signalling and the coordinating channels. The portfolio channel stems from the port-
folio balance model of exchange rate determination where agents spread theIr assets 
holdmgs among assets of different countries based on their relatJ.ve expected returns. 
If the authontles intervene and sterilized, the effects on the domestic mterest rate is 
minimal, as the level of the money supply has remained unchanged. However, the 
composition of the agents' portfolio is being altered. 1bis results m shifting the spot 
exchange rate to affect the domestic value of the foreign bond and their expected re-
!irrns. 1bis becomes possible if the assumption of the perfect substitutability between 
domestic and foreign bonds is relaxed. 
The signaIhng channel theory argues that sterilized interventions can be effec-
tJ.ve even if the perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets holds. Agents 
view the intervention as a signal about the fume monela!y policy. Since the ex-
change rate IS a forward-Iookmg vanable, a shift in expectattons about movements 
in a vanable that affect the exchange rate e g. relative money supplies will affect 
the current spot exchange rate. Intervention by the monetary authorities provides the 
market with the relevant mformation. The assumption is that the authorities have su-
perior information to the rest of the market participants, which they reveal through 
therr actIOns. In essence, private agents change their view on the likely futlrre actions 
of the monetary authonties or they change their view on the effects of some actions 
of the authonties based on the information revealed through the market transactions. 
However, authorities should be cautious of takmg actions that can undermine their 
credtbllity, which is essential for orderly market functioning. 1bis is why it IS ar-
gued that signalling channel will be weaker m emergmg and developing countries as 
monetary authonties m such countries suffer from institutional and policy credibil-
Ity. Lack of credJ.bllity could heighten the likelihood of speculative attack against the 
domestic currency (Samo and Taylor, 2001). For example, when interventions were 
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undertaken to defend an unsustainable exchange rate, market participants can resort 
to speculative transactIons. Domac and Mendoza (2004) while stressing this pomt 
have found empirically that the monetary authorities' signals in Mexico and Turkey 
had no impact on the exchange rate volatility. 
The third channel through which sterilized intervention affects exchange rate 
IS coordmating channel where mtervention takes place in order to stabilize exchange 
rate by coordmating speculative actiVIties of the informed market participants (Reitz 
and Taylor, 2006). At times, various interests and activities of the agents could lead 
to coordmating failure in the foreIgn exchange market. The monetary authonty, via 
ItS intervention policies coordinates the market, which bnngs back the exchange rate 
level to a level consistent with ItS fundamentals. 
In general, there is a great doubt about the effectiveness of the sterilized inter-
vention in the ilterature. The opinions can be summed up into three main VIewS. First, 
there are those who accept that interventions in a style of , leaning-against-the-winds' 
can affect both the level of exchange rate and also dampen out excess volatility. In 
tins, there are those who opine that the mtervention is only effective on the latter, 
but not on the former. Secondly, there are those on the other extreme who argue 
that interventions are not effective in alterIng the level of the exchange rate and/or 
dampening out volatlilty, but on the contrary, it contributes to exchange rate volatil-
ity. The third strand are those in the middle of the two extremes who contend that 
interventIOns are less sigmficant, as they do not affect the level of the exchange rate 
or address exchange rate volatility, but they do not think that intervention contributes 
to volatility (Domtmguez, 1998; Edison et aI, 2006). 
4.3.1 Non-Sterilized Interventions 
Non-stenIized mterventions happen when the authorities do not attempt to alter their 
money supply or interest rate by selling Its assets after the interventions. The trans-
action causes changes in monetary base as open-market operatIOns do. However, m 
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the fmmer, the traded assets are foreign, wlule in the latter it is domestIc assets that 
are transacted. The monetary approach to exchange rate determmation reveals that 
non-sterilized operatlOns can mfluence the level of the exchange rate in proportion 
to the changes that occurred in the relative supplies of domestic and foreign money. 
There seems to be a consensus that non-sten1ized mterventions are effective and can 
mfluence exchange rate levels by changing the stock of the monetary base. This in 
turn, results in changes in monetary aggregates, interest rates, market expectations, 
and consequently the exchange rate. 
4.4 Foreign Exchange Interventions in Emerging and 
Developing Countries 
The foreign exchange interventions are more acute m the emergmg and developing 
economies due to therr structural characteristics. Exchange rate markets of these 
economies are relatively small and could be highly volattle if the monetary author-
ities do not intervene to provide guidance and support. The finanCIal sectors are 
also not well developed that can make nsk-hedging against exchange rate risks pos-
sible. There is also non-existence of established record on macroeconomtc policies 
that agents can anchor their expectation upon, while forming their VIew on the future 
monetary and exchange rate poltcles. The mtervenlton poltcies m these countries are 
sometime part of the larger development policies. For example, the East Asian coun-
tnes had adopted an export-oriented strategy in the I 970s, which made it compellmg 
to adopt an exchange rate that can make their countnes attractive for investments and 
their exports cheaper. 
Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) observe that foreign exchange rate interven-
Itons in developing and emergmg countries are very frequent and large in size. The 
interventions are targeted at exchange rate mtsalIgnment, dampening of exchange 
rate volatility, reserves accumulations, and supply of foreign exchange to the market 
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However, they have singled out exchange rate policy as the main aim of interventlons. 
Most of the empinca1 work on the foreign exchange mtervention IS on the developed 
economies, IMF had conducted an elaborate survey on the foreign exchange mar-
ket organization m 2001 that covered 90 developing and emergmg econOlOles of ItS 
member-countries. These countries constitute 89% of the developing and emergmg 
economies exports, 91% of their imports, 85% of their GDP, and 20% of their in-
ternational reserves in 2000. The results suggest that intervention in these countries 
could bring about greater Impact on the path of exchange rate than in the developed 
economies, particularly where no currency crises was experienced. The report ar-
gues that unlike the monetary authorities in the developed economies, the authonties 
m developmg countries do not sterilize their interventIOns. Secondly, the authori-
ties in developing countries intervene in their foreign exchange market with amounts 
that are important relative to the level of the market turnover, the money base and 
the stock of the domestic bonds outstanding. Thirdly, authorities in developing coun-
tries may have a relative infonnation advantage compared to their counterparts in 
the developed economies. Many authorities in developing econOmies use regulatory 
policies and fore!gu exchange operations in acquiring infonnatlon, which enables 
them to mfer the aggregate of the foreign exchange order flow. It IS also argued that 
authontles m developing countries use moral suasion to mtenslfy effects of their for-
eign exchange market transactions. 
Although mterventlons m developed economies have become very infrequent 
m recent years, N eely (2007) asserts that authorities m developmg countnes are still 
actively involved in foreign exchange interventions across regimes and sizes of the 
market. The IMF survey indicates that the most frequent interventions take place 
m the intermediate regunes while fewer interventions seem to take place in the free 
floating regimes. 
Another Important featlrre of fomgu exchange rate mterventlons in developing 
countries is the posItion occupied by the central banks as a large customer. Cen-
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tral banks in these countries buy and sell foreign exchange for a number of reasons. 
FITSt, foreign exchange is needed for their expendItures, hke foreign debt servicmg. 
Secondly, they sell foreign exchange to the market in order to support the balance 
of payments. Thirdly, the central bank authoritJes could participate in the foreIgn 
exchange market with the aim of influencing the exchange rate level or to danIpen 
exchange rate volatility, as It IS done in developed countries. In the whole, govern-
ments or thelT agencIes m the developing economies are Important sources of foreign 
exchange because of the relative large size of the government economy. 
It IS also argued that the most inIportant reason for governments of develop-
ing countries often participate in the foreign exchange market, is defending their 
exchange rate polIcy objectIves. It was dIscovered that on a number of occasions, 
government of developmg countries or thelT agencies borrow from abroad with the 
main purpose of defending their exchange rate polIcy, but not to finance therr fis-
cal deficits. Taylor (1982) identified this type of transaction in the foreign exchange 
market by the developmg countrIes way back m the early 1980s. 
4.5 Exchange Rate Regimes and the Reserves 
The relationship between exchange rate and reserves IS weIl establIshed m the text-
book expositions as the latter is used to stabilize a given exchange rate. There are 
many empirical works that used reserve volatJlity as determmant of exchange rate. 
The IMF in 1999 started incorporatmg reserves volatility among the exchange rate 
determinants. Other works that have lInked the exchange rate and the reserves are 
Levy-YeyatJ et al (2003), Berg, Borensztem and PatJllo (2004) and Bordo, Eichen-
green, Klingebiel and Soledad-Martinez (2001). This may not be unconnected to the 
problems associated with sourcing data on interventions, particularly in developing 
and emerging countries. It is only recently that central banks in the developed coun-
trIes have started releasing therr mterventlOn data. Therefore, several empirIcal stud-
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ies have used changes in international reserves as proxy for intervention. However, 
this method is cnticIzed on the basis that changes in reserves could not be attnbuted 
to mterventlon transactlons alone, but a number of other factors can cause reserves 
fluctuatlons, especially in developing countries as noted above. 
During the pre-floating era, the contnbutlons on the reserves were limited to 
the relationship between the reserve and the global liquidity, but the introduction of 
the flexible exchange rates in the 1970s and the development of the capItal markets 
resulted m dIscardmg the opmion on the adequacy of intematlonal reserves vis-it-vis 
the global liquidity. However, the financial crises of the 1990s rekmdled the discus-
sion, but rather on country level and concentrated on what IS the appropriate reserve 
level a country should hold in order to protect Itself from currency crises. Currently, 
the trend in the developing countries is accumulation of reserves, particularly in the 
Asian countries. As Fisher (2001), riglItly points out that, reserves are among the 
detenninants of a country's capability of preventing economic and financial crises. 
He further elaborates that reserves are important to all countnes, but more pertinent 
to the emerging and developmg countnes that generally experience volatile interna-
tional caPItal flows. 
Other related arguments in the literature include that reserves holdings reduce 
pOSSIbIlIty of currency crises or 'sudden stop' of capital inflow. Secondly, higlI re-
serves tend to lead to low costs of external borrowmg. These effects come from 
improved confidence, whIch is regarded as dIrect effects and througlI credit rating or 
sovereign currency debt as risks for lIkely default has reduced with the accumula-
tion of the foreIgn reserves, which is known as mdIrect effects. Hviding et al (2004) 
studying 2821 emergmg countries varymg across reginIe, find a strong non-hIIear ef-
fects ofhiglI reserves to exchange rate volatility. This means that a country WIth higlI 
reserves stock would expenence less exchange rate volatilIty. Flood, Perraudin and 
Vitale (1998) have also found relationship between reserves loss, balance of payment 
21 The COlD1tries in theIr sample mcluded 5 Afncan countnes. 
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crises and subsequent devaluations in Latin American countries in the 1990s. In gen-
eral the results show that the countries experienced reserves and exchange rate cycles 
during the period and suggested that unsuccessful devaluations were as a result of the 
process of reserves loss and gain cycles. 
There has been debate on the necessity of holding large reserves by a country 
smce the 1997-1998 Asian crises, as a preventive measure against speculative attack 
on its exchange rate. However, on the other spectrum, is a group who argue against 
accumulating reserves. The group contends that the reserves generally earn relatively 
less compared to other mvest1nents withm the economy. Secondly, there seems to be 
a problem of economic rationaiJty in that a country holds cash, and at the same time 
pay huge interest on outstanding obligations. Those who favour it on the other hand, 
argue that the cost of holding reserves is far less than the economic consequences 
of speculative attacks, which would normally results in sharp devaluations with the 
resultant Iugher foreign denommated debts and raises the phantom of inflation 
4.6 The Econometric Methodology 
Smce the work of Hamilton (1989), two groups ofiiterature on modelling economic 
variables defines different states of the regimes, and to allow for the Wcelihood that 
the dynamic behavIOur of econOmiC variables depend on the regime that occurs at any 
time developed The first group is the Markov-swltching models, which assumes that 
the regune cannot actually be observed but IS deternuned by an underlymg stochastic 
process. This means that although, probabilities on the occurrence of the different 
regimes can be assigned, It would be difficult to ascertain which particular regime 
has occurred at a given point in time. These were extended into Markov-Swltching 
Vector Error Correction (MS-VECM) models. The second group views modelling the 
regime, explicitly as a contmuous function of an observable variable like in threshold 
autoregresslve (TAR) models, introduced by Tong and Lw (1980). As a result, both 
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the past and the present regimes are known with the use of statistical techniques. 
Thus, giving the TAR models an edge over the Markov-switching models. 
Modelling exchange rates and reserve within the threshold context can be mo-
tivated by the fact that the transition mechanism is controlled by offiCial interventions 
in the market. For instance, it allows for distinguishing between the impact of the m-
terventtons on the exchange rates when there is a large reserves and their impact on 
exchange rates dunng whtch the reserve is small. Threshold models are becoming 
popular in applied econometrics because of their ability to caprure non-linearity and 
regtme shtfts in ttme senes. It IS observed that macroeconomic and financial time 
series typtfies by different regime behaviour and asymmetric responses to shocks. 
Therefore, the assumptions of parameter constancy and lineanty may be inappropri-
ate, whtch could lead to maccurate conclUSion. An important featltre of threshold 
models is their ability to captltre persistent behaviour while remaming stationary. 
For example, it is argued that variables like unemployment and interest rates should 
be stationary. However, the conventtonal tests for umt roots fat! to reject the null 
of non-stationartty. This resulted m argument that probably, threshold models may 
better explain the dynanncs of such series. A classical case Cited is that of the real 
exchange rates, which have been documented to possess umt root, which implies 
non-existence of mternational arbitrage and therefore, violation of the PPP hypothe-
sis. However, when threshold models were uttlized, effects of transaction costs are 
captl1red and the series appear globally stattonary (Bec, Ben-Salem and Carrasco, 
2004). Movements towards eqUlltbnum could not take place due to the presence of 
adjusttnents cost on the side of the economic agents. There is therefore a persis-
tent deviation from the equilibrium until such deviattons exceed a cnttcal threshold 
thereby resulttng ill a htgher benefit to adjust than the cost. Taylor (2006) asserts that 
non-linear adjustment models of the real exchange rate in which various adjusttnents 
in response of shocks have, largely solve the Rogotf's (1996) PPP puzzle. 
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The threshold comtegration was introduced by Balke and Fomby (1997) that 
combmes non-linearity with cointegration. Models that have comtegrating variables 
can be typrlied by an error correctIon model (ECM) that explains how the vanables 
respond to equilibrium in the face of deviations in such a way that the ECM repre-
sents an adjustment process through which long-run eqUlltbrium IS aclueved. Balke 
and Fomby (1997) explain that it is not possible that movement back to or along the 
equihbrium takes place at every time period because of the existence of adjustment 
costs on the side of the economic agents. In the same vein, interventions With the pur-
pose of altermg the exchange rate level, or to dampen volatility do not occur within 
a given band. Thus, mterventlons of tlus nature occur only when the exchange rate 
is outside the band or approaching the edge of the band. The threshold cointegration 
maintains that the cointegrating relationslup does not hold within a certain band, but 
only when the system is far away from the equilibrium, exceedmg a certain thresh-
old. Such adjustment IS useful in explaming the behaviour of monetary authonties. 
The authonties would intervene when the exchange rate deviates too far from what 
they consider to be the equihbrium. The threshold cointegration would capture a pos-
sible non-linear relationship between the exchange rate and foreign reserves in such 
a way that a mean-reverting dynannc behaviour of the exchange rate can be expected 
after exceeding a given threshold. 
Among the apphed work in the field are Baum, Barkoulas and Caglayan (2001), 
who used an estimated exponential smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) in 
modelling dev:tations from PPP. They found evidence of a mean reverting dynam-
ICS process for deviations from PPP. Enders and Slklos (2001) developed an Engle-
Granger test for cointegratlon that allows asymmetry m the adjustment toward equi-
librium and show that the test has better SIZe power properties than Engle-Granger 
test when there is an asymmetric departure from the equilibrium. Lo and Zlvot 
(2001) have devised a multi-variate threshold technique that was applied to US data 
and found threshold cointegration m tradable goods. Similarly, Obstfeld and Taylor 
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(1997) analysed PPP and law of one price, in wluch, possIbility of threshold was ex-
plIcitly accommodated, and discovered iliat the model performed well and provided 
reasonable parameter estimates. WhIle mvestIgating sIZe and duratIon of deviations 
from PPP, O'Connel (1998) found larger deviations from PPP are more persistent 
than the smaller deviations. Threshold model was also used by O'Connel and Wei 
(1997) m investIgating transport cost induced non linear behaviour of departures from 
PPP. The result suggests evidence of non linearity in mean reversion, but the devi-
ations depend on relative importance of fixed and variable costs. Taylor, Peel and 
Samo (2001) fitted a non linear mean reverting model to US real exchange rates and 
recorded a faster adjustInent speeds than previously reported. 
Based on BaIke and Fomby the threshold vector of set of two endogenous vari-
ables, log of exchange rates and log of reserves is given as: 
(4.1) 
wluch is a 2-dimensional 1(1) tIme series where e, and r, as defined above. The 
model assumes iliat there IS a long-run relationship between the series WIth a cointe-
grating scaler of f3 A linear VECM of order 1 + 1 takes the followmg: 
where 
1 
W'-I 
t.X'_I 
X'-I = t.X'_2 
t.Xt-l 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
where t. represents the first order difference operator, the regressor X t - I IS k x 1 
and A is k x 2 and k = 21 + 4 The error term, ut IS assumed to be a (2 xl) 
WIth fimte covanance matrIx E = E(ut, u;) A IS a coeffiCIent matrIx iliat describes 
the dynanncs in each of the regimes. If log of exchange rate €p,t , IS nonstationary 
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1(1), i.e. stationary on first differencing, then equation (1) represents a comtegrated 
system where Wt-I = e.-I - {3rt-I is a stationary error correction tenn. 
Based on Hansen and Seo (2002)22 the model in equation (4.2) could be ex-
tended as: 
t.Xt = {AiXt- I({3) + Ut ~f Wt-I({3) :5')' 
A2X t- I({3) + Ut ~f Wt-I({3) > ')' (4.4) 
where ')' is the threshold parameter. Equation (44) above can be alternauvely wntten 
m the following form: 
where 
du (')') = l(wt-J({3) :5')'), 
~(')') = l(wt-J({3) > ')') 
where I ( ) represents the indicator fimction. 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
The threshold model in (4 5) has two regtmes, defined by the value of the error-
correctlon term. The coefficient matrices Al and A2 manage the dynamics in the 
reginIes. Model (4 5) allows all coefficients, apart from the cointegrating vector, to 
switch between these two reginIes. In some cases, a constraint may be placed on Al 
and A2 to obtain a special case of the model, which allows some coefficients to shift 
between the regtmes. For instance, it may make sense to inIpose greater parsinIony 
on the model, by only allowmg some coefficIents to SWItch between reginIes. This 
IS a specIal case where constraints are placed on (AI; A2)' For example, a model of 
partlcular mterest only lets the coefficients on the constant and the error correction 
Wt-I to SWItch, constraining the coeffiCIents on the lagged Xt-J to be constant across 
reginIes. The threshold effect only has content if 0 < P(wt-J :5 ')') < 1, otherwIse 
the model sinIphfies to linear cointegration. A constraint is inIposed by assummg 
that 
22 I am grateful to Hanseo, who allowed a free download ofru. codes that are used here 
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(4.7) 
where 'Ir 0 is a trimmmg parameter and positive. 
The threshold model in equatJ.on (4 5) has two-regimes wluch is defined by the 
value of the error correction term. As long as the deviations from the equilibrium are 
lower or equal to the threshold, it would remain unlikely that the variables Xt would 
adjust towards the equilibrium. In other words, the variables would not be cointe-
grated. However, If the devIations are greater than the threshold, there is possibilIty 
of the variables would adjust towards equilIbrium, meaning that the variables would 
be comtegrated. 
If equatJ.on (3 5) is represented in the following form 
(4.8) 
where A(Wt_l) = Aldlt (,) + A2~t('), it could be seen that the threshold VECM 
can be mterpreted as a Imear VECM but with time varying parameters. 
Hansen and Seo (2002) also developed two LM test statistics to assess the 
evidence for threshold effects, a linear cointegration against the presence of threshold 
effects. The LM statJ.stic is: 
~ 
~ 
SupLM = SupLM((3,,) 
'YL"S:,'Y'5:'¥U 
(4.9) 
where (3, is the estJ.mated (3 and 1L and,U represent the search is set so that,L is 
the 'lro = 0.05 and,U is the 1 -'lro = 0.95 percentile. 
The model results in one threshold if the adJustJ.nent parameter differs signif-
icantly between the two-regimes. If the adJustJ.nent parameter for the inner regime 
is not different from zero, one could mterpret the threshold as transaction cost that 
needed to be high so that adjustJ.nent can be worthwhile. 
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4.7 The Estimated Results and Discussion 
The estimatlon started by subj ecting the senes, the log of exchange rates and the log 
of the level of reserves, to the unit root test. Table 4.1 presents the unit root test 
results from ADP, pp and KPPS. 
Table 4.1: Unit Root Tests 
ADF pp KPSS 
Series Level I" Level I" Level I" D1fference Difference Difference 
lkenres -089· -1725" -1 04· -2656·· I 96' 016" 
lkcncxc -092- -12 87 u -090· ·1290" 2 02' a 06 b 
ialgrcs -0 IS· -23 SI" -034· -2903" 1 89 I 008 b 
laJgexc 020· -15 SO" -002- ·1610" 20" o 2S b 
lbotsrcs -052'" -11 00" -1 28· -so IS" 1 97' o IS b 
tbotsexc -1 87· -1613" -1 98· -1609" 023 • 021 b 
19hnres -056· -253" -0 so· ·2795" 2 03' 007 b 
Ighnexc 060· -440" 1 61· -1233·· 1 63' o 6SbC 
lugantes -1 36- -1609" -14S· -2603·· I 97' o 3S b 
luganexc -2 19- -17 OS .. -2.29- -18 02·· I 74' 009 b 
lsares 1 76- -590" 023· -3278" 2 00' 024 b 
lsacxc -226· -1637" -227· -1636" 2 00' o 41 b1i 
Intgres -1 04- -1074·· -1 29· ·1649" 1 19· 033 b 
IDlgexc ·107· -1667" ·1 07. ·1669" 2 00· 012 b 
Imorres -1 46· ·1663·· ·1 23· ·2721" 1 92· 014 b 
Imorexc -254· .1S 94" -253· ·1592*- 038· OU b 
bcslgmficant at 1 % level of sIgnificance 
bdsignificant at 1 % and 5% level of sigmficance 
*Pailed to reject the null that the series has unit root 
**ReJected the null that the series has unit root 
"Rejected the null that the senes IS statIOnary 
bPailed to reject the null that the series is stationary 
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Based on the procedures for these tests explained in section 3 5 , the series 
were subjected to the battery of tests. In all the countries studied, stationarity i.e. 
non-presence ofumt root was r'<iected in favour ofnon-stationanty m the levels but 
stationary in first dIfference. Thus indicating that the series are all non-stationary 
1(1) processes. 
The results for all the countries estimated rejected the presence of linear coin-
tegration m favour of threshold cointegration. The p-values for both fixed regressor 
and the residual bootstrap are all zero. The thresholds are summanzed in Tables 4.2 
and 4.3. The diagnostics results reported m Table 4 3 indicate that the models are 
adequate. 
In Algerian two-regime threshold cointegration, the estimated threshold para-
meter is 21.30. The first regime has 39% of the observations and the second regime 
has 61% The latter is the usual regime. The error correction effects, in both e, and 
Tt models, are sigmficant. The size of the coefficients pomts to the fact that more 
adjustment takes place m the reserves m the first regime whereas the exchange rate 
adjUsts more in the second regime. This is consistent with the floating exchange rate 
regnne operated by the country. Figure 4 1 plots the error correction effects, which 
further illustrate this point, as there is a very small positIve error correctIOn effects for 
the reserves and strong negative effects for the exchange rate equations on left side 
of the estimated threshold. Strong negatIve error effects continued for the exchange 
rate wlnle the reserves equations have a slight negative error on the nght side of the 
estimated threshold. The results, as indIcated by the size of the estimated thresh-
old parameter and more adjustment occurred m exchange rate in the normal regime, 
suggest that the country operates floatmg exchange rate regime. 
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Tatie4.la 
Tbreshold VECM 
Country Vanab1es 
1st Regime 2nd ReglDlC 
et Imdel Tt rmdel Cttmdel Tt tmdel 
Intercept -1.86 o "g, ,;:, -033 (0 OS) (003 (o.oil 
-4325 8491 -2632 855 
Wt_1 (04 71 (213) (818) (2251 
IJ7 -0.Q4 ,.~) 0.0 et_I (OD4) (002) (004 (000) 
AIgena ·316 09,~ 011 OI~, T'_I (03) (01 (013) (004 
_ ... Id 
21.3 Plraneta-
CototegraJJD 391 Vector 
%ofobs 39 61 
Intercept -044 01 -197 -023 (0 (6) (006, (0461 (0") 
075 -07S 1>, -018 
Wt_! (0071 (0051 (0781 (069) 
07' 01S 12' 05 el_t (0 (4) (0.03) (023) (0J2) 
Botswana 01;, (~~, (~:i!, (1~~, Tt_I (007 ,.2 
Threshold 174 PlI'ametcr 
ComtegraDD 123 Vector 
%ofobs 89 11 
Intercept 02' 213118 -009 -19946 (010) (1321481 (001) (95 12) 
-239 -5694 78 (~~) 211i~ Wt_1 (002) (SI ,"oil (162 
-012 -~~!,' ,g~, -62' 84 et_I (0001 1303 (I27OSI 
Glan. -ODO 04;) (g~) OJ TI_I (000) (007 (00') 
Threshold 046 PII'lI11eter 
ComtegrllDD 097 Vocto, 
% ofobs 13 87 
Intercept 456 278 022 016 (049) (026) (005) (004) 
286 197 024 018 
Wt_! (041) (021) (002) (001) 
-5 5 -266 -014 -001 
et_I (o5Il (0281 (004) (001) 
Kenya 1153 491 023 008 
T'_I (094) (054) (006) (002) 
Thre~kl 
PlIlmettl' 09 
ComtegraDD 270 Vocto, 
%ofobs 22 I 78 
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Table4.2b 
Threshold VECM 
Oluntty VlIIliIble5 
1st ReglIre 2ndRegune 
erDDdel T, DDdel e.ODdel r, DDdel 
interoept ·104 ig;:) (~3J) 51;) (010) (078 
Wt_1 
-018 
(003) (g~ (g~) (:~i) 011 
0.8 256 ID7 270 
e.·1 (om) (013) (012) (0.31) 
Morocco -035 ·116 ono -011 ft_t (Om) (009) (013) (0 OS) 
T_ld 
028 Plnmctcr 
Cou:tegnlDD 029 Vcctor 
%ofobs 34 66 
Intercept 014 111 -031 012 (0 "') (014) (004) (003) 
-0.35 ·209 073 ·om 
Wt_1 (011) (018) (009) (006) 
-113 -1 14 -035 017 
e.·1 (001) (011) (012) (0 OS) 
Ntgena 0.33 2no 003 018 ft_I (016) (013) (003) (002) 
Tl.-e:sh:Ild 
097 Pnmeter 
ComtegnlnD 145 v""", 
%ofobs 40 60 
Intercept -010 ·113 011 ·15 (011) (010) (019) (016) 
072 415 -us 71~) Wt_1 (0.34) (0.35) (0 OS) (071 
e.·1 00:) (004 (~~) (~~) (~~g) 012 
SouthAfnca 003 013 -0 II OA4 f'_1 (002) (0.04) (010) (012) 
~Id 
412 Pmmctcr 
CoDegrtf:IOD 
.() 90 Vector 
%ofobs 46 54 
interoept (g.3,;) 0.32 ;~7~i ;~7~i OnI (001) 
(~~) (~~) ·248 ·248 Wt_l (0.33) (0.33) 
0.33 0.33 7.37 737 
e.·1 (0 OS) (0 OS) (113) (113) 
Ugaoda fl_1 :~~I (004) ig~) -3.59 it:) (206) 
Tbt'esbJld 015 PlI'lmeter 
Comtegratl)D 072 v""", 
%ofobs 79 I 21 
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Table 4.3: ThresIDld VECM 
. tics 
Test Fixed Bootstrap Counoy R.gress<r Statistics p-Value p-Value 
Algeria 19355 000 0.00 
Botswam 102.31 0.00 0.00 
Gbam 25477 0.00 0.00 
Kenya 193.62 0.00 0.00 
Morocco 16355 0.00 000 
NIgeria 9043 0.00 0.00 
Srnth 151.52 0.00 0.00 Africa 
Ug;mja 12582 0.00 000 
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Botswana's results indicate an estimated threshold of 1.74. The first regime 
is the usual or typical regime as 89% of the observations are included while the 
unusual or extreme regime has only 11% of the observations is included. The error 
correction effects are only sigruficant in the first regime and et model of the second 
regime. In the typical regime, the response of the reserves is more than the exchange 
rates. Botswana is on a peg regime, so the results seem to concur with that. The 
estimated parameters of the dIfferenced terms reflect the transitory effects in the first 
period and the next penod. The error correctIon effects are plotted in figure 4 2, 
in wluch a near zero effect for the reserves and moderate negative effects for the 
exchange rate equations on the nght SIde of the threshold The reserves and the 
exchange rate equations record slight and strong negative effects on the nght side 
of the threshold with an implication that exchange rate beyond the threshold would 
result ID an appreciation with an accompanying reduction in the reserves, but the rate 
of the appreciation seems to be higher than the reduction level in reserves. 
The estimated two-regime threshold cointegration for Ghana has an estimated 
threshold of 0 46 WIth the first regime as the unusual regime, as only 13% of the ob-
servations whereas the second regune, the usual regime has 87% of the observatiOns. 
The error corrections effects are significant in both regunes. The coefficients of the 
error correction effects suggest that more adjustlnent takes place in the reserve, in 
both the first and the second regtmes. The error correctIOn effects, as plotted ID fig-
ure 4.3 show that the exchange rate equations recorded a near zero effects on both 
the left and the nght side of the threshold whereas the reserves equations have con-
trasting recorded strong posItive and negative effects on the left and nght SIde of the 
threshold, respectively. The exchange rates remam somewhat stable after the thresh-
old but the reserves declined sharply after the threshold. 
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Exchange Rates and Reserve Responses to Error Correctton 
FIgure 4.1: Algeria Figure 4.2: Botswana 
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Exchange Rates and Reserve Responses to Error Correction 
Figure 4.5. Morocco Figure 4.6: Nigeria 
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Kenyan two-regnnethreshold VECM reveals a threshold of 0 9 The first regime, 
which is the unusual or extreme regime, has 22% of the observations and the usual or 
the typICal regime, which includes 78% of the observations. The error correction ef-
fects are more significant in the second regnne, which is the usual regime. The sizes 
of the coefficients indicate that more adjustment occurs m the exchange rate than in 
the reserves. This IS consIstent WIth a flexible exchange rate regime, which Kenya 
operates. Figure 4 4 represents the error correction effects with both the exchange 
rates and the reserves equations havmg strong positIve effects on the nght side of the 
threshold and near zero effects after the threshold 
The estimated two-regime threshold cointegration for Morocco shows an estI-
mated threshold of -0 28. The first regime IS the unusual regime, consIsting of 34% 
of the observatIons wlnJ.e the usual or second regime, which is the usual regime in-
cludmg 66% of the observations. The error correction effects are SIgnificant in both 
regimes and the size of the coefficients suggests that there is more adjustment in the 
exchange rate m the first regune and the adjustments in the second regime do not 
slgmficantly differ m the second regnne. The results do not devIate much from the 
expected one, as Morocco has a managed float regune. The error correction effects, 
as m figure 4.5 show a slIght negatIve effect and a near zero effects for the exchange 
rate and the reserves equations on the left SIde of the estImated threshold. While the 
exchange rate recorded moderate positive effects, the reserves exlublted a strong pos-
itive one on the right SIde of the estunated threshold. The reserves rose considerably 
after the threshold WIth a slIght apprecIatIon of the currency. 
The estimated two-regune threshold for NIgeria has a threshold of 0 97%. The 
first regnne IS the unusual or extreme regune, includmg 40% of the observations 
included while the second and the usual regune has 60% of the observation. The 
adjustment in the second regime seems to be placed on the reserve than in the ex-
change rate. The error correction effects are sigmficant in both the regimes. Figure 
4 6 plots the error correction effects, winch shows that the reserve has more positive 
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effects than the exchange rate on the left side of the threshold whereas the reserve 
has a slight positive effect while the exchange rate has negative effects on the right 
side of the threshold. 
The estimated two-regime threshold VECM for South Africa shows a threshold 
of 4.12, and the first regime is the usual regime as 79% of observations are mc1uded. 
The second and unusual regime IS when the exchange rate includes 21% of the ob-
servations. The error correction effects are significant in both the regimes. The error 
correction term allows analysis of the behavIOur of the gap between the exchange 
rate and the reserves. The size and the magnitude of the coefficients tell us about 
the processes of how the long-run equih'brium between the exchange rate and the re-
serves is maintained. The coeffiCients on the error correction term suggest that the 
response of reserves IS Jngher than the response of the exchange rate. A value of gap 
above 4 1 % m one month would result in downward pressure on the exchange rate 
m the followmg month whereas a value of gap below 4 1% m one would result in 
upward pressure m the subsequent month. The exchange rate revealed a near zero 
effects at both the left and nght Sides of the estimated threshold The reserves equa-
tions on the other hand, have negatlve effects at both the left and the right side of the 
estimated threshold. 
The Ugandan two-regune threshold VECM has with an estimated threshold -
0.15. The first regime is the usual regime, as 79% of the observations are mcluded. 
The second and the unusual regime has 21% of the observations mc1uded. The error 
correction effects are sigmficant in both reglIDes. The exchange rate equation has 
small negative effects while the reserves equations have a slight pOSitive effect at the 
left side of the threshold. But both equations display strong negatlve effects with 
the exchange rate more negative than the reserves on the right side of the estimated 
threshold. This means that both the exchange rate and the reserves would drastically 
dechne after the threshold. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter uses the threshold cointegration techruque to investigate the relationship 
between exchange rates and international reserves ID C1ght Afncan countries The 
results have shown that threshold cointegration exists between the senes, meaning 
that a long-run dynamic relationship between them exists. This means that, as it 
is done ID empmca1 work, the use of reserves volatility as a proxy for intervention 
could be valid. The error correction effects have shown how changes and adjustments 
take place within and between the series. In some cases, adJustInents are lugher in the 
exchange rate and in some cases it is the reverse. The threshold varies from ID to 0.28 
in Morocco to 4.12 in SouthAfnca. This IS a reflection of the degree of tolerance that 
the countries have for exchange rate volatility. In general, countnes that have fioatIDg 
regimes seem to have higher threshold and the exchange rates appear to adjust more 
than the reserves. 
From the policy point of view, the results suggest that interventions by authori-
ties are mfluenced, ID addition to the exchange rate regime operated, by availability of 
foreign reserves and level of exchange rate volatility. The non-lmeanty suggests that 
official interventions in foreign exchange markets are such that nommal exchange 
rate movements are asymmetric. This is because, for example, as found by Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002) monetary authonties tend to be more tolerant of currency appre-
ciation than depreciation. 
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Chapter 5 
The Long-Run Determinants of African 
Real Exchange Rates 
5.1 Introduction 
Afiican economic growth has been the lowest among the developmg countries (The 
World Bank, 1995). In the 1980s and 1990s, the per capIta GDP has, on average, 
declined by almost I % per annunt. The declme was so alarming that about 32 coun-
tries of the continent were poorer in 1990 than they were in 1980. By the mid-1990s, 
sub-Saharan Afiica, which constItutes about two-thrrds of the Afiican continent, had 
the lowest income m the world. Thts dismal performance of Afiican econOlmes 
was attributed to, among others, poor macroeconomic policies and mappropnate ex-
change rate regintes. Specmcally, the IMF and the World Bank had IdentIfied ex-
change rate and trade policies as the major causes of the econolntc crises. Razin and 
Collins (1997) has found an empirical support for that. In an extensive analysis ofim-
pact of misalignment on economic growth, they found that there is negative relation-
ship between overvalumg of a country's currency and economic growth. Conversely, 
the paper reveals that nuld undervaluallon leads to economic growth". Similarly, 
Roudet, Sexegaard and Tsangarides (2007) work on the WAEMU zone", indtcate 
that the currency of the zone, the CFA was characterized by lugh degree of misalign-
ment. Therefore, one of the components of the structural adjustment programmes 
23 The analySIS had covered all the contments of the world, developing and developed countries 
Amongst wluch were 23 sub-Saharan and 4 North AfrIcan countries For detail. see Razm and Col1ins 
(1997) 
24 It refers to the west AfrIcan CFA franc zone that pegs Its currency to the Euro See chapter 3 for 
dISCUSSIon about the zone 
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adopted by twenty nine African economies in the 1980s, was an mtroducnon of more 
flexible exchange rate systems. 
TIns chapter is a contnbution to the long-run determinants of real exchange 
rates m Africa. It utilizes the Johansen cointegration procedure and vector error 
correctIOn mechanism, VECM, based on a trade balance model of exchange rate 
determination. The rest of the chapter is set out as follows. Section 5 2 deals WIth the 
theoretical bases of the model and Section 5.3 is on the econometnc methodology, 
where concept of comtegration, VAR and VECM are explained along with the model 
checkmg technique for the robustness of the model. SectIOn 5.4 discusses the data 
and the estnnated results wlnle Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 A Theoretical Framework 
This chapter draws on the trade balance relanon. This model is appealmg to the 
developing countries' economies that experience few private capital flows. DIfferent 
versIOns of the trade balance models have been used on many developing countries2S. 
The concept dates back to Meade (1951) and Swan (1963), but in the recent litera!tlre 
from Williamson (1983) such models are referred to as 'fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate'. The model assumes that current account balance, CAB, consists of 
trade balance, TB and invisible balance, I NV. In equilibrium, the current account is 
defined as: 
CAB=TB+INV=O (5 1) 
where CAB, TB and I NV as defined. The trade balance, TB, is assumed to be a 
function of the domestic and foreign demand, yd and yd. and the real exchange rate, 
ep' Ip. Thus: 
(5.2) 
25 For details, see Hmkle and Monliel (2001) 
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The foreign and domestic demand for output is a positive function of output and 
negative function of mterest rates 
Yd* = a"(y",··) a" > 0 a" < 0 , 1 '2 
yd = a(y,t) al > 0, ~ < 0 
Using equations (5.3) and (5.4) above, we obtain 
TB = 7" (a" (y", to) Ja (y, t), (ep" Jp» 
(5.3) 
(54) 
(5.5) 
Linearizing, using a Taylor's expansion and ignoring the second and higher order 
terms, giVen, after rearranged YIelds 
TB = 7"1(y" - y) + 7"2(t· - i) + 7"3(e+p· - p) 
where 7"1 > 0,7"2 >< 0 and 7"3 > o. 
(5.6) 
Turnmg to the invisible account, which is uniquely aid flows, A, plus any in-
come earned by domestic residents from trading foreign currency assets. The tradmg 
activities are a negattve function of domestic interest rates and positive function of 
foreign interest rates, hence· 
- + 
INV = t· B~(t,t") + A 
Lmeanzmg equatton (5.7) gives 
INV = </>(t· - t) +A 
where </> > 0 Combinmg equations (5.6) and (5.8) proVldes 
Therefore, 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
Equation (5 10) states that the equilibnum real exchange rate depends positively on 
relative output and on aid received. The mterest rate rufferentta1s can be eIther neg-
ative or positive. Countries with more open capital market and a larger stock of 
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overseas assets should have larger value of 1/>1 and therefore mterest rate dIfferentIal 
should be positIve in those countries and Vice versa. 
5.3 The Econometric Methodology 
This chapter utilizes the Johansen (1988, 1992) maxunum hkebhood estImator for 
the establishment of long-run relationshIp between the real exchange rate and the 
vanables discussed in the previous section. The Johansen methodology addresses 
autocorrelation and endogemety parametrica1ly by a vector error correctIOn mecha-
nism (VECM) formulation. The advantage of this methodology in this work is the 
estimated coefficIent, (3, can be a measure of the equilibrium exchange rate and con-
sequently quantifies the gap between the current exchange rate and its eqwbbrium 
level. It also derives estImates of the speed that the real exchange rate converges to 
the equihbnum level. 
The methodology can be explamed thus· Defining a vector, 
x, = [RER,RGDP,GRANT,INRD1F,R1SKPj (5.11) 
where RER is real exchange rates, RG D P refers to relative GDP, GRANT denotes 
aid received by the country, IN RD I F F is interest rate dIfferentials and RISK P 
represents country risk. The vector is represented by a vector autoregressive model, 
V AR A V AR estimation involves specification and estimation of a model and check-
ing its adequacy. If defects are detected, the model is revised until a satisfactory 
model is achieved. The estinIation started WIth unit root tests for the integrated levels 
of the variables. This is in order to make sure that the variables included in the model 
are all 1(1) variables, as stationary vanable can result mto arriving at a wrong con-
clusion of presence of comtegration, whIch could have been driven by the statIonary 
variable. More so, inclusion of variables that are of dIfferent mtegratIon, say 1(1), 
1(2) and 1(0) would greatly affect the results. The second step is to test for the coin-
tegration and the third step IS to construct the vector error correctIon (VECM). The 
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vector error correction model explams the adjustment mecbamsm of real exchange 
rate from its short run to Its long-run position. The basic VAR model of order p 
(V AR(P)) can be specified as: 
(5.12) 
where A,(i = 1, ... ,p) are (K x K) parameter matnces and random tenns process 
Ut = (Uti,. ,Ukt)' is K -dimensIOnal zero mean wlnte nOIse process with covariance 
E(Utu;) = ~. Precisely, Ut ~ itd(O,~) The system represented in (5.12) can be 
written more compactly using the lag operator as follows: 
A(L)Xt = Ut (5.13) 
where A(L) = 1k - AIL - - A,.£P and is a matnx polynomial in the lag operator 
of order p. The VAR representatIon m (5.12) above, IS not swtable forvanables with 
stochastIc trend I.e. ~ 1(1) as they could be cointegrated. Comtegration relations are 
of VItal intportance and they do not appear overtly m the equation. The comtegration 
relations are normally ana1yzed Within the VECM representation 
(5.14) 
that is obtained by subtractmg Xt_1 on both Sides of the equation and re-arranging it. 
IT = -(h - Al - .. - Ap), whereas 1 symbohzes identIty matnx, r, = -(A'+l + 
.. + Ap) for J = 1, . , P - 1 Smce AXt does not contain stochastic trends, that is, at 
least all vanables are at most 1(1), ITXt IS the only one that has 1(1) vanables. ITXt_1 
must be also 1(0) as it contains the cointegrating relations. r,(J = 1, .. ,p - 1) are 
the short run parameters, which determine the short run movements of the variables 
and ITXt_1 is the long-run or the error correction or eqwlibrium correctIon term of the 
model. If IT IS of full rank or zero rank, then there is no comtegration exists among 
the elements in the long-run relationship. In tins case It would be appropnate to 
estimate the model either m levels, where the vanables are 1(0) or in first dIfference 
if they are ~ 1(1) But if on the other hand, IT is of reduced rank, r, then there is 
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n x r matrices a and {3 such that IT = a{3' In this case the VECM representation 
becomes 
!lXt = a/3'Xt_1 + rl!lXt_1 + ... + r p-1!lXt-P+I + Ut (5.15) 
{3 is the matrix, where each column in the matrix represents a cointegrating vector. 
{3 = ({31,{32" ,{3.) has r cointegratmg vector, {3'. a is the adjustment coefficient 
matrIx. All indIvidual element in a denotes the speed of adjustment of the error cor-
rection tenn. The cointegrating relations are the long-run relatIOns, which according 
to Johansen (2006), does not mean that such condItions would only materialIze af-
ter sometinIe but these relationships are there always which influence the movement 
of the process Xt, through the adjustment coeffiCIents, a. Thus, the more the process 
{3' Xt deviates from E {3' Xl> the more a adjusts the process back to its mean 
Johansen (1991) developed two tests to determme the comtegration among the 
variables in Xt; the trace (T R) and the maxunum eigenvalue tests. The trace stattstics 
for the null that there exists at least r dIstmct co integrating vector is given as follows: 
N 
Air""" = -T L In(I- A.) (5.16) 
~ ~ 
where A.are the estinIated eigenvalues Ab A2 ... , Akfrom the IT matrix. It starts withp 
eigenvalues and successIvely, the largest is removed. That is Alrace = 0 when all the 
A. = 0, for ~ = 1, . ,g. The trace IS Jomt test in which the null is that there exist of 
comtegratmg vector of less than or equal to r against the alternatIve of more than r. 
The maximum eigenvalue has a null that the cointegrating vectors are r at most, 
agamst an alternattve of r + 1 and gIVen as follows: 
~ 
Amax = -Tln(l- Ar+l) (517) 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1995) had generated cnttca1 values for 
the statistics as they have non standard distribution under the null but depend on 9 - r, 
whIch IS the number of non stationary component and whether constants are included 
in the equations. 
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The last step is to check for the model adequacy, that IS, the model has truly rep-
resented the DGP appropriately. Generally all model-checking procedures are based 
on the residuals of the final model estimated. These range from VIsual inspection 
of the plots of the reslduals and their autocorrelation to formal tests for residual au-
tocorrelation and hetroscedasticity, to determme Jf they conform to the wlnte noise 
assumption. Stability checking is another important model-checking procedure. Sta-
bility checkmg for the first order VAR suggests that for a VARlVECM to be stable, 
all ItS characteristic roots should he withm the urnt circle. Tests for normality are also 
carried out, but Lutkepohl (2006) argue that normahty is not a necessary conrution 
for the validity ofVAR models. In this work, stabJIity checking, autocorrelation and 
hetroscedastlclty tests are carried out on the residuals of the final models estimated. 
These tests are explained below. 
The lM test for resIdual autocorrelation of order h is a test of zero coefficIent 
matrices in the following model: 
'Ut = B1'Ut-l + .. + B'Ut-h + e, (5.18) 
in winch et is wlntenoise error term The hypotheses are Ho: B. = 0, (z = 1,2 h) 
against HI . B. i- 0 for at least one E {I, ... , h}. The test statistIc is based on an 
auxiliary model of this kind' 
(5.19) 
U are the estimated residuals from the onginal model and e; IS an auxiliary error term. 
But since the underlymg model m tIns case is a VECM, the auxiliary model takes the 
following forms: 
~ 
u = a{3Yt-I + rl~Yt-I + .. + r p-1~Yt-p+l + Blu,-I + Bhu,-h + et. (5.20) 
~ 
(3 is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of the cointegration matrix. Repre-
~. 
sentmg the estimated reslduals in equations 517 and 518 by et(t = 1,. T) and 
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- . ., 
the corresponding residuals covariance matrix estimator by Ee = ~ Ee, et , the LM 
statistics can be specified as: 
..... -1 ..... 
QLM = T(K - tr(Eu Ee)) (5.21) 
It has an asymptotic X2 (hK2) dtstribution. 
A test for multivariate autoregressive condttional hetroscedasucity of order q 
for residual vector Ut takes the following form 
where vec is the column-starking operator for symmetric matrices that stacks the 
columns from the main dtagonal downwards and Et / t - 1 is the condttional covariance 
matrIX of Ut given Ut-1,Ut-2. 130 IS a 4K(K + I)-dImensional parameter vector 
wlule BJ's are (4K(K + 1) x !K(K + 1)) coefficient matrices for (J = 1, .. , q). 
The pair of the hypothesis that are tested are Ho : B, = ... = Bq = 0 against 
H, : B. ,;, 0 for at least t E {I, . q} If Ho IS not rejected, there is no ARCH in the 
res1duals. 
However, given the fact that V AR model IS sens1uve to the lag order, there 
is need to determine the optimum number of the lags. Here the cntena used are 
the sequentlal modrlied LR test statlstic, (LR), the Ftnal Prediction Error (FPE), the 
Alauke Information Criterion (AlC), the Schwarz Information (SC), the Hannan-
Quinn Cnterion (HQ) (each test at 5% level). The A,kaike's information cnterion is 
given thus: 
- 2 AIC(m) = 10gdet(Em ) + TmK2 (5.23) 
Em = T-IEu,;;,'is the residual covariance matrix estimator for a model of order m 
and mK2 is a function of m which penalizes large V AR order while log det mea-
sures the appropriateness of order m The Hannan-Quinn's is denoted by the follow-
ing equations: 
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HQ(m) = 10gdet(I:m) + 210g~OgT mK2 (5.24) 
2 log log T IS the sequence that is dependable on the sample sIZe The Schwarz crite-
na are presented as follows: 
- 10gT Seem) = 10gdet(Em) + TmK2 (5.25) 
where log TIT is the sequence winch also depends on the sample size. AlC suggests 
the largest lag order and SC picks the smallest order wlule HQ IS in between the two 
(Lutkepohl, 2007). But It IS possible to have the three criteria to agree m the chOIce 
ofVAR order. 
5.4 Data and Estimated Results 
The data are sourced from the IMF International Financial Statistics database, the 
World Bank Development Indicators and the World Bank African Database CD Rome 
(2005). The exchange rates variable is the real effective exchange rates taken from 
the IMF database, and where it was not available, real exchange rate was constructed 
by deflating the domestic oommal exchange rate in terms of US dollar by the domes-
tic inflatlon, proxied by the CPI. 
Tables 5.1a - 5 le report the unit root tests results for the series The tests 
are based 00 the ADF, pp and KPSS procedures that were explained in Chapter 3. 
In general the tests rejected statlonarity of the senes in levels in favour of non sta-
tionanty in first difference, which means that the log of real exchange rates, interest 
rate differentials, log of atd, log of relative real GDP and contry nsk indeces are J(l) 
processes.26 It IS, therefore, appropriate to use the VECM specificatiOll to estlmate 
the model. 
26 The country nsk IS proxied by rallo of GDP to foreIgn debts (taken from World Bank Africa 
Database CD) m all the countnes except ID South AfrIca, where government bond YIeld was used. 
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TableS.la 
Unit Root Tests Results 
LREER INRDIFF LGRANT RGDP RISKC 
Levels -036- -1.9- -075- -057- -042-
ADF I" 
Difference -S 35-- -93** -3.7S-- -346-- -5.70--
Algeria Levels -056- -I 16- -074- -025 -0 IS-
pp I" 
Difference -S 46-- -937-- -5.79** -S.29-- -7.27--
Levels 100' 094' 0.73' I 12' 0.30' 
KPSS I" 012" 028" 0.21" 012" O.ll" Difference 
Levels -1.41- -2.19- -122- -1.79- -2.14-
ADF I" 
Difference -S 35-- -S60" -49S-- -49S-- -346--
Botswana Levels -135- -2 SO- -101- -1.28- -169-
pp I" 
Difference -842·· -861-- -629-- -8.39-- -620-· 
Levels 1 10' 0.77' I 16' I 11' 1.10' 
KPSS I" 011" 014" 010" 0.22" 0.17" Difference 
Levels -038· -200· -248· -127· -I 19-
ADF I" 
Difference -S 02·· -S 89-- -422·· -819·· -3 OS" 
Levels -065· -275· -24S· -256· -039· 
Egypt pp I" 
Difference -945·· -S SS·· -479-· -7 S7·- -665-· 
Levels 102' 022' 0.22' 031' 0.99' 
KPSS I" 009" 007" 004" o OS" 033" Difference 
Levels -1.44· -1.51- -1.27- -1.54- -201· 
ADF I" 
Difference 4.85·· -842·· -634·· -576·· -578*-
Levels -I 26· -16S- -145- -15S- -208-
Ghana pp I" 
Difference -60S*· -849*· -600" -s 87·· -491·· 
Levels 091' 076' 096" 099' 047' 
KPSS I" 0\2" 027" 012" 004" 018" Difference 
*Fatled to reject the null that the senes has a umt root 
··ReJect the null that the senes has a umt root 
'Reject the null that the senes IS statIonary 
"FaIled to reject the null that the sene. IS stallOnary~ 
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Table 5.tb 
UnIt Root Tests Results 
LREER tNRDIFF LGRANT RGDP RISKC 
Levels ·178* -1.74* -1.22* -087* -051* 
ADF I" 
Difference -6.78** -694** -745** -045** -586** 
Kenya Levels -I. 78* -I 98* -183* -174* -1.82* pp I" 
Difference -640** -668** -531** -859** -586** 
Levels 1.11- 0.55- 017" I 12- 029' 
KPSS 1 025" 028" 0.\1" 016## 005' Difference 
Levels -292* -I 61* -306* - -0.14* 
ADF 1044** 
I" 
-854** -7.62** -8.07** -600** -373** Difference 
-Levels -2.88* -2.07* -278* 036' 
Morocco pp 18.51** 
1· 
-8.70** -7.60** -9.78** - -589'* Difference 4615** 
Levels 024- 077' 074- 040· 1.04-
KPSS I" 019- 0.25" 0.35" o 18- 039" Olfference 
Levels -I 52* -244* -009* -3.04* -260' 
ADF 1 
Difference -7.65** -717** -377** -545** -434** 
Levels -I 57* -217* -0.27* -466** -234* 
Nigeria pp 1 
Difference -775** -687** -479** -626** -598** 
Levels 069' 020- 086- 025- 024' 
KPSS I" 0\1" 005" 016' 0.14- 0.32" Difference 
Levels 
-I 54* -272* -I 31* -1.34* -1.32* 
ADF I" 
Difference -471" -7.30** -1265** -906** ~8 39** 
South Levels -1.72* -2.97* -1.12* -1.31* -142* 
Africa 
pp I" 
Difference -865** -718** 1261** -9.06** -8.26** 
Levels 0.86' 018' 052' 1.11' 028' 
KPSS I" 006" 006" 0.13" 031" 0.10" Difference 
*Faded to reject the null that the senes has a umt root 
**ReJect the null that the senes has a Uott root 
'Reject the null that the series IS statIOnary 
"'Failed to reiect the null that the senes IS statIOnary 
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TableS.le 
Unit RooI Tests Results 
LREER INRDIFF LGRANT RGDP RISKC 
Levels -238- ·3199-- ·218- -1.24' .() 86-
ADF I" 
Difference ·853" -590*- -300-' -998-- ·357" 
Tanzania Levels -238' ·268' -113' -1.34' .() 08' 
pp 
I" 
Difference ·933" -684 -492"'· ·998-- -703-' 
Levels 026' 064' 082' 069' 027" 
KPSS I" 
Difference 0.11" 012" 0.10" 037" 011' 
Levels ·140' ·1.93· ·012' -208' ·198' 
ADF I" 
Difference -797" -868" -387-' -1585'· -3 SI--
Levels ·1.30* ·273- 0.35' -1466" -165-
Tunisia pp I" 
-812-- ·868-- -626-· ·3629-' ·540'· Difference 
Levels 088' 022' 1 11' 032' 040-
KPSS 
I" 013" 005' Oil" 086" 019" Difference 
Levels 416·· ·186· ·019' ·1043·' 089· 
ADF I" 
Difference ·8 16·· -946·· -781" -596"''' -260·· 
Levels ·284' ·196' .() 71· ·25 62·' 163· 
Uganda pp 
I" 
·11 04·' ·947·- -683-· 4576" -665·· Difference 
Levels 097" 021' 1 IS' 033' 1 02' 
KPSS 
I" 025" 010" o OS" 018" 016" Difference 
'Failed 10 ~ect the null that the senes has a urnl root 
"Reject the null that the senes has a urul rool 
'R<;Ject the null that the senes IS statIonary 
"FaIled to ~ect the null that the senes IS statlonarv 
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Tables 5 2a - 5.2b contain results for Johansen comtegration tests based on 
trace and maximum eigenvalues statistics. In all cases the mformation critena ex-
plamed above, was used in selectmg the appropriate lags length In case of Algeria, 
the identified lag order is six and the cointegration test of intercept Wlthout detennin-
istic trend was identified. The trace stabstics reported two cointegrating relationship 
whereas the maxunum elgenvalues statistics reported one cointegratmg relabonslnp. 
To be on the safer Side, one comtegrating relationship was chosen. One cointegrat-
ing relationship was identified for Botswana based on four lags detennined from the 
opttmum lag cntena. One cointegrating relationslnps is identified for Egypt, based 
on the trace and the maximum eigenvalue tests. This was on six lags chosen by the 
informabon criterion. Two cointegratmg relationships were identified for Kenyan 
real exchange rate. Morocco's results have identified four cointegrating relation-
ships base on six lags ascertained from the information cnteria. Three comtegrating 
relatIOnships were discovered for Nigenan real exchange rate where as a single coin-
tegrating relatlOnslnp VECM results for South African real exchange rate based on 
six lags chstmguished from the information criteria. Two cointegrating relabonship 
were found for Tanzania based on six lags by both the trace and the maximum elgen 
value tests. Three comtegratmg relationships were found for Uganda, based on eight 
lags. 
The VECM results were reported m Tables 5 3 and 5 4 while Tables 5.5 and 
5 6 report the model-checking results. The model evaluation and diagnostic tests are 
to assess if the models estinIated represent the DGP. The results reported are those of 
autocorralation LM tests and hetroscedastlclty tests for the residuals of the respective 
models estimated. 
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Table 5.2a 
VAR Colntem ation Tests Statistics 
HypothesIZed No ofeEs Trace Max Elgenvalues Rank 
r=O 91807' 43 lOO' 
Algena ,SI 48702' 21393 
,S2 27309 17126 r=1 
rS3 10183 9579 
rS4 0603 0603 
,-0 74441' 38680' 
,SI 35761 20827 
Botswana rS2 14934 7527 r=1 
,S3 7406 5114 
,S4 2.293 2293 
r=O 111398' 52639' 
,SI 58759- 26017 
Egypt ,S2 32742' 20.270 r=l 
rS3 12472 9442 
,<4 3030 3030 
r=O 113482' 38909' 
,SI 74573' 33503' 
Ghana ,S2 41070' 21.203 r=2 
rS3 19867 15170 
rS4 4698 4698 
r=O 180638' 79405' 
rSI 101.234' 55601' 
Kenya rS2 45633' 22410 r=2 
,S3 23.223 15.286 
,S4 7938 7938 
*Stgrufies teJcctton of the hypothesis at 5% level of slgruficance 
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Table5.2b 
v AR O>int ....... on Tests _sties 
II)potheslzedNoofCFs Trace Max FJgenwlue Rank 
r=O 300.274· 120490" 
Morocco rSI 179784· 89070" 
r<2 90714· 40420" r=4 
rS3 50.294· 38938· 
r~4 1I356 1I356 
r=O 129.286· 45640" 
rSI 83 646· 35741· 
Nigena r:S:2 47905· 32.340" r=3 
r<3 15564 1I618 
r::;;4 3947 3947 
r=O 76.331· 39.326· 
rSI 37005 16959 
SoothAfuca r:S:;2 20046 12900 r=1 
rS3 7147 6697 
r::;;4 0450 0450 
r=O ISO 386· 72.388· 
r$l 77997· 50964· 
Tarrzama rS2 27033 16001 r=2 
r::;;3 1I029 9250 
r<4 Im Im 
r=O 104933· 45914' 
rSI 59019* 38797* 
TUIlISUI r::S;:2 20.222 12.354 r=2 
rS3 7868 7704 
r:S;:4 0164 0164 
r=O 127.248' 5961I' 
rSI 67636' 30659* 
Ug;nm r::;;2 36977' 22.855· r=3 
rS3 14123 12.299 
r::;4 1823 1823 
"Slgmfies "<)ectlon .fthe h}pot\x:sIs at 5% level of sgmficm:e 
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The results for Algena show that when there is deviation from the equihbnum, 
the real exchange rate adjusts downward by 28 6% per quarter untll it goes back to 
the equilibrium rate. The negative coefficient on the interest differential may not be 
unexpected as the Algerian capital market is relatively underdeveloped and private 
residents hold little of foreign assets. In the long-run the real exchange rate is also 
mfluence by the fundamental economic factors, partIcularly the relative GDP. The 
analyzed residuals of the VECM reported indicate that the model IS stable and satisfy 
the tests conditions. 
The real exchange rate for Botswana adjusts downwards by 1.2% every quar-
ter when there is a deviation from the long-run equilibrium, until the rate is restored. 
The short run adjustment coeffiCients indicate that the mterest rates differential van-
able has the highest speed of adjustment wlnle the slowest is the relative output and 
country risk variables. The long-run coefficients show that the economic fundamen-
tals have great impact on the real exchange rate in the long-run. Almost all the 
coefficients are significant and have the predicted Signs, apart from the aid. The in-
slgmficant of the variable can be explained from the fact that grant IS not important to 
the economy. The chagnostlc tests revealed that the model is both stable and passed 
the tests. 
The real exchange rate adjusts downwards whenever there is devIation from the 
long-run equilibrium rate by 6 3%, every quarter. The long-run coefficients are all 
significant, implying the importance of the variables as the long-run detenmnants of 
the real exchange rate. They have the predicted signs. The interest rate chfferentlals a 
positive sign, which IS an mchcation of the country's residents holding of foreign as-
sets. 11ris is a good representation of the fairly developed and open capital markets 
in Egypt. The relatively developed financial system of the country has further man-
ifested in the speed of adjustments of the short run coefficients. The speed is higher 
in the interest rates chfferentlal and the lowest is in the relative GDP. The Egyptian 
stock markets of Alexandna and Carro have the reputation of being among the oldest 
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in the contment having started operations m the 1880s. The model-checking proce-
dure, whose results are also reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 indicate that the model IS 
stable and adequate. 
Ghana's long-run and short run adjustment coefficients based on two cointe-
grating relationships as indicated by the trace and maximwn eigen values. The results 
indicate the real exchange rate revaluates downwards by 8.7% every quarter If devia-
tions from the long-run was recorded. The long-run adjustment coeffiCients indicate 
the sigoificance of the fundamental variables on the exchange rate, particularly, rela-
tive output and grant. The diagnostic test also accepts the adequacy and stablhty of 
the model. 
The Kenyan real exchange rate response to deviations by adjusting downwards 
by 144% every quarter until equihbriwn is restored. The fundamentals, as revealed 
by the long-run coefficients have long-run effects on the behaviour of the real ex-
change rate. They have the correct Signs and significant, with the exception of inter-
est rate differential, wluch IS not statistically siguificant. The model has adequately 
represented the DGP as revealed by the diagnostic test results. 
The Moroccan exchange rate adjUSts upwards by 24.2% quarterly until the 
equihbriwn rate is restored. The long-run coefficients have indicated that the funda-
mentals have long-run effects on the real exchange rate as they are sigmficant apart 
from the country risk index and have the expected signs. The model has also passed 
the model-checking procedures m Tables 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Table 5.3 
Loug-Run DetenDnantli ofExcbaoge Rates 
Cointegrating Coetlidena, p 
LEER(-I) LRGDp(-I) INRDIFF(-I) LGRANI'(- LRPR(-I) C I) 
1394 -0007 1591 -0.234 
Algeria 1000 (0413) (0006) (0.292) (0 on) -4458 
[3372] [-1.2401 (5456] [:30591 
1.219 -0093 -0572 3767 
Botswana 1000 (0390) (0016) (0349) (1 099) -5.202 
i3 1241 r:56561 r:1 6361 i3 4281 
12.717 0034 0.292 -0.211 
Egypt 1.000 (1473) (0015) (0114) (0086) 84541 
[8632] [2.308] [2.556] [:2.46i1 
1878 -0001 2.509 0362 
Ghana 1000 (0443) (0009) (0463) (0362) 8981 
[4.242j [:0 09i:J [5419j [1 oolj 
Kenya 0105 -0001 0019 -0009 1000 (0005) (0000) ~~ (0002) -0.219 [19136] H 714] [:3998] 
0102 0031 0054 -0035 
Morocco 1.000 (0034) (0034) (0019) (0023) -1953 
(2957) [8547] [2884] [-1 527] 
0677 -0040 0568 -0513 
Nigeria 1000 (0144) (0009) (0065) (0094) 1516 
i47181 r44051 i87391 r:54521 
South 0986 0126 0793 0019 1000 (0384) (0026) (0397) (0049) -5915 Africa [2.568] [4861] [2000] [0380] 
0024 0000 -0021 0001 
Tanzania 1000 (00\0) (0000) (00\0) (0005) 0007 
[2495j [1 732j . [:2.169] [01411 
0002 -0070 2048 -1.252 
Tunisia 1000 (0.229) (0020) (0454) (0.249) -7.258 
io 0131 r:3425] [45081 [:50351 
0512 -0030 -0675 0423 
UglU1da 1000 (0152) (0004) (0147) (0065) -7544 
[3368] [-7571] [-4601] [6564] 
Figures m() and [] an: standard errors and l-stIllsbcs, n:specIIvely 
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TableS.4 
Long~RuD Determinants of Enhange Rates 
Adjustment Coefficients, a 
D(LEER) D(LRGDP) D(INRDIFF) D(LGRANT) D(LRPR) 
-0286 -0003 -1767 -0018 -0264 
Algeria (0065) (0065) (3 175) (0028) (Olln [44581 [~O 3771 [~O 5571 [-0 6351 [2261 
0012 0014 2407 -0024 -0014 
Botswana (0007) 
[I 784j 
(0016) 
[0 865j 
(0506) 
[4756j 
(0016) 
r:14771 
(0007) 
r:20261 
-0063 0005 -2540 -0 llO o ll2 
Egypt (0048) (0005) (0709) (0114) (0039) 
[~I 3191 [09141 [~3 5821 [-09591 [2 8631 
-0087 -0015 -3415 -0129 -0028 
Ghana (0030) 
[:2873] 
(0033) 
[:0462] 
(I 384) 
[:2468] 
(0040) 
[:3.227] 
(0025) 
[:1 139] 
Kenya -0144 -1238 24862 4210 -5042 (0038) (0627) (24.378) (2548) (10614) 
[~3 7991 [~I 9761 "[10201 [I 6521 [-04751 
0242 1230 -14386 2521 -0040 
Morocco (0061) (0784) (7795) (2.382) (0.789) 
[3992i [I 569i [:1 8461 h 058i [~O 0501 
-0.300 -0002 3707 -0004 0157 
Nigeria (0070) 
[4279] 
(0011) 
[:0222] 
(2.204) 
[I 682j 
(0156) 
[:0028] 
(0094) 
[I 666j 
South -0017 0003 -1370 -0.124 0180 (0008) (0002) (0457) (0050) (0303) Africa 
r:20621 [I 50li r:24571 r~2 4901 [0 595i 
-0336 1494 -34450 -0754 2519 
Tanzania (0034) (0253) (285883) (0821) (I 756) 
[-9 8091 [59071 [-01211 [-09191 [1 434i 
-0032 -0031 -0996 -0017 0077 
Tunisia (0010) (0052) (0770) (0010) (0062) 
r:3 1791 r:o 5881 r:1 2931 r:1.7401 [I 242i 
0029 -0054 15836 0045 -0550 
Ugauda (0086) (0066) (6060) (0052) (0161) 
[0333] [-0 820] [2613] [0869] [-3422] 
Figures tn() and [ ] are standard errors and t-statIstIcs, respectIveJy 
129 
The VECM results indicate that the Nigerian real exchange rate adjusts down-
wards by 30% per quarter until the rate returns to Its long-run equilibrium. The 
long-run adjustment coefficients revealed that the fundanientals mfIuence the long-
run behaviour of the real exchange rate as all of them are significant and have the 
expected signs. The diagnostics tests results show that the estimated model IS ade-
quate 
The South African real exchange rate adjusts downwardly by about 1. 7% every 
quarter until the long-run eqwhbrium rate is restored. The vanables have significant 
effects on the real exchange rate as revealed by the long-run coefficients. The coef-
ficients are all significant, With the exception of the country nsk index. As expected, 
the mterest rate differential is positive, mdlcatmg the well developed and open capi-
tal markets and large pnvate holding offoreign assets by the residents of the country. 
The model has passed all the model-checking tests. 
The VECM results for Tanzania show that the real exchange rate adjusts down-
wards by 33 6% quarterly. One surprismg thmg with the results is that, the mterest 
rate differential is positive. Although the capital markets in Tanzania are relatIvely 
open, but are generaIly small in tenns of size, which would make one to expect a 
negative coefficient. 
The VECM results for Tunisia's real exchange rate are based on two comte-
gratIng relationship that was Identified by the trace and maximum eIgen values. The 
results show that the real exchange rate adjusts poSitively when there is a deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium by 3 2% every quarter in an effort to restore the equi-
librium rate. The economic fundaniental have impacts on the real exchange rate in 
the long-run. All the coefficients are SIgnIficant, except the relative GDP and have the 
correct signs. The model is adequate and stable by the results of the model-checking 
tests reported in Tables 8 and 9. TunISia has experienced overvaIwng of its currency 
in the early 1980s. 
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Table 5.5 
Model Evaluation and Diagnostics 
Autocorrelation lM Tesb 
LM(I) LM(l) LM(3) LM(4) LM(S) LM(6) LM(7) LM(8) 
Algeria 33509 29538 25.919 28465 38896 28896 (0119) (0.242) (0412) (0.287) (0037) (0.297) - -
Botswana 23491 28006 22.829 27.752 (0549) (0.308) (0588) (0.319) - - - -
Egypt 26036 27011 25652 37844 24868 17.393 (0406) (0355) (0426) (0048) (0470) (0867) - -
Ghana 41218 25656 34818 31578 37825 19.270 (0022) (0426) (0092) (0171) (0048) (0784) - -
Kenya 21576 52569 38165 260249 25347 24933 
(0660) (0001) (0045) (0406) (0443) (0466) - -
MOI'OCtO 30066 36172 43895 16334 27923 17171 (0222) (0069) (0011) (0905) (0311) (0876) - -
Nigeria 29151 30956 34950 29.338 19027 33883 (0258) (0191) (0089) (0250) (0796) (0110) - -
South 27835 19896 25406 22818 23928 21963 
- -Afrl<a (0316) (0752) (0440) (0588) (0524) (0638) 
Tanzania 35582 31733 33000 33846 20830 23181 (0078) (0166) (0131) (0111) (0702) (0567) - -
TunIsia 37486 14170 19173 36887 23296 16734 21.554 33319 (0052) (0959) (0789) (0059) (0560) (0891) (0661) (0123) 
Ugnnda 21271 21.947 22189 32736 33527 2109S 25237 44683 (0677) (0639) (0138) (0625) (0118) (0687) (0449) (0009) 
FIgures ID parenthesiS are probabilIties from c1u-square 
Table 5.6 
Model Evaluation and Diagn""tics 
Hetr""kedasticityTests' (Joint Tests) 
Oll-squan: Df Prob 
Algeria 1220306 1230 0572 
Botswana 1248.151 1230 0353 
Egypt 1221.104 1230 0566 
Ghana 972.281 930 0 163 
Kenya 1248098 1230 0353 
Mococco 939.329 930 0409 
Ntgeria 900 489 930 0751 
South Africa 1087919 1050 0202 
Tanzania 366.514 330 0 081 
Tunisia 1087919 1050 0202 
Uganda 1087919 1050 0202 
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'These tests are the extension of WIute's (1980) test to sy.stems of equatims as discussed by 
Ke1'<1,an (1982) andDoomik (1995). 
2]h, test IS dtstnbuted as a With degree of freeOOm mn wOOre m=k(k!-1 Y2 IS the number of 
cross-!I"Odu:ts of the res,duals m the system and n IS the nunber of the cmnnm set of right hand 
Side variables in the test regression 
VEC stability check All roots have moWlus less than one and he mSlde the umt CIrCle 
Therefore, the VEC is stable. 
The Ugandan VECM results reveal that the real exchange rate adjusts upwards 
by 2.9% every quarter to restore the long-run eqUlhbrium rate. The fundameotals as 
indIcated by the sigmficance of the coefficieots, infIueoce the long-run behavIOur of 
the real exchange rate. The relative GDP and the interest rate differentlals have the 
expected signs. The negatlve coefficleot on the mterest rate dlffereotial reflects the 
under-developed nature of the country's finanCial sector. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The ainI of this chapter was to ideotify the prmClpal detenninants of AfrIcan long-run 
real exchange rates. A theoretical model based on trade balance model of exchange 
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rate detenrunations was developed. This was to take care of the PPP's inadequacies 
found in several papers, for example, Masters and Iancbrichia (1998). The model 
was estnnated with vector error correction model (VECM) and uses data from eleven 
African countries that covered 1980-2005. The determinants, based on the theoreti-
cal model include relative GDP, interest rate dIfferentIals, country risk and aid. The 
results have mdicated that these variables are significant and have correct signs ex-
cept in few cases. For example in Botswana, the coefficient on rod IS negative, but 
insignificant. Botswana's economy is among the best in Africa, it may not be out of 
place to find that aid is not sigmficant to the country. The adjustInent of the real ex-
change to Its long-run equih'brium varies from country to country. For example, the 
Nigerian real exchange rate adjusts downwards by 30% every quarter while that of 
Morocco on the other spectrum, adjusts upwards by 24% every quarter. 
As revealed from the results, the speed of adjustInent of the real exchange rate 
to ItS long-run equilibrium varies from country to country. In Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria 
and Tanzania, it takes between one year to one and a half year for the real exchange 
rate to adjust to ItS long-run equihbrium, if there are no further shocks. The period 
in Tunisia and Botswana, however, IS between eight to twenty years. This mdIcates 
that, although m some countries, the real exchange rate takes a short penod to revert 
back to its eqwhbnum level that may not require action from the authontles, in others 
there may be need for an action, probably in form of devaluations. 
Chapter 6 
Sources of Real Exchange Rate 
Fluctuations: Empirical Evidence from 
African Countries 
6.1 Introduction 
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As part of the measures to address the econotnlc crises that confronted them, African 
countries have been liberalizing their economies since the 1980s. These measures 
include deregulation, partIcularly, trade regunes, the financ1lll sector and the foreign 
exchange markets. Many of these economies have shifted from fixed exchange rates 
to a more flexible exchange rate regime, in which the market forces play a larger 
role m determinmg the rates.272' TIus change in policy has resulted in both greater 
nominal and real fluctuatIons of exchange rates of these countries. Exchange rates 
volatl!J.ty has economic Implications for international trade and macroeconotnlc sta-
bility, smce movements in real exchange rates can affect inflation and output, which 
can be more problematic in developing countries. More importantly, as found by 
Corsetti, Pessenti and Roubini (1999), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Remhart (1998) and 
Sachs, Tomell and Velasco (1996) the real exchange rate is an Important factor in 
predicting currency crises. 
Following MacDonald (1998), the literature on real exchange rate fluctuations 
can be grouped mto four classes. The first mvolves an exatrunation of the relation-
ship between real exchange rates and real mterest d!fferentlals. The second is to 
27 The peg is either to a smgle currency, SDR or a WeIghted basket of currency 
28 For a an elaborate dIscussIon on the evolubon of these arrangements, please see Caramazza and 
Azizi (1998) 
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decompose the real exchange rate changes into permanent and transitory compo-
nents, mostly done by means of the decomposition technique initiated by Beveridge 
and Nelson (1981). The third approach draws on the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, 
which involves in decomposing real exchange rate fluctuations into segments due 
to changes in mternaJ and externaJ relatlve prices; that is, movements in the relative 
pnce of traded to non-traded goods withm countries and in the relatlve pnce of traded 
goods across countries. Finally, the fourth approach COnsiStS of estImatmg a V AR 
model including the real exchange rate as one of the endogenous variables and im-
posing the long-run identification restrictions sunilarto Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
The result is to decompose real exchange rate movements mto parts due to differ-
ent structural shocks. Using the Blanchard and Quah (1989) technique, Lastrapes 
(1992), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Parasad (1994) and Lee and Chmn (2002) 
use long-run restrictions to identify structural shocks in an economy. The restrictions 
normaJly come from econOlntC theory, which enable the shocks to be categorised into 
notmna1 and real. This chapter contributes to the fourth group of studies, wluch fol-
lows Clarida and Gali (1994), develops a tri-variate structural VAR to Identlfy three 
types of macroeconomic shocks; real supply, real demand and nomina! shocks. The 
aim of the technique is to investigate the influences of these structural shocks on the 
real exchange rates. This allows for assessment of the contnbutlon of each shock to 
the variabilIty of relatlve output, relatlve prices and the real exchange rate. Clarida 
and GaJi (1994) discovered that most of the real exchange rate fluctuatlons were due 
to demand shocks and monetary shocks with supply shocks playmg a neglIgtble role 
m the long-run fluctuations of the real exchange rates This is consistent with the rus-
equilibrium approach to the sources ofreal exchange rates fluctuations." The lesser 
Importance of supply shocks to the real exchange rate appears to be surpnsmg gtven 
the Importance placed by the theoretical literature on productivity vanables (AJexius, 
2001). The results reported by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) indicate the inslgmf-
29 Please refer to sectIon 5.2 for a detaIl dIscussion of these competmg theones 
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lcant contribution of monetary shocks to the US and UK real exchange rates. TIns, 
on the other hand, supports the equilibrium view on the sources of real exchange 
rates volatility that the fluctuatIOns come from the real shocks rather than from mon-
etary shocks, although, Rogers (1998) obtains the oPPOsite results. Enders and Lee 
(1997) argue that monetary shocks can be important in exchange rate variations in 
countnes With high inflation rates, but for industrialIZed economies with low infla-
tion rate real shocks is lIkely to be a more important contributor to real exchange 
rate movements. Alexus (2001), employmg the technique for three Nordic countries, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, found that supply shocks accounted for most of the 
variations in the real exchange rates of these countries. Based on that, he argues that 
the productiVity approach to long-run exchange rate determinatIOn IS best suited to 
these countries. 
Interest ID analysing sources of real exchange rate fluctuatlons is mainly jus-
tified by the central role played by the real exchange rates and by the necessity to 
determine the available economic policies that monetary authonties can use to stabi-
lize the exchange rates. From the monetary approach of real exchange determinatlon 
point of view, a negatlve demand shock i.e. from a restrictive budgetary policy, leads 
to a real exchange rate appreciation whereas a restrictive monetary policy results into 
a real exchange rate appreciation. Hence confronted with exogenous variations of 
the real exchange rate, the government can react through budgetary and monetary 
policies. The effectiveness of tlus measure depends, of course, on the relative con-
tributlon of the shocks on public spending and of nommal shocks to real exchange 
rate fluctuations. IdentIfYing the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations enables 
measurement on one hand, of the consequences of economic policies implemented 
by the government on the real exchange rates, and on the other, the alternatives au-
thorities have at their disposal to address the effects of real exchange rate movements 
on economic actiVity. This is because relative effects of supply and demand factors 
in the long-run movement may have not only implication for the relatlve importance 
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of different models of real exchange rate detennmations, but also helps to address 
relevant policy to be adopted. For instance, where the real shocks are more domi-
nant than the monetaIy shocks, this mdicates that a flexible exchange rate regime IS 
a preferable option. It also highlights the drawbacks of a fixed exchange rate regime 
in this circumstance. Directly hnked to this issue IS the question of the usefulness 
of flexible nominal exchange rates as shock absorbing mechanism. It is argued that 
the nominal exchange rate IS a propagator of shocks that spnng up from the financial 
markets, in particular from the foreign exchange markets, whereas the real economy 
View treats the nominal rate as an absorber of real shocks. Thus, according to the for-
mer approach, fixing the parity would shield the real economy from nominal shocks 
and thus prove beneficial With regard to macroeconomic stability (Mundell, 1961; 
Fleming, 1962; andPoole,1970). 
It IS m this policy perspective that this chapter sets to address two questions, 
what are the major sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in African economies? 
and can econOlnlC policy used to address real exchange rate fluctualions m these 
econolnles?30 In addition, the chapter bridges the gap that eXists in the hterali1re 
by investigating sources of real exchange rates in selected African countries, which 
has been largely overlooked. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The 
next seclion discusses sources of real exchange rates from the theoretical perspec-
tive. Section 6 3 sets out the theoretical model and Seclion 6 4 IS on the econometric 
methodology that mc1udes explanation on long-run identification schemes. Seclion 
6 5 is on the data and discusses the estimated results, while Section 6 6 concludes. 
30 VemODS of tlus chapter were presented at 2008 ScottIsh EconOtn1C SOCIety Annual Conference 
and Money Macro, Fmace Annual Conference held in Perth and London, respectIvely 
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6.2 Theoretical Debates on the Sources of Real Exchange 
Rate Fluctuations 
Smce the collapse of the Bretton Woods system offixed nommal exchange rates in the 
early 1970s, the volatility of real exchange rates has mcreased dramattcally. In this 
floattng penod, real exchange rate fluctuations have largely gone step-in-step with 
nommal exchange rate changes and have consequently shown the same high level 
of persistence. The question that needs to be answered is why is the real exchange 
rate volatthty higher under the floating system than under the fixed nominal rates, 
and specifically, as to whether It is the nominal exchange rate changes that dnve real 
rate fluctuations or if the caUSality was from the real sector to the nommal exchange 
rate. Explanattons of the sources of real exchange rate fluctuattons are not a settled, 
even m theorettcal literahire. The literahlre can be grouped into two: those from 
the 'disequilibrium' view and those from the eqUIlibrium approach. According to 
the former, which was first articulated by Mussa (1986) was based on sUcky price 
model. The model postulates that with goods markets characterized by sttcky prices, 
prompt cIeanng of the assets market results in changing the nominal exchange rate. 
Thus the model argues it is changes in nominal exchange rate that lead to changes 
in real exchange rate. Related to this argument, as highlighted by Alexius (2001), is 
the one that stems from the PPP literahlre. It IS argued from this strand of hterahlre 
that movements in real exchange rates are due to the monetary shocks. Therefore, 
long-run monetary neutrality guarantees that deviations of real exchange rates from 
their long-run equiIibnum are temporary. If this IS the case, then real exchange rate 
IS stattonary and PPP holds m the long-run. 
The alternattve view is based on ilie equilibrium models of exchange rate, as 
documented by Stockman (1988) This literahire asserts that changes that come from 
real disturbances in terms of supply side and preference shocks are responsible for 
propelling the nominal exchange rate for unadjusted relative prices in a country. The 
approach, therefore, concludes that real exchange rates fluctuations are driven by 
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the real shocks as opposed to nominal ones. So, persistence ID real exchange rate 
changes is as a result of the shocks to national productivity. Stockman (1988) ar-
gued further that this stand IS consistent with near random walk behavIOur of real 
exchange rate than the exposition based on the sticky price models. The equilib-
rium approach presumes that real exchange rates fluctuations tend to accommodate 
shocks to real macroeconomic variables like output or employment. In other words, 
real (and, If pnces are sticky, also nominal) exchange rates change so as to bring 
about rapid adjustment of relative pnces in the face of real msturbances. Here it acts 
as an equilibratmg force when asymmetric shocks; i.e. country specific real shocks, 
occur Accordingly, a country would find It relal1vely costly ID terms of macroeco-
nomic stability to give up nominal exchange rate flexibility, provided that pnces are 
sluggish However, some economists are skeptical of the View of neutrality of money 
in the real exchange rate fluctuations as seems to be suggested by the eqUlhbrium 
approach31 . 
6.3 Theoretical Framework of the Model 
The theoretical framework of the model used ID tIns study, is based on Clarida and 
Gall (1994) and binges on the two country rational expectal10ns open macroeconomic 
model ofObstfeld et al (1985). It also uses expositions in Dornbusch (1976), Branson 
(1979), Flood (1981), Mussa (1982) and McCallum (1989). The model displays the 
Mundell-FlenIing-Dornbusch results in the short run where prices adjUst slowly to 
the demand, money and supply shocks and also incorporates long-run character!sllcs 
that typify macroeconomic equilibrium in an open economy in which pnces have 
finally adjusted to all shocks. The model IS built upon the followmg equatIOns: 
(6.1) 
31 For an elaborate discussion on this, refer to Devereux (1997) 
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(62) 
77tt - Pt = Yt - ).Zt (63) 
(6.4) 
As in Clarida and Gall (1994), all the vanables are in logs, excludmg the interest rates 
and denote home relative to foreign levels. That is Yt = Y~ - yt and Zt = z~ - Z{32. 
Equation (6 1) is an open economy IS equation, where the demand for home output 
relative to foreign output, 1If is positively related to the real exchange rate, St - Pt and 
a relative demand shock, 11,. It IS negatively related to the interest rate chfferentials, 
in favour of the domestlc economy. 11, captures shocks to home absorption relative 
to foreign absorption, like fiscal shocks. Equation (6 2) is a form of price settlng 
equation, as in Flood (1981) and Mussa (1982) in which the price level ID penod t 
is an average of market clearmg pnce expected in t - 1 to exist ID t._ I , P:, and it is 
the pnce that will clear the output market in period t, P:. If 9 = 1, prices are flexible 
and the output is supply-determmed, but if on the other hand, 9 = 0, prices are fixed 
and set 1 period in advance. Equation (6 3) is the standard LM equation, in which 
income, Yt is positively related to the real money supply, 77tt - p" and interest rate 
is negatively related to the real money supply. Equation (6 4) represents the interest 
ratepanty. 
To solve the model, Clarida and Gali (1994), specified the processes that gov-
ern the relative supply of output, Yt, the relative demand shock, 11" and the relative 
demand, 77tt, these are: 
(6.5) 
32 The superscnpts h and f represents home and foreIgn countnes, respecl1vely 
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(6.6) 
(6.7) 
where z and v are error term and a denotes shocks to relative demand. Therefore, 
it is expected that ail of the processes would be influenced by both transitory and 
permanent shocks. For clarity, 11. and Tnt are assumed to be random walks, but it 
IS assumed that a fraction of 'Y of any shock to relative demand, d, is mitigated in 
t + 1 As in Clarida and GaIi (1994) and for simplicity, flexible price real exchange 
rate and price level expressions are derived under flexible price ad]ustlnent, before 
derivmg these expressions under the sluggish pnce adjustlnent system. Applying law 
of motion to y: and d, in the IS equation (61) and solving for eft gives: 
(6.8) 
Equation (6 8) IS the flexible -price real exchange rate which depreciates in reaction 
to a supply shock wlule appreciates due to demand shocks. When 'Y > 0, expectatIOn 
that demand shock partially swaps m the future results in the expectation of the real 
exchange rate depreciation and therefore reduces rate of appreciation m the present. 
The flexible price level is obtained by using equations (6.5) - (6.7) and flexible price 
real exchange rate expression (6 8), assummg that m the real exchange rate equation, 
and the LM equation (6 3),pt satisfies that (1 + >')Pt = Tnt - y: + >.(Etqt+l - qt) + 
>.EtPt+I, Yields: 
(6 9) 
It says that three shocks affect the time path of the flexible-price level. The pnce 
level nses while reactlng to monetary shocks and component of the demand shocks. 
An exclUSive permanent relative demand shock drives the foreign real and nominal 
interest rates up in flexible-price eqwhbrium. As a result, given output and supply, a 
permanent demand shock pushes domestic and foreign pnce up wlule the pnce level 
rentains unchanged 
141 
The fleXible-price equilibrium yields a tnangular system of relative output y;, 
real exchange rate q, and relative national price levels p~. Collecting them together 
gIve: 
(610) 
(6.11) 
(612) 
The sluggish price level is obtained by subsbtuting equation (6 9) into equation 
(62), which provides: 
(6.13) 
where 0< = >.(1 + >.)-1(1)+ utI. The price level under the sluggish system mdicates 
that the pnce level nses in reaction to either positive money or demand shock but less 
than p~, the fleXIble price. The level of Its sluggishness is governed by (1-0). Where 
o = 1, pnces are fleXIble and p, = p~. The real exchange rate under the sticky price 
is attained by subsbtutmg the IS and the interest rate parity equations into equation 
(68), which gives: 
(6.14) 
where 0< = (1 + >.)(>. + 0' + I)tl. Under the sluggish price system, unhke the 
flexible price adjusbnent where monetary shocks do not affect the real exchange rate, 
shocks to money influence the real exchange rate. This follows from the overshoobng 
model ofDombusch (1976) where the price level is slUggIsh m adjusbnent. By using 
equations (6.14) and (61) and solving for demand determined level of short run 
output where prices are sticky YIelds: 
y, = if. + (I) + u)v(l- O)(v, - Zt + 0<,,),0,) (615) 
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If prices are sluggish, supply, money and demand shocks impact on Yt in the short 
run. Therefore, a monetary shock increases output m the short run as domestic out-
put relative to foreign output grows in reaction to the temporary component in the 
demand shock. 
Equations (613), (614) and (615) represent a stochasticopenmacroeconomic 
equilibrium. Following in Clarida and Gall (1994) three types of macroeconomic 
shocks are identified; supply, real demand and nominal shocks. Relative contnbu-
tion of type of shocks to the movement of relative output, relative pnces and the real 
exchange rate is considered within the framework. In the IS-LM framework outIme 
above, the shocks to the goods and money markets shift the IS-LM curves, respec-
tively and shocks that mfluence the long-run level of capacity output The shocks 
to the long-run level of capacity output is the aggregate supply shocks, winch is 
changes in over all productivity of home to foreign countries. Shocks to goods and 
money markets are the aggregate real demand shocks that are changes in relative 
government spendmg and relative market access for home products compared to for-
eign and nominal or monetary shocks that are due to monetary shocks and demand 
shocks. 
A higher rate of productIvity growth in the domestic economy, that is a positive 
supply shock, increases the aggregate supply of domesnc goods. In the long-run, 
this results in raising the domesnc output level and decline in domestic pnces and 
consequently, the real exchange rate depreciates. A posinve demand shock on the 
other hand, raises demand for domestic products, which raises the prices of home 
goods and results in real exchange rate appreciation and mcrease m domestic output 
in the short run. The output level returns to ItS long-run trend over tJ.me while both 
the pnce level and the real exchange rate remam Ingh. A positive nominal shock is 
expected to lower the domesnc interest rate and in the short run, the real exchange rate 
depreciates wlnle the home output mcreases and the relative price nses. However, 
both the real exchange rate and the output return to therr long-run trends. 
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As observed by Wang (2005), applying this model to developing countries may 
be debatable, because, for instance, the model assumes capital mobility among oth-
ers. Although, AfrIcan countries may not fully satisfy this assumption, structural re-
forms introduced over last twenty five years have made the model applicable. More-
over, it is pertinent to note that the long-run relatlonships predIcted by the model are 
conslstent with a large set of models and the underlying assumptions of the model are 
not generally restrictlve. The long-run neutrality of monetary shocks can be devel-
oped from most modern macroeconomic models. SimiIarly, usmg many Keynestan-
type models, it is posslble to show that real demand shocks may not have a long-run 
effect on output. The basic underpinning assumptions of the model of prices respond-
ing to demand and supply shocks and output responding to price (and exchange rate) 
signals are relevant to most of the African economies which have undergone substan-
tialliberaIization since the 1980s. Hoffiruuster and Roldos (2001), derived a long run 
relatlonslup sunilar to Clarida and Gali, where they show that fleXlble exchange rate 
regime, perfect capital mobility and sophistlcated financial markets are not essential 
in deriving the long-run relationslnps of the model. There are many examples of the 
CIarida and Gali model being applied to developmg countnes, mcluding Borda, Man-
ioc, Olisier and Montanban (2000) on Caribbean economies, Chen and Wu (1997) 
Korea, Taiwan and PhiIippmes and Dibooglu and Kutan (200 I), Hoffinaister and 
Roldos (2001) on Brazil and Korea and Wang (2005) on China. 
6.4 Econometric Methodology 
The econometric methodology uses the Clanda and Gali (1994) tri-variate structural 
V AR model. The theoretlcal model entaJ.ls that the variables, relatlve output y, , real 
exchange rate q" and price level p, are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first 
dtfference33• Therefore, Dox, = [Doy" Doq" Dop,], denotes 3 x 1 vector of the vari-
33 To test whether the senes are 1(1) ID levels and 1(0) m first chfferenee, senes of tests are earned 
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abies and structural chsturbances are represented by Ct = [S., d" m,J . A structural 
V AR is an extension of the standard V AR where the restrictions needed for the iden-
tification of the underlymg structural model are proVIded by the economic theory. 
These restrictions can be contemporaneous or long-run, depenchng on whether the 
shocks, as suggested by the theory, are temporary or permanent. It is therefore, a 
bridge between multiple time-senes analysis, including VAR that is atheoretlcal and 
the economic theory in considering dynamic responses of given vanables to various 
shocks withm the economy. SVAR evolved out of the criticisms of the trachtional 
VAR and come from the works ofSims (1986), Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and 
Watson (1986) and Blanchard and Quah (1989). The first step is to detennine the 
level of mtegratlon of the series included. This IS necessary in order to appropriately 
determine winch form of representation IS requIred. The next step is to estunate a 
reduced form ofVAR 
!::"Xt = A(L)Ut (6.16) 
where !::"Xt is a vector of first chfferences of the variables mcluded in the model and 
A( L) IS a log polynomial and Ut IS a vector of disturbances with estimated covari-
ance E. To disentangle the impact of various structural shocks, the coefficients of a 
structural V AR model need to be estimated: 
!::"Xt = C(L)ct (6.17) 
where Ct = [cs cd C f l' is an n x 1 vector of an unobserved mutna1ly mterrelated 
shocks that are interpreted as relatlve supply, relative real demand and relative nomi-
nal shocks. The long-run representation of equation (6 9) can be written as follows: 
[ 
!::"Yt ] [C1l(1) C12(1) CIa (1) ] [ Cs ] 
!::..qt = C21 (1) C22 (1) C2a (1) Cd 
!::"Pt Ca1 (1) Ca2 (1) Caa (l) Cm 
(6.18) 
where C(l) = CO+ Cl +C2 + . are the long-runmultiphers of the structural VAR. 
Equations (6.16) and (6 17) suggest that the followmg has linearrelatlOnship 
out See tables 5 1 and 5 2 
............ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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(6.19) 
Co is the 3 x 3 matrix which defines the contemporaneous structural relationslnp 
among the three vanables and the matrix needs to be Identified to determme the 
vector structural shocks, et from the estimated disturbance vector 'Ut. 
An estImate of the symmetric variance-covanance matrix of the disturbances 
are also recovered, 
E = E'Utu; (6.20) 
The model specified m equatIon (6 17) is under-identified. It IS therefore necessary 
to impose additional restrictions to obtain estimates of Co and also et From (6 18) 
and (6.19), it is observable that 
(6.21) 
Equation (6 20) denotes a system of equations in SIX unknowns, that is the three 
variances and covariances which define E. In essence, it imposes six of the nme re-
strictions that are necessary to identify Co. That IS, to convert the residuals from the 
estimated unrestricted VAR mto original shocks that dnve the behaviour of the en-
dogenous variables. To impose three adchtional identifying restrictions, B1anchard 
and Quah (1989) recommend the use of econOIIDC theory. Therefore, based on the 
theoretical framework outlined above and following Clanda and Gali, three addi-
tional restnctIons on the long-run multipliers are Imposed wlnle the short-run dy-
naIIDCS are allowed to be freely detemoined. The three restnctions are: (i) nominal 
(monetary) shocks, winch have no long-run impact on the levels of output, (ri) real 
exchange rate and (iiI) real demand shocks have no long-run effect on the level of 
output. The long-run multIphers of the strucllIral VAR are represented by the matrIX 
C(I) = [Co + Cl + C2 + ... 1'. The three long-run restrictIOns make the (1,2), (1, 3), 
and (2,3) elements of C(I) matnx eqnal to zero. This means that the cumulatIve 
11llpact of these shocks in the long-run IS zero 
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fa (~y~) = 0, 
.=0 Let 
(6.22) 
fa(~Y~) =0, 
.=0 Let 
(6.23) 
and 
fa(~q~) =0 
.=0 Let 
(6.24) 
ThIs means that the 0(1) matrix is converted mto a lower triangular, i. e. 
[
0 11 (1) 012(1) 0 13(1)] [. 0 0] 
0 21 (1) 022(1) 0 23 (1) =. 0 
031(1) 0 32(1) 0 33(1) . . 
(6.25) 
It is evtdent that the above is achieved by unposmg 
0 12(1) = 013(1) = 0 (6.26) 
Meanmg that the demand and monetary shocks have no long-run impact on the long-
run level of output. Snmlarly, the restriction that money shocks have no long-run 
impact on the real exchange rate is denoted by: 
(6.27) 
These three additional restnchons are sufficient to identify the stnlch1ral matrix 0 0 
and also to recover the structural system defined by 0 1, O2 •• and the struch1ral shocks 
et = [e;, et, e;"]', that is shocks to supply, demand and money, respectively. ThIs 
technique proVldes us with three tools to shed 11ght on the sources of real exchange 
rate fluctuahons. They are the impulse response functions, the forecast error variance 
decomposItion, and the Instoncal decomposition of the real exchange rate series. The 
impulse response funchons allow the possibility to inveshgate the dynamic response 
of the variables to dIfferent shocks WIthin the system. The forecast error vanance 
decomposition shows the relahve contnbution of the strucrural shocks to the forecast 
error VarIance of the vanables for different horizons and it gIves the percentage of the 
variance accounted for by each of the shocks at different time horizons. 
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Usmg an estimated VAR, a lustorical decomposition of the real exchange rates 
of the countries covered are computed. The lustoncal decomposition is based on the 
movmg average representation of the V AR, which can be: 
(6.28) 
>=0 
where X, IS a column vector of the variables in the system, J-l'-I is column vector 
of the shocks to the elements of X in period t - 1, and M. is a matnx of lmpulse 
response weight that confonns to the dtmension of X and j.t. taking a based period 
that runs from observation 1 - T, the value of X in penods following T can be 
represented thus: 
00 ,-~ 
X'+1 = EM.J-lT+1-' + EM.J1.T+1-' (6.29) 
t=3 t=O 
where the first term on the right hand side is the base proJect1on on forecast of XT +1 
based on mformation available at time T. The second term is to which addttlon of the 
shocks to a spectfic vanables to base projection generates a senes, wluch IS closer to 
the actual series (X'+J) than the base projection alone (2:::0 M.J1.T+1-') . If j.t has N 
components, the histoncal decomposition of X T +1 has N + 1 part .. TIns means that 
the forecast of X'+J based on information at T and for each of the N components of 
j.t, the part of the first term that IS due to the time path of the component. 
6.S The Data and the Estimated Results 
The data used are sourced from the IMF International FinanCial Statistics database. 
The are quarterly series of real exchange rates, output and CPI, covering the period of 
1980·01 -2005:04. All the variables are m log fonns. For proper specification of the 
VAR, the level ofmtegration of the variables needs to be detennined. Tables 1 and 
2 report the vanous unit root tests results, using the ADF, pp and KPSS tests. The 
results, generally, confirm that stationarity on levels can be rejected at conventional 
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level of slgmficance. However, the tests fall to reject stationarity on first difference. 
Therefore, the series are 1(1). 
TableU 
Unlt Root Tests Results 
RLREER RGDP RCPI 
.... ," -0 SS· 089' ~2 26' 
ADF 
101 Dlfferatce -881' -301" -719" 
AI,,,,,, 
.... ," -061' 007' -02S' pp 
I" DUIerence -882' -8.24" -765" 
.... 'b 104' lU' I'" 
KPSS 
I" Dlfference 0..- 016- 01'-
.... ," -184' -1.34' -2 SS· 
ADF 
I" Ihlfcrmce -6.21" -s U" -581" 
......... ....," -201' -08S' -272' 
pp 
III Dlffemu:e -776" -863" -840" 
.... ," Ill' 112' 020' 
KPSS 
I' lloffi=>oo 0'0' o IS- 013-
"""" 
-186' -093' -162' 
ADF 
I"' Difference -764" -S 77" 451" 
"""" 
-189' -179' -146' 
Egyp' pp 
t"' Ddl'e:rence -742" -996" -1167" 
.... ," 1 os' liS' Ill' 
KPSS 
I- Dtfference 026' 0'9" 016-
.... cb -164' -2 OS' -I OS· 
ADF 
I"Dlfference -493" -3 SS" -398" 
.... c. -139' ·209* -053' 
Gha .. pp 
I III Dtffc:rence 
-637 -544" -969" 
""". o 8S' 
, 04' 097' 
KPSS 
I" Thfference 011" 022" 026" 
'*Falled lo~«:tthenuU that the senes has 8 unrt root at S% level 
"ReJect the null that the scnes has a urnt root at oS% level 
'Re.!ect the null that the sc:ncs 1$ stalloruuy at S% level 
"Failed to re.Ject !he nuD that the senes IS stabooaIy at S% level 
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Table 6.2 
Unit Root Tests Results 
RLREER RGDP RCPI 
Le.e~ -244' -113' 253' 
ADF 
I'Ddfcrence -410" -440" -778" 
Ko",. Le.eb -230' -085' 200' 
pp 
I'Differmce -7.23" -856-- -800" 
Le.e~ 121' 112' 025' 
KPSS 
I'Dlffermce 035H 011" 006" 
Le.els -209- -II~ -2.79' 
ADF 
1'Drl!i=<e -383'- -5.23-- -77fJ11-
M ...... Le.els -250' -1.28' -195-
pp 
I'~ ·785" -862-- -1094 
Le.e]s 043- 089' loo' 
KPSS 
I'~ 0.21- 0.23H 020" 
Le.els -156- 0.27' ·103-
ADF 
I' Difference -840" -460" -457--
Lcv,ls -174- 060' -084-,....... pp 
I'~ -842" -7SO-- -909--
Le.els 065- 112' 105' 
KPSS I'~ 012- 02'- 034" 
Le.e. -288- -028' 0.24-
ADF 
I'Dlfference -8 OS" -961-- ~.27--
Le.eb -219- -031- 063-
South Afrta pp 
l'lloffmnoe -811" -962" ~33--
Le.els 012- 113' 114' 
KPSS 
I' DlffercDCe 006" 0.37" 018-
Lcv,ls -250- -171* 
-I "" AD. 
I'Dlfference ·7m-- -349-- -793" 
Le.e]S 088- -1.21- -131· 
T ........ pp 
I'D1ffemIce -1065·· -860" -1039·· 
Le.e. 031' Ill' 106' 
KPSS I'~ 013- 0.26- 014-
"Failed to reject the null that the senes has a wut root at 5% level 
"Reject the mill that the scnes has a umt root at 5% kvel 
'Reject the nuB that the scnes IS statiODIU)' at So;. level. 
HFailed to ~oct the null that the senes IS statlonaty at 5% 1eve1 
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Having established that the variables are non-stationary I (1), the next step is to 
find out whether the series are cointegrated or not. Although, the theoretical model 
assumes no cointegration among the variables, Its presence will make estimating the 
model with a stationary V AR mappropnate. In tlus case, the V AR model should 
be replaced with an error correctIon representation. The Johansen technIque that 
gives two likelIhood ratio tests for the number of comtegrating vectors; maximal 
eigen values and the trace tests is used. Table 3 reports cointegration results for 
the variables used. The results mdlcate rejection of cointegration in favour of its non 
existence at 5% level of significance. It is therefore appropriate to use the VAR model 
as explained in Section 6 4 above. Smce the V AR model is sensItive to lag length, 
information cntena were used m determining the optimal lag length. The impulse 
responses are computed along with the variance decomposition of forecast error. 
FIgures 6 1 - 6 9 Illustrate the impulse response functions of the explanatory 
vanables to a one standard deviatIOn structural shock for all the countries covered. 
Responses of real exchange rate to demand, supply and nominal shocks are m the 
first panel. In second and third panels are output and CPI responses. In all the coun-
tries, positive demand shocks resulted m real exchange rate appreciatlOn However, 
the magnitude and the persistence vary from country to country. A poSItIve demand 
shock in Algena resulted m 2 5% real exchange rate apprecIation in the period umne-
dlate after the shock, but sharply returns to its long-run value in the second quarter. 
In Egypt and Kenya, the appreciation was 8% but declines to 2% m the fourth quarter 
in the former, but in the latter declines to a steady state. NIgeria and Nigeria recorded 
6% appreciation, but sharply return to ItS long-run value in the first and third quarter, 
respectively. Morocco's real exchange rate apprecIated by 12% and fell to less than 
1% in the third quarter. The results are consistent WIth the theoretical model. SIm-
ilar results have been reported by Clanda and Gall (1994), Wang (2005) Astley and 
Garrat (2000). 
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Table6.3 
Johansen ro .• onTest 
Hypothesized 0.05 Max-Figen 0.05 Trace Critical Critical No of CEll Values Statistic Values 
Algeria r-O 2413 2980 1490 2113 
rSI 9.22 1550 9.14 1426 
rS2 OOS 384 OOS 384 
r=O 2722 2980 1782 2113 
-
rSI 939 1549 611 14.26 
rS2 3.29 384 3.29 384 
r=O 26.19 2980 1649 2113 
l4:YPt rSI 970 1549 700 1426 
rS2 270 384 270 384 
r=O 1491 24.28 788 1780 
GwIa rSI 702 1232 644 1122 
rS2 058 413 058 413 
r=O 2752 2980 1467 2113 
Kenya rSI 1285 1549 1235 14.26 
rS2 051 384 051 384 
r=O 3449 4292 1779 2582 
MIrocoo rSI 1670 25.87 1036 1939 
rS2 635 1252 635 1252 
r=O 2189 2980 1453 2113 
NIgeria rSI 736 1549 7.19 14.26 
rS2 017 384 017 384 
r=O 4281 4292 1971 2582 
South Africa rSI 2309 25.87 1333 1939 
rS2 976 1252 976 1252 
r=O 3483 4292 18.27 2582 
Tanzania rSI 1656 2587 1091 1939 
rS2 565 1252 565 1252 
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A positive supply shock brought about a mild depreciation, of about 1 % in the 
third quarter, in Ghana before returnmg to a steady state. Similar pattern are recorded 
for Kenya, Morocco and South Africa. The responses in Algeria and Tanzania were 
real exchange rate appreciation. The nominal shocks had produced a mild deprecia-
tion in short run in all the countries apart from Botswana and Tanzania. This confirms 
the theoretical predictions of the model that the nomina! shocks have no long-run ef-
fects on the real exchange rates. The relative output responded to demand shocks 
by contraction in the short run, in Algeria and Tanzania whereas in the remaimng 
countnes the output increased. 
A positive supply shock induced an increase in relative output in the short run 
in all the countries apart from Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania. A nomina! 
shock resulted in nse in relative GDP in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria 
and Tanzania in the short run, wJule in the remaining it is neutral. TIns is also in 
hannony with the theoretical model. A pOSItive demand shock resulted in a two 
quarter rise in price level in Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Nlgena and South 
Afnca while responses were neutral in Kenya, Morocco and Tanzania. A positive 
supply shock does not seern to have any slgmficant tmpact on inflation m most of the 
countries. TIns contradicts the premction of the model. However, results for Ghana, 
Morocco and South Africa appear to have followed the theoretical model of declme 
in price level in the long-run. Nomina! shocks to pnce levels are positive, which 
agrees With the theoretical model. 
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Figure 6.1: Algeria 
Impulse Response of Real Effective Exchange Rates 
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F1gure 6.2: Botswana 
Impulse ll.esnonse of Real Effective Exchan~e Rates 
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FIgure 6.3: Egypt 
Impulse Response ofReul Effective Exchange Rales 
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Figure 6.4: Ghana 
Impulse Response of Real Effecdve Exchange Rates 
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Figure 6.S: Kenya 
Impulse Response of Real Effedive Enhange Rates 
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Figure 6.6: Morocco 
Impulse Response oCReal Effective E:s:c::bange Rates 
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Figure 6.7: Nigena 
Impulse Response or Real Effective Exchange Rates 
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Figure 6.8: South Africa 
Impulse Response of Real Effective Exchange Rates 
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Figure 6.9: Tanzania 
Impulse Response of Real Effective Exebange Rates 
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The impulse response analysis is useful iu consideriug the SIgns and magni-
tude of responses to specific shocks. However, the relative importance of shocks 
for a given variable fluctuations is assessed through forecast error variance decom-
POSItIOns. Tables 64 - 6.13 present the forecast error variance decomposItIons of 
the three variables that can be attnbuted to each type of shocks at different forecast 
honzon. The first panel reports relatIve contribution of demand, supply and nominal 
shocks to real exchange rate vanatIons. In second and third panels are the mfluences 
of these shocks to output and price levels. 
The vanation of real exchange rates attributable to demand shocks was be-
tween 40 - 60% m Algena, Egypt, South Africa and Tanzania. In other countries 
of Botswana, Ghana,Kenya, Morocco and Nigeria, contribution of demand shocks to 
real exchange fluctuations is higher; 70 - 90% Supply shocks, on the other hand, 
accounted for between 25 - 30% of real exchange rate fluctuations m Algeria, Egypt 
and Tanzania. ContributIon of supply shocks to real exchange rate changes was mar-
gmal, I.e. less than 20% iu Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigena and South 
Afnca. Therefore, demand shocks are more Important than supply shocks m explaiu-
iug exchange rate fluctuations iu these countries. Thts finding is iu consonant WIth 
results reported for other developiug countrIes by Wang (2005), Altmed (2003) Chen 
and Wu (1997), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Moore and Pentecost (2006). 
The nominal contrIbution to the exchange rate fluctuations vanes from less than 1% 
to about 29%. Countries with lowest percentages are Ghana, Morocco and Nlgena34. 
34 In all these COUIltnes the contnbunon of nominal shocks to exchange rate vananon was between 
().4% 
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Table 6.4. Algeria 
VarianceDeco • 'on of Forecast Error 
Fractioo ofReaI Fxchange Rates Variance Due to: 
Honzon Demand Supply Nominal 
I 70.48840 14.22585 15.28575 
2 62.84345 24.05840 13.09815 
3 61.84604 24.79347 13.36048 
4 62.44073 24.34459 13.21468 
8 61.03172 23.98473 1498355 
12 60.94053 24.09543 14.96403 
16 60.92873 24.09735 14.97392 
20 6092456 2409948 14.97597 
30 60 91980 24.10286 14.97734 
40 6091757 2410454 14.97788 
50 6091648 2410535 14.97817 
Frnct!oo of Relative GDP Vanance Due to· 
Honzon Demand Supply Nominal 
1 23.49783 62.11638 14.38579 
2 3268996 57.66788 9.642159 
3 32.12981 51.34500 16.52519 
4 3087814 51.74752 17.37434 
8 2430468 54.78561 20.90971 
12 21.35447 5596580 22.67973 
16 19.73957 5665207 23 60836 
20 18.73281 57.09199 34.17520 
30 17.42429 57.67615 24.89955 
40 1686067 57.90542 25.23391 
50 16.59429 5802078 25.38493 
Frnct!oo ofRelalIvePnce VananceDueto: 
Honzon Demand Supply NonnnaI 
I 2.426495 43.61842 53.95509 
2 2.890476 4327172 53.83781 
3 3.733790 43.24581 53.02040 
4 5.715958 42.71178 51.57226 
8 6553064 51.23267 42.21426 
12 6892134 5334552 39.76235 
16 6.980199 5408402 3893578 
20 7.038597 5440019 38.56122 
30 7.105957 54.74011 38.15393 
40 7.117002 54.82643 38.05657 
50 7.124708 54.88148 37.99381 
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Table65: 
~Real ,R", .... ,Dueto: 
Oemand upply 
1 82.79753 )10444 171Q')m 
2 80.13384 (R~Q(I 
3 ~~ 1.792624 I~ ,M?~ 4 1.786395 1803090 
8 7601751 2910151 2107214 
12 75 '8 .Hn,;,?,; 21 8470 
16 7, 4.100875 m7 
20 75 :6 3' 21 nil 
3 7, ?Q114 41. 2054599 
4 7524548 4.1' 20.57797 
5 7521QQ2 4.180566 2059951 
,TlUJ ,to: 
ne.rumtl Supply 
1<;24 m 55.: 1121 29.64765 
2 14 "Q4, hIl :~??~ 2460833 
3 15.13427 52 ms: 11 QQ~~Q 
4 13.48769 40.1969 4hW7l;2 
8 17.3491 In 'Q1 51.95792 
I~ ,7'; '7' ;14 5342747 
IRII~Q 15 57 <;(;14144 
17.59963 2439310 )728 
30 17,m':~ 2241162 ('\ll4 
40 17.31711 214h159 1130 
50 17.19059 20.97055 IiLR3886 
,Drn,to: 
Supply 
1 4 ~ ~';~QOI; 
2 9278951 4R urn 
3 9912105 4h 1480 
4 45836< 9.487710 44.67583 
8 4hR4? 10.67708 4?4ROR4 
12 47.0531 11.62033 41l2'iRl 
16 47625 11.44146 419: 
20 90 47.5' 1 1.40431 
30 47.809 1 .3' 9967 4 .7~ 
40 47.82403 11 ~, rt57 I ~'l757 
50 47.82689 ll' <)(;4l 1 l<lli4l 
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Variance n Table 6.6: ~ 
lofReaI ;R.;;;;, 
TFm""tI Supply 
32.3752 
: Error 
Due to: 
• 79fSl. 1.66820 1 n <;N\~R 
;2.07170 30 03076 17.~Q754 
5092269 29.88956 19.1 8775 
4Q~~?<n 2Q.R2441 20 84266 
48 86230 7 ) 7,~~ 71 ~SWY1 
48 69879 7'14QQ 71 ,~?? 
~ GDP ~ Due to: 
Tlem:md Supply 
I ~().85445 3 64t ,7C 
2 13.71254 3.73L2C 
3 14~7476 R0Q22Q2 4752823 
12 1661329 78.70R53 467R1R2 
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16 17.1: 78 39524 ~~-~20--~-~1I;~"=--+--~~12~rro~+--~7l3~n:O·· 
30 15<J' 4091711 
40 15.74: 14 QRRItM 
50 1'~· U 
~Dueto· 
141735 2~~k ~ 
~ 1.92131 IV 
2183932 167129 
21) 59798 1.11878 
! 
1700 20.14235 69 72065 . 
Q 
1000415 
1003291 
?n ?OQ?~ 6980686 
?n ?AA?<; 
69.73642 
6968083 
1 
• 
1 
20 
30 
40 
50 
I 
2 
3 
I 
2 
3 
40 
50 
, 
30 
40 
50 
tError 
Dooto: 
1Pm .. ,,1 Supply 
9829630 153' R' 0.150516 
l ,~~t:tI O~ rnv;o '7<;' 
'l4 .S141 ~ 4. 715 
92g 
921n49 
11 ~ 11>S11> 
11.73705 
91.65748 
91,SUlU 
; 17<;<;QC 
1104195 
185802 
11.45712 
045179 
79574 
)78607 
)76415 
~ot 
n 
1 
121562 
785460 
'I I>".17~ 
1.722788 
,207318 
I> 11.17.17 
6332930 
6395620 
" .71 
~Dueto: 
8~ 
81.71164 
77.83329 
1 
1 1M7 
\371 
:lU'<lU 
1 
--,- 0.11 no<; 
2018678 
-1070958 
18.95874 
69 4 t, 20 30850 
68.8' 20.25114 
68.4' 20 69744 
W70S 21.13336 
I 7.98~ 71 17<;<;1 
I 7.859<1 21 17641 
~oUet(): 
Suoolv 
0' 
1 6 
1 l~ 
1 
D.71 34 
04914 
~ 
16.89074 
1?IUH 
89.71153 
QC 11 
84.7' 17 
~I 
8:72 
71 64 
~ 
76.81158 
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Table 6 8: Kenya 
Variance of Forecast Error 
I of Real , Rot", l Due to: 
n,..",."tl Supply 
1 ,~Q4, RI>?R,n, 1'183205 
2 '0<: ,1 R 71m';Q 02732 
3 ;)u-'" o ~,<KLlR 9890115 
7910458 Q4()'),Q~ 1140282 
74()(;ffi4 11~7S~ 1400742 
7366441 12451iO 13 87958 
16 73.<;4J;~Q 12.57' 97 13 87382 
20 7351538 l' '';1 ~5 13.87113 
_ 30 7345173 _ I? (;RR; 1 
40 7342412 12.7214: 
50 7341114 12.73681 
\( lGDP lJ)ueto· 
Supply 
1 R 1<),;41, 87.68073 4 '7R,1 
2 R Q/lIl/) 1 ,; r7.6483 
3 ~~ r7.5899 17 4 
8 ;7~~Ml AA ? Q,;OR4' 
l2 ? f,?7Q<J 
16 40 
20 5_RI4t;19 91.84207 2343311 
30 ' ,R<n70 ()') 7n1QR ??n~745 
40 92.U QI;? 2.154019 
_SO 5455400 92.41470 2.129903 
lmce 
n,..",."tl Supply 
1 55834 i~ 97.04577 2 95.91457 
3 1.( 75788 3.762059 9456215 
4 ? ~nR410 ~ QI;?"~ 172907 
4~m47? 6153964 153856 
'1.L"~1I'1 fi <lfl'i?4? ~Rm'R 
4_29151R 1-621011 i47 
2( 4?Q4QI4 RnlI'647 87.61944 
3( 4?R~5 8:'''60"" 8691288 
4( 4 ?R,7<;1'; 9_128287 86585,& 
50 4?R4,Rn Q?R?1?Q Rf,4~~?Q 
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Table 6.9: Morocro 
Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error 
Frac!J.on of Real Exchange Rates Vanance Due to: 
Honzon Umand Supply Nommal 
1 98.46643 1.384288 0149282 
2 9817003 1.646251 0.183719 
3 97.35735 2180823 0.461829 
4 97.44127 2125028 0433704 
8 93.77933 5382327 0838341 
12 91.79594 7326153 0877902 
16 91.13447 7.972360 0.893169 
20 9084260 8.263137 0894261 
30 90.66612 8437476 0896401 
40 9064704 8456371 0896593 
50 9064500 8458387 0.896616 
Frncti.oo ofRelattve GDP Vanance Due to: 
Honzon Demand Supply Nommal 
1 1542316 84.34637 0.230472 
2 1962105 80.19983 0.179120 
3 1847032 81.24606 0283616 
4 1870726 80.45969 0.833052 
8 16.79330 81.54609 1.660615 
12 15.66844 8269106 1.640507 
16 1520206 83.11500 1.682934 
20 14.99592 83.32288 1.681198 
30 14.86319 8345339 1.683415 
40 14.84728 8346949 1.683225 
50 14.84550 8347130 1.683202 
Frac!J.oo of Relative Pnee Vananee Due to: 
Honzon Umand Supply Nommal 
1 0.768003 0473006 98.75899 
2 1.572251 0.941837 97.48591 
3 1.680034 2133825 96.18614 
4 2199452 3.668588 94.13196 
8 4.890260 5.407621 89.70212 
12 4.834218 5473398 8969238 
16 4.823654 5.551482 8962486 
20 4.825362 5.553613 8962103 
30 4.825125 5.560350 8961453 
40 4.825109 5.560730 8961416 
50 4825108 5.560759 8961413 
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~ )"" to: 
n.m.nrl Supply 
I >Mm 14.1' 0480816 
~;~ 15.7( ~~ 
82~ 34: I>R~~ 0898224 
8 801 9087 1 ~7Q()';? 
12 79' 16: 1 <;47Q70 
16 7965019 18.75239 1.597416_ 
20 7960419 18.78572 1610095 
30 7956032 lR.&222'i 1 61742'i 
40 79.54~ l~~~?n 1.61R1i65 
50 70W 18.83471 I Iil~QlO 
:GOP' ,Due to: 
~ Supply 
I 7.779653 ?Q4? 'CfXm.7 
2 'f.,fYVoJ7 94.72128 '517904 
3 ~ ??ltn? Q? {;4~" 2135752 
4 41i~?lQ1i 90.71421 4653594 
8 ~~ ?~"Ii ,; ,;,,~~~ 
" 
;.379388 87.'Hm ( 52064 
H 87AAIiM ! '"25 
2( 87.6647~ 
31 ;.515101 87.57543 Ii <m471 
41 ;'i?1i'i'i7 R7'i'iQQQ 6913450 
51 ;.529711 ~~~1j37 60n915 
:mce : to· 
Supply 
I '/)1 <,,14>. 0.029~ 6 99.95498 
1 14~lQ~ 98.41114 
1.137322 )oR7~ 9 ""'.' '''0, 
1147R14- 3.426796 95.42537 
I HR 
I~ IJh4 
20 1 44~70>' 4.61&1&5 93.9~R02 
30 1443241 41i?OOl1i 9392774 
40 144l1Q1i 1.629'i2l 93 92728 
50 1.443199 4629599 93 92720 
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Table 6.12: South Afri"" 
dR;;;;! ~;:~to: 
Supply 
1 1042429 ry,; ';~71l1 
2 I R 'W1 1009981 26.0115' 
3 ;? 1137479 
4 11 11.29481 7 ''llROO 
8 )84751 11~ 2 '.59037 12 188319 11 2 :26088 
16 1.R4R47 1185264 ~~ 20 W.80801 1184422 
30 ~q7CJh1? 1: M7!M ry2 'l';lM 
40 59.79574 11.84281 ?R'l';lM 
50 5979572 11.84281 ?R 'l~14" 
IO! ~GDP' ~to: 
.I Supply 
1 .lU.OU H~ ,,; ,Cl()R' 2300600 
2 ?1?1\?40 5604084 22.69676 
3 5679660 ?? 'l14Ql 
4 LV O/IU4 5688206 ??MAAq 
8 1814256 5278228 29.07516 
12 1881727 "0'1 29.14352 
16 1887145 :,lCX 2929755 
20 lR Rmoo 'fi<l<f 1"16853 
30 1: ~ 29.37711 40 29.37795 
50 75427 29.37797 
lot ~Dueto: 
n.mmvl Supply 
?7?flR?, 
.L" ".H ,6 77 t;d7Lll 
2 7!Llt; 76.54714 
3 , ;M~ ?1 OO7m 7,~lfi 
4 , ifiRR 201ROOll 76.25110 
8 Q ~,,; 1 ( 74 
I' 116 ;Q, 
)1;, I" 125 
t6 18.17752 7145622 
30 U\ ~~Q2'; 1817118 7145896 
40 1O,7m, 18 17081 7L45RR4 
50 1037036 18.17080 71.45884 
2 7'10 >81 2016188 5.54731; 
8 fiC).3Rl04 :"),1 5.793' 
I: ,;0 ~QR?l i35' 5965 
11 1\c)7~?IQ :1'i' 5951' 
21 1& ?J.R~RQ<; 5974192 
30 I~I 5 987842 
40 'LI Q{;,~Q 'i. <l98277 
50 6900917 'LlORIIQ.1 
I 
8 
12 
16 
20 
30 
40 
I 
2 
3 
4 
8 
12 
11 
2 
31 
40 
50 
LI lRO,' 
liS 
~ 15888 
2~.50196 
204: 19l 
18.5' 15: 
lfU'lCSO 
1707A<l<1 
101 
R~<l2655 
61.13909 
;3 
6387599 
6463622 
65.17641 
663:~~ 
to: 
: !'nee ,Due to: 
Supply 
13. 
1507480 
19089 
1dI\1 
l'i.4'iOOl 
10 85386 
1188581 
1370203 
14fi220<; 
15.15507 
15623( 
15 695~ 
79.76618 
787128: 
785515: 
71;6 
71;.4 
7618308 
7614833 
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In general, it is real demand shocks that explain most of the vanations in real 
exchange rates of all the countries covered. The findmg IS consistent WIth those of 
Wang (2005), Che and Wu (1997) and Abmed (2003) on developing countries. The 
supply shocks are more significant than nominal shocks ID Algeria, Egypt, and Tanza-
nia. This could be due to major supply-side changes that took place WIthin the period 
in these countries. South Africa, Egypt and Botswana, on the other hand, have the 
highest contnbutions. The supply shocks accounted for over 50% variation ID rela-
tlve output growth in all the countnes except Botswana. In Botswana's case, supply 
shocks accounted for about half of the output variation in the short-run, but quar-
ter nominal shocks becomes the most important shock accounting for more than half 
of the fluctuations in the long-run. Supply and nominal shocks accounted for vana-
tions ID the movement of relative prices in Algeria, but in Botswana It is demand and 
nomma1 shocks that accounted for changes ID the relative prices. In the remaining 
countries, it is nomma1 shocks that accounted almost all variations ID the price levels. 
Supply shocks were more slgmficant in explaming the variation in relative pnce lev-
els than the demand shocks ID most of the countnes. TIns agrees with Agenor (2000) 
that supply shocks are significant contnbutors to inflation in developing countnes. 
Based on the estimated V AR, the historical decomposition of the real exchange 
rates was computed and reported ID figures 6.10 - 626. In general, the results re-
veal the importance of demand shocks to the real exchange rate fluctuations of the 
countries covered. As revealed by the results, the role of the demand shocks for the 
real exchange rate movements is much lugher than the supply and monetary shocks 
However, the role of supply shocks is significantly important in Algeria and Ghana, 
particularly from the mid- of the 1990s. The monetary shocks do not appear to have 
any sigmficant contribution to the real exchange rate variations of the countries. 
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Figure 6.10 
mstoricai Decomposition of Ahrerlan Real Excbaolle Rates: On Levels 
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Figure 6.U 
Historical 'don ofBoUwaoa Real Exc Rates: 00 Level. 
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Figure 6.13 
Historical Decomposition of Botswana Real Exchange Rates: First Differenced 
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Figure 6.14 
Historical Decomposition of Egyptian Real Exchange Rates: On Levels 
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Figure 6.15 
Historical Decomposition of Egyptian Real Exchange Rates: On First Differenced 
0.,--------------------------------------------------, 
.. 
02 
D1 
1~ 1~ 1~ 1B 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1m ~ ~ ~ 
RuI &~ Raes • -_. 0emInd Componeru 
0.,-----------------------------------------------, 
01 
01 
.01 
.02 
1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1~ ~ ~ ~ 
Real &dlqt Raes --_. ~ ~ 
0.,-----------------------------------------------, 
02 
01 
.01 
'O,~----r__.--_r--r__.--_r--r__.--_r--r__,--_r--~ 
t~ 1~ 1~ 1~ 1. 1m 1~ 1~ 1~ 1m ~ ~ ~ 
RuI~~ts •• _ ••• ~~ 
178 
Figure 6.16 
Historical Decomposition of Ghana Real Exchange Rate.: On Levels 
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Figure 6.17 
Historical Decomposition of Ghana Real Exchange Rates: On First Differenced 
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Figure 6.18 
Historical Decomposition of Ken an Real Exchange Rates: On Levels 
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Figure 6.19 
Historical Decomposition of Kenyan Real Exchange Rates: On First Differenced 
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Figure 6.20 
Historical Decomposition of Moro(can Real Exchange Rates: On Levels 
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Figure 6.21 
Historical Decomposition of Moroccan Real Exchange Rates: On First Differenced 
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Figure 6.22 
Historical Decomposition of Nigerian Real Exchange Rates: On Levels 
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Figure 6023 
Historical Decomposition of Nigerian Real Exchange Rates: On First Differenced 
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Figure 6.24 
Historical Decomposition of South African Real Exchange Rates: On Levels 
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Figure 6.25 
IDstorical Decomposition of South African Real Exchange Rates: On Fust Dlfferenced 
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Figure 6.26 
Historical Decomposition of Tanzanian Real Exchange Rates: On Levels 
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Historical Decom osition of Tanzanian Real Exchange Rates: On First Differenced 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in some 
African countries, utilizing a tri-variate structural VAR. The theoretical framework 
has ldenttfied three shocks; demand, supply and monetary shocks. Impulse response, 
variance and historical decomposItion were derived based on the esttmated V AR. 
The empirical results show that the most important sources of real exchange rate 
movements in these countnes are the demand shocks. However, supply shocks have 
contnbuted to the real exchange rate vartations of countnes hke Algeria and Ghana, 
particularly, dunng the period after supply-side reforms. 
Financial systems of these countries, except in South Africa are relatively un-
derdeveloped. It is therefore, not surpnsing to find that nominal shocks have con-
tnbuted least to real exchange rate flUctuatIOns in the countries In addttion, the less 
importance of nommal shocks to real exchange rate variations, questions aspects of 
monetary pohcies of these countnes that seek to promote competitiveness. 
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Chapter 7 
Terms of Trade and Economic Performance 
Under Different Exchange Rate Regimes 
and the Role of Exchange Rate 
Pass-Through 
7.1 Introduction 
A country's tenns of trade is defined as the relative price of that country's exports 
to its imports. Shocks to the tenns of trade affect a country's economic growth and 
more importantly introduce macroeconomic instabihty. The effects of such distur-
bances are well documented in the literature, for example, Mendoza (1995) and Kose 
(2002) discovered that these shocks accounted for about 50% of the output volatility 
in developmg countries. Barro (1976) finds that prolonged, negatIve terms of trade 
shocks of a country significantly affect its growth. Stuches of tenns of trade effects 
date back to 1950s with the works of Herberger (1950) and Laursen and Metzler 
(1950). These authors predict that a worsenmg of the tenns of trade would reduce 
real mcome, savings and inveshnent, winch would in turn negatIvely affect the cur-
rent account balance of the country. This is the 'Herberger-Laursen-Metzler effect'. 
The role of the exchange rate regime m the adJushnent process by countnes faced 
with terms of trade shocks also dates back to 1950s when MUton Friedman put for-
ward the arguments in favour of a flextble exchange rate regune. Friedman (1953) 
argues for flextble exchange rate regimes on the basis that in a world characterised 
by price ngidity, the nominal exchange rate can act as a shock absorber to the econ-
omy. Since then a number of authors not only concur with lnm, but theones and 
models based on flexible exchange rate regime have become common. These include 
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Turnovsky (1983), Flood and Manoo (1982), Dombusch (1980), and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000), but the empirical work that connects the exchange rate regimes and 
tenns of trade shocks is relatively recent". 
It is against tIns background that thIs chapter sets out to examine how develop-
mg countries in Africa cope with tenns of trade shocks under different exchange rate 
regimes: mam1y, floating and fixed. Beginning from late 1970s, many African coun-
tries have started slufting from fixed to more a flexible regune. However, there are 
quite a few that still have their currencies pegged, which mclude two CFA currency 
zones of west and central Africa. This chapter rums to achieve two objectives; first 
is to explore the role of exchange rate in mitigating effects of terms of trade shocks, 
and secondly, to examine importance of tenns of trade shocks on the real exchange 
rate and output variations in these countries. 
The chapter is divided into two parts The first part is on the real exchange 
rates, terms of trade and economic performance of twenty two Afncan countries un-
der chfferent exchange rate regimes. The second part, on the other hand, analyses 
exchange rate pass-through m these countries. The rest of the chapter IS organlsed 
as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical chscussions on the real exchange 
rates, tenns of trade and economic performance. Section 7 3 is on the exogeneity 
of tenns of trade while Section 7 4 sets out the econometric model used m the first 
part, where the long-nm structural identifications are explamed. SectIOn 7 5 analyses 
exchange rate regime classification and the technique followed by this study. DISCUS-
sions on the data and the estimated results are curried out in Section 7 6 and Section 
7.7 analyses lffiportance oftenns of trade shocks in the countnes. The second part 
looks at the exchange rate pass-through in Section 7 8 and followed by explanation 
on the empIrical model of exchange rate pass-through in Section 7.9. SectIOn 7.10 
chscusses the data and the estimated results wInle section 7.11 concludes. 
35 They include Mendoza (1995), SWIft (2004) Enge! (2002) Broda (2004), Amano (1995) and 
Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) 
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7.2 Real Exchange Rates, Terms of Trade and Economic 
Performance: Theoretical Discussion 
Large and recurrent tenns of trade shocks are WIdely viewed as an important driving 
force of econOlDlc fluctuations. Sharp fluctuations m econOmIC actlVlty affected 
many industrial and developing countnes after the large oil-price mcreases of the 
1970s, and its subsequent abrupt declines in the following decade Dunng the 19805, 
there were also marked fluctuations in the prices of non-oil primary commodtties that 
resulted in large tenns of trade shocks for developing countries. The terms of trade 
rose by 7% in 1983-84 for exporters of non-oil prunary commodtties, and fell by 
more than 18% in 1985-90 (IMF 1991). Tenns of trade shocks have more devastat-
ing effects on economic activity in developing countries due to their dependence on 
imported capital goods and specIahzation in commodity exports. 
Based on the traditional open macroeconOmIC model, exchange rates play a 
stabilization role of adjusting relatIve prices m reaction to shocks, when price ngid-
Ity does not allow downward adjustment in local currency. hnportant here, is the 
assumption that nominal deprecIatIon leads to real deprecIation which makes domes-
tic goods cheaper in the global markets and therefore, mducmg htgher demands. The 
new open economy macroeconOmICS (see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995), 
drawing on the Mundell-Flenting and KeynesIan tradttIOn argue that export prices 
are sticky in the currency of the producer, the nominal import prices m local cur-
rency seem to 'move one-to-one' with the exchange rate. If import prices are sticky 
in local currency, depreciatIon does not affect home goods in the global markets, and 
therefore, It has no expendtture-switching effects, but rather It raIses ex-post mark 
ups on home imports. 
Fnedman (1953) discusses the general merits of flexible exchange rate regtme 
as a shock absorber of exogenous external shocks. He argues that the regime pro-
vides a smooth adjustment mechanism in face of real external shocks, even Ifnom-
inal rigidities extst. Mundell (1968), Poole (1970) and others have confimted the 
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intuition. However, there IS general discussIOn in the lIterature that these merits or 
demerits of an exchange rate regime depend on the nature of the shocks that affect 
an economy. It IS generally argued that shocks which come from domestic money 
market would be better tackled by a pegged regime which insulates the real econ-
omy from the shock. For example, a positIve demand shock mcreases money supply 
and the monetary authonty accumulates fOreIgn reserves to prevent the domestic cur-
rency from appreciation and consequently the output remains unaffected. In contrast, 
flexible exchange rate would reqUIre income to fall so that real demand money can 
be reduced. This argument favours a peg regune. If on the other hand, shocks are 
mostly real, flexible exchange rate could be the preferred option as it accommodates 
smooth adjustment, as pnce stIckiness would result in slow adjustment. A negative 
real shock which could be from a countly's terms of trade, leads to nominal exchange 
rate depreciatIOn. This reduces the relatIve pnce of tradable goods thereby 1l11tigating 
the effects. The exchange rate here, acts as a stabilizing mechanism. The monetary 
authorities are also free to pursue further polIcies that would assist in neutralIsing the 
negative effects. In the case of a pegged regune, the adjustments take place through 
changes m domestic pnces, which may be very slow due to price rigidIty. TIns means 
that effects of the negatIve shocks would last longer in this circumstance. In additIon, 
the monetary authonnes have to defend the exchange rate from apparent deprecIa-
non by purchasmg the domesnc currency WIth foreign currency. This would further 
contract the economy and leads to fall in employment Argentina in the 1920s and 
United Kmgdom in the 1990s are cited as practical experience of tlus phenomenon 
(Broda, 2001). A related argument is whether pnces are sticky in the producers' 
currencies or the consumers' currencies. If the former is the case, the flexible ex-
change rates mduce expenditure-SWItchIng when they change relative international 
prices which, provides a quick and pamless adjustment. However, if the latter IS the 
case, nominal exchange vanations can lead to a rustortJon in the real exchange rate. 
Engel (2002) found that prices are sticky in consumers' prices in nch countries in the 
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short run This suggests that nommal exchange rate changes do not play a sigmfi-
cant role ID changmg prices of goods in these countries. If consumer pnces are not 
responsive to exchange rates, the depreciation of domestic currency does not raise 
import pnces that the consumers pay. There could be relative effects but not prob-
ably for final goods purchased by the consumers (Engel, 2002). There could be a 
substitution of intermediate goods based on the relative pnce change and the prices 
for consumers act in a manner that is unresponsive to exchange rate changes. 
There is also a debate about the extent to which floating exchange rates ID-
sulate the domestic price levels from foreign shocks in the long-run. For example, 
Obstfeld (1984) shows how nominal exchange rates can asSIst the economy in the 
face of external shocks, but explams also that floating exchange rates cannot alter the 
domestic price level ID the long-run. He argues that if aggregate dentand shocks, es-
pecIally those emanating from fiscal poltcies would influence both the domestic and 
foreign price levels. An expansionary fiscal policy in either foreign or domestic coun-
tries results in pushing up the pnce levels of both. This is because a rise in global 
aggregate dentand raises the world real IDterest rate and for a given money growth 
rate, raises nommal interest rates of the countries In this scenario, therefore, float-
ing exchange rate regrme cannot shield the domestic pnce levels. However, floating 
exchange rates can insulate the domestic prices from external monetary shocks in 
the medtum run. Changes ID money supply and money growth rates do not change 
the world real interest rate, mamfestatlon of the neutral.tty of money. An upsurge ID 
money supply or its growth rate results ID raising the domestic pnce level, but the 
foreIgn pnce level remain the same. A nominal depreciation equal to the rise in the 
national price level precludes monetary disturbance from affecting the real exchange 
rate. On the other hand, If the IDterest elasticities of money dentand are related across 
countries, demand for foreign output would depreciate the domestic currency, nomi-
nally and growth ID demand for domestic output leads to domestic currency apprecI-
ation. When an external shock occurs, it is expected that adJustutent of real exchange 
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rate to real mstw-bance is carried out through the nominal exchange rate that helps m 
adjusting the relallve nallonal price levels 
7.3 Exogeneity of Terms of Trade 
Underlying this study is the assumption of the exogeneity of tenns of trade as in 
Broda (2004). Theoretically, the small country assumption is used as a justification 
for treating the countnes as price takers in the global markets. Thts is because, both 
imports and exports of African economies account for only about 3%" of the world 
total, which means that these countries can not exert any mftuence on either their 
import or export prices. According to the IMF (2008), the countries are heavily 
dependent on primary commomlles that heighten their vu1nerabihty to tenns of trade 
shocks. As recently observed by McKinley (2008) African countries have frequently 
suffered from severe tenns of trade shocks. 
Macroeconomic models of small open economies usually assume that a single 
small country will have httle influence on the determinallon of pnce and quantity 
in world markets for its goods. ThIs "small-country" assumption forms the baSIS of 
commonly used dependent-economy models such as those of Salter (1959), Swan 
(1960) and Dombusch (1980). In these models, interna1 and externa1 adJusllnent 
comes about through a change in the internal relallve pnces of traded goods in tenns 
of non-traded goods In a flexible exchange rate system, if the prices of non-traded 
goods are fixed or sticky, adjustment will occur through a change m the nominal 
exchange rate. 
The exogenelty of terms of trade therefore, idenl!fies the responses ofreal out-
put, real exchange rates and pnce levels to tenn of trade shocks. 
36 See World Trade Orgarusallon (2007) for the full statistics 
198 
7.4 Econometric Methodology 
'This chapter uses structural V AR model37• The model can be represented by a re-
duced form of V AR As the theoretical underpinning the structural V AR has been 
explained in chapter six, only issues that are specific to tins model would be dealt 
with here. The chapter considers a vector of four variables: 
(7.1) 
IS a 4 x 1 vector of varIables and Yt denotes therea1 GDP; qt represents real exchange 
rates; Pt is the consumer price index; and tt stands for terms of trade, which is a ratio 
of export to Import prices. The long-run representation of the structural V AR is gIven 
as follows: 
[ 
D..Yt 1 [C11(I) CI2 (1) CI3 (1) C14(I) 1 [ey 1 D..qt _ C21 (1) C22(I) C23(1) C24 (1) eq 
D..Pt - C31(1) C32(1) C33(1) C34(1) el' (7.2) 
D..tt C41 (1) C.2(1) C'3(1) C •• (I) et 
where C(l) = Co + Cl + C2 + . are the long-run multipliers of the structural VAR. 
where et = [e, Cd e J ett]' is an n x 1 vector of an unobserved mutually interrelated 
shocks The dynamic response of Xt to et is Identified. The main assumption for the 
identification is the exogenerty of the terms of trade 'This means that Cl2 = CI3 = 
Cl. = 0 The other three additional assumptions required to recover the structural 
coefficients are Cz3 = Cz. = C34 = 0 The C(I) matrix is thus converted mto a lower 
triangular, I e. 
[ 
C11(1) CI2 (1) Cdl) C14(I) 1 [ 0 0 0 1 C21 (1) C22(1) C23 (1) C24(I) _ . 0 0 
C31 (1) C32(1) C33(1) C34(I) - . . . 0 
C41 (I) C.2(1) C.3(1) C .. (I) .... 
These restrictions are suffiCIent to identify the structural matrix Co and also to recover 
the structural system defined by Cl, C2 and the structural shocks et = [cf. cl, er, elJ', 
that is shocks to supply, real exchange rates, pnces, and the terms of trade, respec-
37 Refer to the previous chapter i e cbapter 6 proVIdes a detail ruscusslon on structural VAR. 
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tively. This techmque provides two tools With which to shed light on the behaviour 
of these variables in the face of a shock. They are the impulse response functions, 
forecast error variance decomposition. The impulse response function allows the 
possibility to investigate the dynamic response of the variables to different shocks 
within the system while the forecast error variance decompOSItion shows the relative 
contnbution of the structura1 shocks to the forecast error vanance of the variables for 
different horizons. 
7.5 Exchange Rate Regimes Classifications 
Exchange rate regtme classification is carried out and reported by IMF in its Annual 
Report on Exchange Rate Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions. Imtlally, the 
classificatIOns were based on the reported regime by the member-countries (de jure) 
However, there has been increasing doubts on the accuracies of these reports. Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002) find that many countries do not follow the reported regimes. 
This therefore, prompted interest in verificatlon and classification of exchange rate 
regimes. Most of the empirical findings contradicted the reported regtmes as many 
countries that claimed to be operating floating regimes (de jure), their actual regtmes 
(de facto) were not float, which Calvo and Reinhart (2002) called 'fear of floating' 
and a number of countnes that reported peg regimes, the studies find that the behav-
iour of their exchange rates do not reflect that. Reinhart and Rogoff referred to that 
as 'fear of pegging'. The findings in Chapter three have also indicated that many 
African countnes do not follow their announced regimes (de jure), thereby support-
ing the view that results of empirical work that is based on that could be misleading. 
The strategy adopted here IS to use model and the techniques in chapter three 
to identify regtmes operated by the countries. Thts involves the used of the econo-
metric model adopted from Frankel et aT (2001) and the structura1 break procedures 
explamed in the chapter. Furthermore, results from the Reinhart and Rogoff's (2002) 
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natural classification were considered to arrive at robust conclusions. The results are 
reported ID Table 7.1. It is clear from the Table that results for some countries dtffer 
from their declared regimes. Countries in tIns categOIY include EtInopia, Mauritania 
and Morocco. There are other countries where the findings differ with that of Rein-
hart and Rogoff, which are Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco and Tanzama. The IMF and 
Reinhart and Rogoff's classification have identified the Tanzania as peg, but Frankel 
et aI's model and the other procedures used m chapter 3 suggest that Tanzania is 
floating countIy. 
7.6 Data and Estimation Results 
The data set, which covers the period of 1980 to 2005, is sourced from the IMF 
International FinancIal Statistics database and the series are quarterly real GDP, real 
exchange rates, consumer pnce mdex, CPI and terms of trade which is the ratio 
of export to import prices.38 The series were subj ected to vanous unit root tests 
and the results are reported in Tables 7 2a to 7 2c. The tests used are Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Plnllips-Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) Full dtscussion and specifications of these tests were carned out in chapter 
3. The results indtcatethat the variables are 1(1) in levels and 1(0) m first difference. 
Therefore, It IS appropriate to estimate the V AR in first dtfference Another thing 
that needed to be checked is the presence of cointegration relationship among the 
series, which if It exists, will make using the outlined VAR inappropnate. Johansen 
Tests were used for that purpose and the results, as reported in Tables 7 3a and 7.3b, 
mdicate that presence of cointegration was rejected, at 5% level of significance, for 
38 The chapter covers 22 African countnes, among winch 11 are on peg and 11 are on flexlble ex-
change mle regimes The peggers are Berun, Botswana, Cameroon, Central Afuca and EtluOPla. The 
resl are Gabon, Libya, Ma1D1tarua, Morocco, Senegal and TmuSla. Those on flextble exchange mle 
regimes conslst of Algena, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, MalaWl, Ma1D1I1US, Nlgena, South Afnca, Tanzarua, 
Uganda and Zambla. 
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all the countries ID favour of its non-existence. Consequently, a structural VAR was 
estimated for each of the countries. 
Table 7.1 
Exchange Rate Regimes Classifications 
SIN. Co,""", 
Exchange Rate Regunes 
IMF RR® De fiooto Rogunee 
I AI..,.. floatIng' A" .... Floatmg 
2 Borun p,. Pog Pog 
3 80-.. pog Pog Pog 
4 Camoroon pog Pog Pog 
5 Central A:ihca Repubbc Pog pog Pog 
6 Egypt Floatmg pog Floatmg 
7 EtluOP18 A" .... Pog Pog 
S Gabon Pog pog Pog 
9 Ghann Aoa .... Roon,. A" .... 
10 Kenya Aontmglpog Floatmg F108tmg 
11 ubya Pog pog Pog 
12 Ma_ Floatmg floating F10atmg 
13 Mnun_ FIo""'. Pog Pog 
14 MaunllUS F10atmg pog Fl08nng 
15 Mo""", Pog Pog Floatmg 
16 N.genn Floatmglpeg Floanng floatmg 
17 _I Pog Pog Pog 
IS SoutbAfuca FIontmS A ...... Aa ..... 
19 T""""", Roolmf! Pog Floabng 
20 TumS18 Pog Pog pog 
21 U,...,wa Floatmglpeg Fioatlng F10anng 
22 Znmb .. FIoatmg A ...... Floanng 
® Remhart and Rogoo"(2004) cJasslficatJon 
E9 Estuoated USIng FrankeJ et 01 (2001) model 
• Includes managed and free ftoatmg 
b Col1Slsts of sln.\!:le basket and soft ne2 
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Table 7.2a 
Unit Root Test Results 
Teln LREER LGDP CPI TOT 
Algeria ADF wo. -036- -043- -1 09· -1 63-
I""Dlfference -8.35·· -2 52-- -1 83- ·1003·· 
pp Levels -056-- -003- ·1 84- -1 70· 
1· Difference -846·· -8.30·· 
-74'- -1051·· 
KPSS Levels I 00' I 13' t OS' 077' 
I"" Dtffereoce 012" 012- 025- 017" 
Benl. ADF Levels -479" .() 77- -322- -2 16S· 
100DdTerence -12 OS- -291- -850" -914-
pp Levels -4.88" -080· -334- -1.84· 
1- Difference -1553- ·740- -1027" -547-
KPSS Levels 013- 112' a 17- 083' 
I • Dt ffereoc:e 012- e 10· DOS- 0.24" 
BokWa ... ADF wo. -I 41- -1 62- -1 59- -263· 
I ""Difference -8.3S·· -SDI·· -607- -619-
pp Levels -I 35- -1.20· -280· -2 OS-
t- Dtfi'ercucc -842·· -8.35·· -106Su _592 M 
KPSS Levels 1 to' I 13' 047' 044" 
t 01 01 fference Oil" 0.20" 047' 010" 
Camerooa ADF wo. -I 61-- - 064-- -037- -203· 
I"Dlfference -1066·· -361·· -695- -423-
pp Levels -I 53-- -I 97· 
-082- -2 16· 
I"" DIfference 10.66" -775-- -S 94'" -195'" 
KPSS Levels 068' I 12' 112' 025' 
I .. 01 fferencc 007" 0.20" 008- 003" 
Central Africa ADF wo. -I 83- -I 78' -1 OS- -2.24-
100DUference -11 28-- -468-- -683'" -508-
pp Levels -I 77- -2JS- -083- -251-
III Difference -11 50-- -6 SS--
-S 82'" -190" 
KPSS Levels .093' I 22' 112' 0.34" 
1 .. Dl. ffetCncc 010" 0.27" 006- 015" 
ElD'pt ADP Lev •• -038- -I 03' 1.31- -1 02-
101 Difference -S 02-- -305-- -S 6S'" -2 91'" 
pp Levels -06S- -IJo- 135· -0.63-
I • 01 fference -945-- -IOJO" -679'" -629'" 
KPSS Levels I 02' 114" 114' 099' 
I • 01 fferencc 009" 017' D 35l1li 010" 
·F.1ed 10 II:JccttbCDUD tb. tbcserlC5 bas. 1IDd root 
"RCjed tbenu D tbalthe acncs b. a 1101111)01 
"RcJCCt tbcDull Iba! tbc.crleS IS stabODa!), 
""Failed to II:Jcctlbc null tb. thc !lena Itstallonary 
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Table 7.2b 
Unit Root Test Results 
T .. " LREER LGDP CPI TOT 
Etblopla ADF Levels ·374- 015- 017- -1 93-
t"Dlfference -674- -233- -4.53" -S09" 
pp L""b ·323- 075- 048· ·1 98· 
I .. D Iffcreooe 
-790- _760" -7:37-- -457·· 
KPSS Levels 031" 115' 123' 090' 
I" Difference 030" 016- D 14' 040· 
Gobo. ADF Lov,b ·117- -048- ·1 59- -1 65-
1'lDlfference 
-1072" -4.34'- -669·· _832u 
pp Lov,b -113- -061· -1 65- -2 13· 
t" DIfference 1075- -670" -673 -491" 
KPSS Levels 106' 119' 112' 027-
1 .. Difference 007" OOS 010· 014-
Gbn. ADF Leve1s 
·144' -065' 341· -1 71· 
I"Dtffereoce 
-485" -432*'" -009- 5.20" 
pp Lov,b 
-1.26' -064' 796- -1 84· 
I" Difference 
-608" -5.52·· -SA2·· -589" 
KPSS Lov,b 091' 096' 102' 062' 
I .. Difference 012" 0.15' 1 00' 011· 
Ktaya ADF Levels 
-1.78' -1 51' 220· _363u 
t"'Dlfference 
-678" -476·· -6.92-- -15.98'" 
pp Lov,b 
-1.78' -123' 261· -6 14·· 
I" Difference 
-640" -8 SI" -712" ·2011-
KPSS Levels 1.11' 1 14' 1 11' DOS-
101 Difference 025" 022" 063' 004-
Libya ADF Levels -2.30· 143* -1 67- ·1 19· 
t"Dtfference -816- -1 65- ·205- -550" 
pp Lov,b -2.36 .. 31S- ·1 75" -2 10· 
I" DtfTerence 
-816 - -669·· -770 - -4 S9" 
KPSS Lov,b 040' 095' 097' o 3S" 
I· Difference DOS" 093' 039" 028" 
Malawi ADP Levels -212~ 028~ 212~ -2 22~ 
ItlDlfference -74S- -3.85" -083- -15.56-
pp Lov,b -1 67~ 058- 5 73~ -798--
I .. Difference -711- -8A3" -878" -24.58-
KPSS Levels 1 OS' 113' 102' 030" 
I· Difference 004" 023" o 8S" 024-
·Falled tI) Rject Ibenulllballhc: SCl'ICI q. uull lOOt 
"Rqccllbe nuo dl8I tbesencs has. tlml rool 
"Rqectdlenul1d1.1 Ibe SCl'IC$IS-SIIb01I.ry 
-Fatled 10 .eject !be nulllbattbe senes •• tabOaary 
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Table7,2c 
Unit Root Test Results 
T_ LREER LGDP CPI TOT 
MlIIrltalla MY; Lcveh -398" .0.35' 2.09' .os:/" 
I'Dlff'ermce .eSSM -410" .e 69"' -3. 15'" 
pp Lcveh -2.95" -OD1" 198' -117' 
IIIOdfemr.e 
.e75'" -824- .e 79" -464M 
KP$ Lcveb 024- 11s' 1N 04d'" 
l'Odfemr.e 014- 01l6'" 0.43'" 040'" 
M ...... MY; Lcveb -265" -2.30' 378' -1~8' 
1'D.ff'erence _711M -123' -770" .em-
pp Lcveb -278' -2.28' 3.18' -1~0' 
III Dtfferen::e -779" -10.so- .eor .e 08" 
KP$ Lcveh 0.98' 114- 113" 121111 
I' DIfferm:e o 2lf" 044" on" 011-
M ... "" MY; Lcveb -292" -1.26· -248' -563" 
I' OJff'erence -8.54" -4.77" -960" -957" 
pp Lcveh -2.88' .0 SO' -265" -611-
I' DIfferm:e ·870" -967- -964M -212r-
KP$ Lcveb Q2!' 031- 113" o:d" 
I'Ddfereu::e 0.19' Q()IH ost' 002'" 
Nlgeda MY; Lcveb -LS2' Q23' 5.11" -2.95" 
I'Dlfference -7.69'· ·3.18- -1 35" -16.98'" 
pp Lcve' -I.s~ 103· 522" -533" 
III Ddferen:c -77S" -6.33" -735'" -17.35'" 
KP$ Lcveb MO' HON 112" 04'i' 
I' Ddferen:c 011'" 041' oss"" om" 
..... ~ MY; Lcveb -324' .0.35' -125" -2.08' 
J1o.ffermce -700- -379M .e54M -2.51* 
pp Lcveh -285" -1D1" -1 22" -1B4' 
I' Ddferen:c 
-785'" -740" .e63" .e 35'" 
KP$ Lcveb OBO' 124· 118- 023" 
I'Ddfemr.e 018- 010" oJJ/' oIJ5" 
"FaiJedtDrq«:tthenull tbatlbc _hasallllll lOOt 
"Re)Cct thenuDthII1be.cncs hmallllllrool 
'RCJect!be DU!l1bat \be _. stlllODllr)' 
'"Ruled tI n:I ca !be PUI1 that !be _ IS stalCJlB)' 
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Table 7.2d 
Unit Root Test Results 
T ... lREER LGDP Cl'I ror 
Sootb Afrioa AIF lovds -154" .() 14· 127' -2.46' 
1· D.fference -471·· ·1078- -518" -14.55** 
pp lovds -172' .0 14'" 224* -4.39'" 
I' Ddferen;e -865*' 10.78-
-488" -1521·· 
KPiS lovc1s Q86' 0.31' 113' 0.51' 
I' Ddferen;e 0. 011' o.n- 0.67" 0.07'" 
Tanzatla AIF lovds -238' -171'" -061* -1.83" 
1- III ffi:rence ..g.s~. -3.30 .... -157' -10.13'" 
pp lovds -238' -131'" 0.93" -1.54" 
1· Dtffererx:e ·9.33·· -8.31" -1019"· -1498'" 
KPiS lovds 0.711 119' 1.oa" 1.01' 
I' Ddferen;e 011#111 o.2lH c4d'" 021" 
Twisl. lovds -140' -168· -065' -454-
I-Difference -79"'- -4.0-
-483" -1794** 
pp lovds -130' -219' -056" -8.24-
I' Ddferen;e ..g1~· -1079- -5.12" -62.80." 
KPiS lovds 088' 02~ 119" 112' 
I'Il1fI'=w 013" 012" 0.12'" C~ 
Uganda lovds -4164'· ~86' cOO' -2.64" 
tanffemtce -816*· -386" -8.28" -541-
pp lovc1s -284" ~.39' 0.57' -2.32' 
1· Dtfferm:e -11.04"· -785" 
-835" -7rx1" 
KPiS lovds 0'Il' lId' 111- 0..85' 
I'Il1fI'=w 021' 0.10" C2f!" cofI" 
bRill. lovds -2.60" -1.66* 0.49' -120' 
tanference -1016- -1.53" -908" -6.28" 
pp loveb -281· -0.56' 0.39' -1.81· 
I' Drllercn:e 
-10.18- -8.75'" -909'" -464'" 
KPiS lovds 018- 112" 115" c.5fJ' 
I'Il1fI'=w 011" 02d'" 0.23" 0.19'" 
~ kl R)ect die DJll4Jat1be aencs has a tm 1IXt 
.*Re.Ject dlenlll tha: 1bescncs has a UlItroot 
"Rt;lCl:t!be null that !be SI:ftS IS stltlmay 
"'Failed tortaec:t!be nuB 1bat!be scnes IS stmOOZ)' 
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Table7.3a 
Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Hypotbesized 0.115 Mu~Elgen 0.05 Cowtry Tnce Crtical. No ofeE, V."et Statistic Oidcal V.lIes 
A1gena , 0 4783621 4785613 24.24565 27.58434 
,,;; 1 23 59056 29797rr1' 15 19954 2113162 
,';;2 8.391023 1549471 7592088 14.26460 
,';;3 0798935 3841466 0.798935 3841466 
BenlD r=O 6042727 6387610 25 74059 3211832 
,,;; 1 34 68668 4291525 1430815 2S 82321 
,';;2 20 37853 2587211 1331941 1938704 
rS3 7059127 1251798 7059127 1251798 
Botswana r=O 62 64773 6387610 26.21624 32 11832 
,';;1 36 43149 4291525 18.55901 2S 82321 
,';;2 1787248 2587211 11 40528 1938704 
,';;3 6.467198 1251798 6.467198 12.51798 
Camerooo r=O 5748746 6387610 2910169 3211832 
,,;; 1 28 38577 4291525 13 69122 2S 82321 
,';;2 1469455 2587211 8750835 1938704 
,';;3 5943712 1251798 5943712 12 51798 
Central Africa r=O 39.23579 4785613 21 92351 27.58434 
'~1 17.31228 29797(J/ 7733623 2113162 
,';;2 9578658 1549471 6.158300 14.26460 
,';;3 3420358 3841466 3420358 3841466 
Egypt r=O 55.21641 6387610 2691737 3211832 
,~1 28 35904 4291525 13.23936 25 82321 
,~2 1511967 2587211 10 67175 1938704 
,~3 4447918 1251798 4447918 1251798 
Ethiopia r=O 52 82744 6387610 23 05216 32 11832 
,S:I 2977528 4291525 13 &>814 25 82321 
,';;2 1596714 2587211 1077241 1938704 
,S:3 5194724 1251798 5194724 12.51798 
Gabon r=O 5988178 6387610 25 41623 3211832 
,,;; 1 3446555 4291525 1801470 25 82321 
r:S2 1645085 2587211 10 19786 1938704 
,';;3 6.252992 1251798 6.252992 1251798 
Ghana r=O 63 10444 6387610 28 08770 3211832 
,S: 1 3501674 4291525 20 43134 25 82321 
,S:2 14.58540 2587211 9189246 19.38704 
rS3 5396158 1251798 5396158 12 51798 
K81ya r=O 4578365 4785613 1997520 2758434 
,S: I 25 80845 29797rr1 16 15317 21 13162 
rS2 9655284 1549471 9.592345 14.26460 
,';;3 0062939 3841466 0062939 3841466 
LIbya r=O 4100324 4785613 1937rr12 27.58434 
,S: 1 2163253 29797rr1 12.21822 21 13162 
r:S2 9.354309 1549471 9.274687 14.26460 
rS3 0079621 3841466 0079621 3841466 
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Table7.3b 
Johansen Comtegration Test Results 
Hypotbedzed 
005 Max-EJgea 0.05 Couttry Trace Crltical No orCEs Values Statistic Crltk:al Values 
Malawi , 0 3916359 4785613 1962248 27.58434 
r:5:1 1954112 2979707 1410442 2113162 
r:5:2 5436693 1549471 5429817 14.26400 
r:::;3 0006876 3841466 0006876 3841466 
Mauritania r=O 5447907 63.87610 23 89045 3211832 
r:5:1 30.58861 4291525 16.30099 2582321 
r::;;2 14.28762 2587211 10 13066 1938704 
r:S:3 4156959 1251798 4156959 1251798 
Maarltltll r=O 5994143 6387610 2461153 3211832 
,SI 35.32990 4291525 16.36951 2582321 
r:5:2 1890039 25 87211 11 66484 1938704 
r:S:3 7295551 1251798 7295551 1251798 
Morocco r=O 63.23497 6387610 2434674 3211832 
,SI 3888823 4291525 1583011 2582321 
r:::;2 2305812 2587211 1270953 1938704 
,S3 1034859 1251798 1034859 1251798 
Nigeria r=O 4587935 4785613 2712919 2758434 
,SI 1875016 2979707 1051732 2113162 
r:5:2 8232839 1549471 8 182826 14.26400 
,S3 0050014 3841466 0050014 3841466 
Senegal r=O 6336231 6387610 2882939 3211832 
,SI 34 53292 4291525 23 67405 2582321 
r::;;2 1085888 2587211 8296276 1938704 
,S3 2562603 1251798 2562603 1251798 
Soutb Mrlca r=O 4552800 5524578 2480908 3081507 
,SI 2071892 3501090 11 07423 24.25202 
,S2 9644687 18 39771 8488288 1714769 
rS3 1156399 3841466 1156399 3841466 
Tanzania r=O 5841846 6387610 23 61440 3211832 
,SI 34 80406 4291525 19 16495 2582321 
rS2 1563911 2587211 10 40892 1938704 
rS3 5230196 1251798 5230196 1251798 
TunIsia r=O 4509283 5524578 2651428 3081507 
,SI 1857855 3501090 1219311 24.25202 
,S2 6.385442 18 39771 6347210 1714769 
,S3 0038232 3841466 0038232 3841466 
Uganda r:::::O 3899698 40.17493 1910966 2415921 
,SI 1988732 2427596 1239117 1779730 
rS2 7496145 1232090 6507612 11.22480 
r:::;;3 0988533 4129906 0988533 4129906 
Zantnll r=O 4509036 4785613 19 17656 2758434 
rSt 25 91380 2979707 1500751 2113162 
r:S:2 1090629 1549471 7331922 14.26400 
r:S:3 3574372 3841466 3574372 3841466 
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The dynamic responses of the est1D1llted structural V AR are reported in figures 
7.1-722. From the theoretical pomt of view, adjustment to terms of trade shocks in 
countries with a floatmg exchange rate regime is expected to be carried out through 
the exchange rate. In countries with a fixed exchange rate regime on the other hand, 
this adjustment takes place via output changes. For the floating countries of Kenya, 
Nigeria and Zambia, the real exchange rates do not change mitially followmg the 
shock, but then slowly depreciate. The real exchange rates of floating countries 
of Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda, did not respond to the terms of trade shocks dur-
ing the first period, but then depreciate during the subsequent periods. The results for 
Malawi, Mauritius and Morocco indicate that their real exchange rates remam almost 
unchanged at the begmning of the shocks, but then slowly appreciate. With regards to 
the real GDP's response to terms of trade shocks, Algena and Morocco have positive 
responses for the period contemporaneous to the shocks, and a few penods there-
after. Although, some of the floating countnes have shown an element of insulatlon 
of real GDP from the terms of trade shocks, it appears the stabilizing mecharusms of 
the flextble exchange rate regimes IDlght have been exaggerated. Alternatively, con-
sumer pnces m these countries are not responsive to exchange rate changes winch 
make flextble exchange rates meffective to perform a stabilizing role as postulated 
by the theory. All indicated by the impulse response graphs, the floating countries 
have responded dIfferently to the terms of trade shocks. These countnes can be sub-
divided mto three groups. First, where tlte exchange rate did not respond to the terms 
of trade shocks. Countries m this category include Algena, Egypt, Malawi, Nige-
ria and Zambia. The Algerian results indicate that the real exchange rates did not 
significantly respond to the terms of trade shocks up to the tentlt quarter. Thts con-
tradicts the theory, as the country operates flexible exchange rate regime. However, 
real output exhibits a positive response to the shock for up to about the third quar-
ter. The Egyptian results indicate no significant responses by either the real exchange 
rates or output to terms of trade shocks. Egypt, bemg a floatrog country, tlte expecta-
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tion is that the adjustment would emanate from the exchange rate. Malawi's dynamic 
responses are reported by figure 7.12, which, again did not respond to the terms of 
trade shocks. FIgure 7.16 shows that Nigeria's real exchange rates have recorded no 
slgmficant response to terms of trade shock wluIe output has a nnId and positive, but 
insignificant, response. NIgeria IS a floating country, which suggests that adjustment 
in real exchange rates should be higher. Since that country has a floating regime, 
most of the adjustment is expects to take place in the exchange rates. 1n the case 
of ZambIa, winch all the three identification schemes classIfied as floatmg, her real 
exchange rates, as well as output, appeared with less slgmficant responses to terms 
of trade shock. The expectation IS that the adjustment would be undertaken by the 
exchange rates. 
The second group are those where real exchange rates depreciated m response 
to the terms of trade shocks These countnes are Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanza-
nia and Uganda Figure 7 9 plots the results for Ghana. The real exchange rate did not 
respond immechately after the shock, but steadIly deprecIates from the second quar-
ter to the fifth quarter, reaching a peak of about 4%. Although a slight appreciation 
had taken place thereafter, from the 7th to the 10th quarter, the exchange rate change 
remains constantly posItive. Output, on the other hand, remains almost unchanged 
throughout the periods. The results are consistent with the predIction of the theory, 
as Ghana IS a floating country. As for Kenya, the real exchange rates have recorded a 
pOSItive but insIgnIficant response to terms of trade shock. Output appears not to be 
responsive to the shock. FIgure 7.18 is the dynamic responses for South Africa. The 
real exchange rate responded to the shock WIth a depreciation from the first to the 
third quarter, when a mild appreciation took place, but it remained constant up to the 
tenth period. Output seems to be unresponsive to the shock. This also agrees with 
the theory as the country has a floating regime that insulates the real sector of the 
economy in the face of terms of trade shock is done through exchange rates thereby 
msulating the output. 
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Tanzania's real exchange rates have recorded an insignificant depreciated in re-
sponses to terms of trade shock whereas the output recorded msignificant negatIve 
and posItIve responses. The real exchange rate behavIOur does not seem to be COnsiS-
tent with the prediction of the theory, as Tanzania operates floating regime. Uganda's 
real exchange rates have depreciated from about second to the fourth quarter and out-
put remains unchanged Thus, bemg consistent with the theory, as the country is on 
floating regime. 
The third group are those countnes whose real exchange rates appreciated m 
response to the terms of trade shocks. Only Mauritius falls into this category. The 
response of the MauntIan real exchange rate to a terms of trade shock was a mild, 
and msignificant, appreciation from the first quarter to the third quarter, from where it 
remains, approximately, constant. Output does not significantly respond to the shock. 
For the peggmg countnes, apart from Mauritania and Senega\, the real ex-
change rates show no sigmficant response to terms of trade shocks, as expected. 
However, the real exchange rates for Mauritania depreciate up to the third quarter 
and thereafter appreciate, while that of Senegal exhibited a lag of one quarter from 
where it depreciated and appreciated after three months. The pegging countries' 
GDP does not seem to respond to the terms of trade shocks, apart from Botswana 
and Tunisia. Botswana's GDP rose by a marginal 0.05% immediately after the shock 
and increased to 0,01 % ID the second penod before declining back to 0 05% where 
It stays. All figure 7 3 shows, Botswana's real exchange rates did not record any sig-
mficant responses after terms of trade shock as expected. TIns although marginally, 
confirms the theoretIcal behaviour of the peg regime country. Tunisia's GDP on the 
other hand, cild not respond to the shock immediately, but it declined slightly up to 
fifth quarter after the shock. Benin Republic's real exchange rates, as indicated by 
figure 7 2, did not significant response to terms of trade shocks as expected. This IS 
because the country is a member of the currency union of WAEMU. However, the 
response of the output has not shown that a significant ad]ustlnent is done via it either. 
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Carneroon's real exchange rates and output did not significantly responded to 
terms of trade shock. Carneroon bemg a member country of a currency union, one 
would have expected that adjustment to terms of trade would come from the output. 
Figure 7.5, which plots responses ofCentra1 Africa Republic to terms of trade, inch-
cate that real exchange rates did not respond to the shock up to tenth period. Output, 
on the other hand, has shown a significant negative response during the period 1ID-
mediately after the shock and continued up to 2.5 quarters. Ethiopia's real exchange 
rates, as shown in figure 7.7, do not record a slgmficant response to terms of trade 
shock. However, output has shown shght but insignillcant positive responses. In case 
of Gabon, which has a pegged regime, both real exchange rates and output have not 
signillcantly responded to terms of trade shock. Figure 7 11 shows that Libyan real 
exchange rates and output have not signillcantly responded to terms of trade shock. 
Mauritania's real exchange rates responded to terms of trade shock by depreciatmg 
by about 10% from the first quarter to the third quarter of the shock. However, there 
is no sigmficant response from the output. Morocco has shown a pattern of a country 
WIth fixed exchange rate regune as inchcated by figure 7 15. The real exchange rate 
does not signillcantly respond to the shock whereas the output has positive significant 
rise of up to the fourth quarter. Senegal's real exchange rates and output remained 
unchanged for the penod contemporaneous to the shock and thereafter. Tunisia's re-
sults have indicated that the output has an insignificant negatlve response while the 
real exchange rate has not signfficantly responded to the shock. 
221 
FIgure 7 19" Tanzarua 
1"F1sc Response 
R .. pooIM 011'1. .. , Exc'*'lle 1'1. ...... T ...... olT •• $"""kl 
" 
R .. pon.1 01 GDP 10 Terml olTlld1 Shoe'" 
" 
" " 
" 
.. 
~ 
" 
M 
/// ..... -- -_. .,.---~----... 
~ 
- " 
--=::::::::::::::---- --~. ~. 
," .. , , 
• . . . 
, 
• . " 
, , 
• • • • 
, 
• • .. 
R.88ponH fA GDP" Real ~ Rate Shocb 
• 
Reeponae of kllllltion b Terml ofTr.cIe ShoclQl 
" 
• .. 
• 
" • 
---------
" /./' 
, 
" 
/ /--. .-' • ------
-------.... 
-
-- -------
• 
" 
-- - -~ 
." • 
• 
, 
• • • • 
, 
• • .. • 
, 
• • • • 
, 
• • .. 
Flgure 7.11) T UIl1SI8 
1fT£llse Response 
OH 
R"o0ft •• 011'1. •• , hOhnOI R,,*" 10 Term,.' T,"d, .~oo_ 
... 
1'1. •• ",," •• 01 OOP to T ..... 01 T •• u Ihocka 
-
... 
... 
'H 
... 
.., 
H' 
r"--- ----------- ----, ~--
-
'H ---~--------.... ------------ ~G02 ... , . . . . . . . . 
" 
~OU , . . . . , 
· · 
.. 
Rnpo" •• olOOP "R •• ,E ... h ..... R,. thooke Ih ....... oflrlllaU.n ID T ..... ofT.,de 
... 
· 
· 
... 
, 
... 
----------
, 
------... /': · - -, ~---- -... 
--. 
---- ---
• 
~O02 
· ... 
· 
, . . . . . , . . .. , , . 
· · · 
, 
· · " 
222 
..... 7.21'l'g,nda 
Irmllse Rowtit' 
" 
R_"'RHlE>:ehonge __ T_.ofT ___ u It .. pon ... ' ODP '" T .... ofT •• ", Shocko 
m 
" 
· 
A. 
M ~/--------- --~---- " 
-------N 
------• /~--..... " --
· 
~ 
'----- " .. 
~ ." 
· 
. . .. . • • . . . • • • .. 
, . 
· 
. 
· · 
Ro.po ... ofaOp to RNI Exchtlnge R'~ Shclcu 
· 
· 
A .. pone of koflootion • To"" •• ,Tro", Shoou 
., 
· 
.. • 
-
------- · ---
» 
""-
--
. - -4 
." 
· 
-
, . . . . . , 
· · 
.. 
, 
• 
, . • • • • . " 
..... ,.22. ZmrilIa 
htp&seRespa= 
.. 
R .. """ •• of R .. l ellClh.lnge RIIIII to Torml 01 Tr." Shoc;k, 
.. 
R •• po .... ofGDP ID Torml ofTr.cle Shocke 
" .. 
.. 
M .. 
A. 
----------
A. 
- -.. £---- . 
-
-
-----
» . .. 
--
---. .. 
·N . .. , 
• . . . . 
, . . 
" 
, 
• 
· · 
. . , 
· · 
.. 
" 
R •• po .... ,OOP '" Rul Exohango Ro,. 'hoch 
" 
R_ponn of InfkdIon 10 Term. r:I Trade Shocb 
.. » 
.. .. 
. ..-------------
" 
-. 
--~-~. • ---- -
.. 
------
•• 
~-
.. , 
• .. -
, . • • 
, 
• . • 
, 
• • • • • • • .. 
223 
7.7 How Important Are Terms of Trade Shocks in These 
Countries? 
The contnbution of terms of trade shocks is shown by computing variance decom-
posItion of the structural V AR outlined above. The results are reported in Tables 7 4 
to 7.25 below. The results show the relative contnbutIons of demand, terms of trade, 
supply and monetary shocks to the variations of real exchange rates, real output and 
the price level 
Contributions of the terms of trade to output fluctuations vary across regimes 
and countries. Generally terms of trade shocks accounted for 1% to 19% of output 
fluctuations in the countries covered, WIth Tanzania having the highest of 19%.39 
Their contributions to the real exchange rate fluctuations are between I % to 18% and 
about 1 % to 13% of inflation m these countnes were due to the terms of trade shocks 
The contributions of terms of trade shocks to real exchange rate fluctuations in 
de facto the floatmg countries also vary. For example, they accounted for less than 
1 % of real exchange rate fluctuations m AJgena and Nigena, but therr mfluences on 
the Ghanaian and Ugandan real exchange rates are about 19% and 15%, respectively. 
In the remammg seven floating countries, effects of terms of trade shocks on real 
exchange rates are between 2% to 8% Fluctuations of real exchange rates that are 
attributable to terms of trade shocks are 2% in Kenya, 3% m Malawi, 4% m Mauri-
tIus, 6% in South Afnca, 3% in ZambIa, 2% in Egypt and 8% in Tanzania. 
Output vanations that are accountable by the terms trade shocks In these float-
ing countries range between 19% and 1 %. The country that recorded the highest 
is Tanzania, where terms of trade shocks are responsible for about 19% of her out-
put fluctuations and Ghana and Egypt have the least mfluence of about I %. Terms 
of trade shocks accounted for about 16% of output fluctuations in MalaWI, 15% m 
39 The countries studied are Algena, Berun, Botswana, Central AfrIca, Egypt, EthiopIa, Gabon, 
Keoya, MalaWI, LIbya, Mauntarua, MauritIUS, Morocco, Senegal, South AfrIca, Tanzama, Turusia 
and Zambia 
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Algeria and 14% ill Zambia. In the rest of the floating countries, effects oftenns 
of trade shocks on output are less than 10%. Tenns of trade shocks contribution in 
output fluctuations are about 1 % in Ghana, Kenya and Egypt, 3% in Mauntius and 
Uganda, 7% in N1gena and 6% in South Africa. 
About 7% of varianons in inflations in Algeria and Uganda are accountable by 
the tenns of trade shocks. Tenns of trade shocks are responsible for 6% of inflation in 
South Afnca, 4% ill Mauritius and Malawi, 3% in Nigeria and 2% in Egypt, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Zambia. Less than 2% of inflation in Ghana 1S attributable to terms of 
trade shocks. 
Influence of terms of trade shocks in countries that have de facto fixed exchange 
rate regime is generally negligible, apart from Libya Mauntania and Tunis1a. Tenns 
of trade shocks accounted for 5%, 8% and about 13% of Libyan real exchange rates, 
output and mfianons, respectively. Tenns of trade shocks were responsible for about 
12% of real exchange rate fluctuations ill Mauritania and less than 2% of output 
and inflation in the country. About 15% of real exchange rate variations in Tumsia 
were due to terms of trade shocks, but they contnbuted only about 1 % of output and 
inflation. 
It is evtdent that the relanve contributions of term of trade shocks vary between 
regimes as well as W1thin regtme. Generally the contributions of the tenns of trade to 
real exchange rate vananons are higher in de facto floating countnes than in de facto 
fixed exchange rate regime, where they vary from less than 1 % ill Algena to about 
19% in Ghana. Influences oftenns of trade shocks on real exchange rate fluctuations 
ill de facto pegged regtme countries have not exceeded 5%, except ill Mauritania. 
This pattern reflects the theoretlcaJ predictions of the real exchange rates under fixed 
and floating regimes Although the contnbutions of the tenns of trade shocks to real 
exchange rate vananons ill Mauritania 1S the highest among de facto peggers, their 
contributions to the real output fluctuations are less than 1%. 
225 
Table 7.4 
Algena 
V.~.nce Decompolltlon ofDRER: 
Penod DLRER DLRGDP DTOT DCPI 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9750507 0804371 0360889 1329670 
3 9736306 0799011 0365344 1472586 
4 9728664 0797833 0364700 1550828 
5 9724746 0805564 0381409 1.565568 
6 9722813 0805403 0390077 1.576392 
7 9721922 0805394 0392344 1.583045 
8 9721321 0807646 0395669 1.583478 
9 9720946 0.809328 0397523 1.583687 
10 9720533 0809627 0401415 1.583623 
20 9719284 0812729 0409726 1.584704 
30 9719110 0813173 0410918 1.584813 
40 9719084 0813223 0411112 1.584830 
50 9719080 0.813232 0411134 1.584832 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGDP. 
Period DLRER DLRGDP OTOT DCPI 
1 6405317 93.59468 0000000 0000000 
2 6642035 82.00293 6754654 4400384 
3 6510156 7613203 9068302 8289517 
4 6012199 7025201 1166932 1206647 
5 5746932 7074928 1202097 1148282 
6 5562881 68.80338 1304189 12.59185 
7 5456104 6870767 1347742 12.35881 
8 5365006 6778124 1374882 1310494 
9 5319988 6774650 1404015 12.89337 
10 5275949 67.34731 1410122 1327552 
20 5179265 66.82155 1454999 1344920 
30 5179265 66.82155 1454999 1344920 
40 5179096 66.82033 1455085 1344972 
50 5179089 66.82028 1455088 1344975 
Variance Decomposttion of DCPI: 
Penod DLRER OLRGDP OTOT DCPI 
1 0136725 9165980 4904136 8579316 
2 0186526 1525726 4662290 7989392 
3 0824101 1964526 4958699 74.57194 
4 0825689 19.37595 6120528 73.67783 
5 0822333 1960917 6099593 7346890 
6 0833694 1961171 6329214 7322538 
7 0862617 2005635 6293894 7278714 
8 0860817 2001510 6466382 7265770 
9 0869030 2020291 6463997 7246406 
10 0868190 2017898 6538142 7241469 
20 0878407 20.37315 6620657 7212779 
30 0878806 2036065 6625083 7211546 
40 0878620 2038090 6625299 7211498 
50 0878821 2038091 6625307 7211496 
226 
Table 7.S 
Benin 
Variance Decoft1)oslJon of DRER: 
Panod DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 100 0000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9594552 1.254185 2553278 0246718 
3 9584862 1.276630 2628676 0246072 
4 9554852 1.537242 2635381 0278855 
5 9550221 1.56m7 2633875 0296182 
6 9542342 1.648338 2631784 0296463 
7 9536449 1 707455 2630425 0297627 
8 9535663 1713738 2630208 0299420 
9 9531912 1 751534 2629267 0300075 
10 9531801 1752487 2629414 0300094 
20 9529072 1779008 2628811 0301459 
30 9529025 1779485 2628798 0301465 
40 9529024 1779492 2628798 0301466 
50 9529024 1719492 2628798 0301466 
Variance OecomposfUon ofDLGDP' 
Period DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTDT 
1 1 504151 9849585 0000000 0000000 
2 2172649 9701749 o 597311 0212555 
3 2351586 96~6629 0542825 0239317 
4 2233730 9696164 0485579 0318849 
5 2529128 9642204 0541064 0507767 
6 2350809 966m5 0501178 0470260 
7 2499826 96.39746 0520147 0582587 
8 2446298 9643425 0513248 0606208 
9 2476581 96.39818 o 511001 0614262 
10 2491166 9634504 0513843 0649953 
20 2501100 96.32851 0509277 0661113 
30 2501512 96.32796 0509258 0661271 
40 2501523 96.32794 0509258 0661276 
50 2501523 96.32794 0509258 0661276 
Variance DecomposltionofOCPI. 
Period DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 4040778 0107431 59.48479 0000000 
2 3949319 0125465 5873606 1645293 
3 3922917 0.377423 55.20870 2164706 
4 3922133 0.488044 55 10136 2189269 
5 39 10688 0.527013 57 S3503 2431079 
6 3902745 0.630289 57 S0287 2539389 
7 3903399 0.630520 57 79635 2539142 
8 3899683 0.691027 5774132 2570824 
9 38 98647 0701517 5772132 2558695 
10 3898349 0717032 5771106 2588417 
20 3896853 0750273 57.68655 2594643 
30 3896837 0750651 57.68628 2594702 
40 3896836 0750658 57.68628 2594702 
50 38 96836 0750655 57.68828 2594702 
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Table 7.6 
Botswana 
Variance Decof1lloslUon of DRER: 
Penod DRER OI..TOT OLGDP DCPI 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0.000000 
2 9980753 o 154631 0036083 0.001756 
3 9690094 0658015 2325848 0106198 
4 9661'698 0866125 2358355 0108543 
5 9644871 0877219 2522369 o 1516n 
6 9632372 0907370 2607608 0161306 
7 96 24631 0968449 2605543 0179695 
8 96 20012 0981784 2620258 0194833 
9 96 18812 0983875 2628981 0199024 
10 9616314 0996308 2628735 0211815 
20 9613172 1006645 2632463 0.229177 
30 96 12958 1006702 2632536 0231180 
40 96 12944 1006702 2632542 0231318 
50 96 12942 1006702 2632542 0231332 
Vertanee Decomposttlon ofDLGDP. 
Penod DRER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 OD47258 5.565984 0079346 94.30741 
2 0244613 8403125 0277060 9107520 
3 0163343 5622224 2919720 9129471 
4 0178805 6361574 3206480 9025314 
5 0196173 6039054 3775423 89.98935 
6 0232656 5.545890 4292895 8992856 
7 0233340 5.604672 4226586 8993540 
8 0260696 5268623 4296470 9017421 
9 0259799 5257287 4282891 9020002 
10 0268720 5037127 4226916 90A6724 
20 02n229 4758419 4262438 9070191 
30 0278454 4727308 4267034 9072720 
40 0278526 4725411 4267473 9072859 
50 0278535 4725190 4267513 9072876 
Vartance Decomposition ofDCPI: 
Period DRER DLTOT OI..GDP DCPI 
1 4846445 0032597 9512096 0000000 
2 4602010 0067207 9533068 0000101 
3 7443229 0993514 9155567 0.007590 
4 7403753 1483539 91 10502 0.007685 
5 7A04059 1 531922 91 01311 0050909 
6 7.379253 2004823 90 55815 005m2 
7 7.360627 2196224 90 35143 0091720 
8 7.351571 2195469 90 33950 0113459 
9 7.342588 2288428 9024510 0123880 
10 7.337166 2346104 90 16817 0148564 
20 7.330113 2383929 9010451 0181448 
30 7.329807 2384204 9010098 0185024 
40 7.329788 2384203 9010074 0185268 
50 7.329786 2384202 90 10072 0185292 
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Table 7.7 
Cameroon 
Variance Decorrposlion of ORER: 
Period DRER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 100.0000 ODOOOOO 0.000000 0.000000 
2 96 42941 OD08099 0.620893 2.941595 
3 95.51114 0.348031 1177623 2965207 
4 94.52870 0488326 2D35585 2947386 
5 94.52442 OA69400 2.039742 2947441 
6 9404804 0.574396 2444620 2932949 
7 9393719 0625978 2.505169 2.931666 
8 93.85706 0625498 2.587156 2.930284 
9 9376785 0642680 2.661586 2927900 
10 9375101 0.654394 2.665396 2929209 
20 9368223 0.660434 2728456 2928883 
30 9368157 0.660450 2729108 2928871 
40 9368157 0.660450 2729114 2928871 
50 9368157 0.660450 2729114 2928871 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGDP: 
Period DRER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 1620154 0146942 9823290 ODOOOOO 
2 1 579312 0.388268 9748831 0.544109 
3 1 454814 0.337711 96.91687 1290607 
4 1 266307 OA05370 9718568 1142446 
5 1447876 0478907 9676820 1.305014 
6 1394620 0451118 96.66626 1288005 
7 1422554 0485916 9678497 1.306561 
8 1436534 0484399 9674335 1.335715 
9 1425629 0484321 9676594 1.324106 
10 1443568 0489530 9672340 1.343486 
20 1444299 0486661 9672204 1.347003 
30 1444315 0486659 9672199 1.347031 
40 1 444316 0486659 9672199 1.347032 
50 1 444316 0486659 9672199 1.347032 
Variance Decomposition ofOCpt 
Period DRER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 17.03979 0017166 0.523701 8242035 
2 24.07916 1046372 0468566 7440590 
3 30 12915 1250946 0543478 6807643 
4 30 41517 1.261515 0553305 6777001 
5 30.31645 1.572015 0645196 6746634 
6 3025593 1729409 0714644 67.30002 
7 3025859 1729487 0716157 6729576 
8 3023327 1779785 0747094 6723985 
9 3022113 1.616571 0749944 6721236 
10 3021957 1.617034 0758096 6720730 
20 3021115 1.636870 0783784 6718819 
30 30.21111 1.836945 0763865 6718808 
40 3021111 1.836946 0763865 6718808 
50 3021111 1.836946 0763865 6718808 
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Table 7.8 
Central Africa Republic 
Variance DecorJ1)osltlon ofDRER: 
Period DRER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 100Dooo 0000000 ODOOooO 0000000 
2 91.23207 1.516384 5.894851 1.356700 
3 89.54766 1.528244 7.506752 1.417346 
4 86.27836 1746038 1049698 1478623 
5 85B2290 lW8528 10.82517 1.543401 
6 85.os974 1.894997 11.33297 1712290 
7 84.54237 1910949 1178648 1760197 
6 8446865 1955474 11.80888 1766998 
9 84.20096 lM2357 1205163 1785058 
10 8417931 lM3017 12.07293 1764745 
20 64Dl731 1.987956 1219917 1795562 
30 84D1571 1.988080 12.20050 1795709 
40 84.01570 lB88080 12.20051 1795710 
50 84.01570 lB88080 12.20051 1795710 
Variance Decomposllon of DLGDP 
Period DRER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 lOD1865 5193396 8478776 0.000000 
2 9246873 5657053 85.06361 0.032466 
3 8858220 5.285319 8278064 3D75824 
4 8062912 5.674294 8216796 4D94812 
5 8100073 6.056680 8178148 4.061768 
6 8310113 5.845068 61.84373 4.201086 
7 8226286 6105231 81.51974 4148745 
8 8264891 6157436 81.35480 4.222869 
9 8260345 6103421 81.38651 4249723 
10 8250278 6182957 81.31990 4.246865 
20 8255102 6165651 8129368 4.285564 
30 8255034 6165158 81.29380 4.286007 
40 8255035 6165155 81.29380 4.286011 
50 8255035 6165155 81.29380 4.286011 
Variance Decomposition ofDCPt 
Period DRER DLTOT CLGDP DCPI 
1 0251560 0.076671 0920419 9875135 
2 7461021 0.345672 7450128 8474318 
3 1176212 0471728 9.853309 77B1284 
4 llW012 0.501606 9690740 77W753 
5 11.68861 0527366 10.80585 76B7818 
6 11 64014 0601153 llD4394 7671477 
7 11 66984 0640764 1117367 76,51573 
8 11.65284 0.640302 1143110 76.27576 
9 11.65217 0648317 1143053 76.26898 
10 11.64395 0661105 1151662 7617632 
20 11.83825 0672984 11.58966 7609910 
30 11.63819 0673104 11.59046 7609824 
40 11.83819 0.873104 11.59047 76.Q9823 
50 11 63819 0.673104 11.59047 76.Q9823 
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Table 7.9 
Egypt 
Variance Decomposllon of DRER 
Period DlRER OlGDP OCPI IllTOT 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0.000000 
2 9871846 0030577 1191114 0050047 
3 9728924 0038358 1.898113 0774284 
4 9631589 0049711 2164877 1A69722 
5 96 28171 0051415 2191635 1475235 
6 9611493 0051481 2190484 1.643105 
7 96 01974 0052587 2195604 1732070 
8 9599503 0059979 2211921 1733J69 
9 9595300 0060807 2222890 1763502 
10 9594372 0063392 2.224174 1768710 
20 95.92339 0073001 2.225198 1 n8412 
30 9592025 0076089 2225208 1778453 
40 9591923 0077107 2.225215 1778445 
50 9591894 o On401 2225220 1778444 
Variance Decomposllon ofDLGDP: 
Period OlRER DlGDP DCPI DlTOT 
1 0072365 99.92763 0.000000 0000000 
2 0070645 9643524 3.369285 0124832 
3 0171644 95.38256 3763873 0681927 
4 0279510 9522446 3758243 0737789 
5 0247114 95.63263 3239459 0880793 
6 0314720 95.31904 3.361266 1004974 
7 0281233 9529173 3416639 1 010393 
8 0321266 9520826 3313203 1157266 
9 0298459 9522474 3372326 1104476 
10 0320456 9524008 3245174 1 194289 
20 0316179 95.20617 3282796 1 194859 
30 0318323 9516914 3312063 1200476 
40 0319562 9516466 3311318 1204263 
50 0319726 9516728 3307929 1205066 
Variance Decomposition ofDCPI 
Period IllRER IllGDP DCPI DlTOT 
1 0957070 2.069243 96.97369 0000000 
2 3716110 2117828 9416536 0000699 
3 3476784 3A60239 92.55844 0504535 
4 3403006 3.692456 9163215 1272384 
5 3.360944 3.681291 91.54673 1411039 
6 3345213 3.665091 91.5n02 1 412672 
7 3332805 3900129 9131243 1454636 
8 3331167 3993542 91.22301 1 452281 
9 3325748 4.065662 9112766 1480928 
10 3324516 4116145 91.05779 1 501546 
20 3308761 4.snS09 9060579 1507844 
30 3304568 4705257 9048274 1507440 
40 3303201 4747410 9044200 1507397 
50 3302710 4762475 9042746 1507356 
• 
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Table 7.10 
Etlnopla 
Variance Decomposition ofDRER 
Penod ORER DTOT OLGOP DCPI 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9861633 On5376 0584683 0003608 
3 9736808 2035108 0582590 0014220 
4 9645314 2415056 1073046 0048763 
5 9639J17 2424987 1145544 0049298 
6 9584711 2738929 1230552 0183406 
7 9540062 2996030 1271174 0.272172 
8 9543)57 3005519 1289835 0.274078 
9 9530140 30n406 1 304062 0.317130 
10 9516736 3190485 1316903 0325248 
20 9500207 3272879 1390389 0334663 
30 94 99745 3275398 1 391607 0335347 
40 94 99726 3275450 1 391900 0335393 
50 9499725 3275451 1 391903 0.335394 
Vartance Dacomposllon of OLGDP. 
Penod ORER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 0519486 1681875 9779864 0000000 
2 12IT405 2208870 9622555 0288179 
3 1173751 2,004654 92B3064 3990957 
4 1257009 1779813 8972958 7233600 
5 1332376 1741425 89.66363 7262572 
6 1 520981 1.920101 87.37261 9186306 
7 1 514524 2275788 86B1039 9299294 
8 1674638 2165109 8642859 9731662 
9 1690082 2A02762 85.90579 1000137 
10 1733508 2490144 85B1464 9961711 
20 1793592 2.512905 85.50189 10 19162 
30 1 796150 2.514761 8549074 10 19835 
40 1 796217 2.514743 8549019 10 19885 
50 1 796219 2.514741 85A9018 10 19886 
Vadance Decomp:lsltlon ofDCPt 
Penod ORER DLTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 0348699 0050624 2270511 9733017 
2 o 8131IT 0.365630 6241019 9258017 
3 1 681753 04m74 8480410 8936046 
4 1669233 0467022 1044830 8741544 
5 1 659814 0466606 13.20541 84 66817 
6 1657935 OA90928 13.36789 84 48325 
7 1669135 0823019 14.93789 8286995 
8 1667938 0540200 1494202 8284984 
9 1 690646 0.544859 1560299 8216151 
10 1692595 0.602609 15.66484 8203996 
20 1 721187 0654369 16.34729 8127715 
30 1 721853 0655562 16.36924 8125334 
40 1 721865 0655566 16.37011 8125245 
50 1 721866 0.655567 16.37015 8125242 
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Table 7.11 
Gabon 
Variance Decomposllon ofORER: 
Perk)d OLRER DLGDP DCPI DlOT 
1 100 0000 0000000 ODoooOO 0.000000 
2 8298814 5756211 1117309 OD82559 
3 8268971 5982689 1113521 o 19Z189 
4 8038514 8374541 1079884 0441473 
5 7973076 8997604 1072055 0.551085 
6 7949685 9174015 1077588 0.553256 
7 7696704 9661738 1070949 0~61734 
8 7885805 9687167 1070753 0747149 
9 78 no58 9764282 1071733 0747802 
10 7868148 9833887 1070748 0777152 
20 7859221 9873712 1070051 OB33569 
30 7859158 9874133 1070042 OB33859 
40 7859158 9874135 1070042 OB33861 
50 7859158 9874135 1070042 OB33861 
Variance Decomposllon of DLGDP 
Perk»d DLRER DLGDP OCPI DrOT 
1 6909503 9309050 0000000 0000000 
2 6634852 9279456 0197319 0373269 
3 7441711 90.33557 1674353 0548367 
4 6492404 9132145 1 609129 0577013 
5 6431373 9074008 1702968 1 125578 
6 6412287 90.32531 1.969307 1 293091 
7 6275097 9045202 1~60722 1 312164 
8 6268275 9018643 1975603 1 569694 
9 6238783 9012058 2003877 1636759 
10 6220057 9013108 2.000267 1 648591 
20 6202721 90.00184 2.002252 1 793188 
30 6202641 9000134 2.002208 1793808 
40 6202641 90.00134 2D02208 1793811 
50 6202641 90.00134 2D02208 1793811 
Variance Decomposition of DCPI: 
Period DLRER DLGDP OCPI DrOT 
1 4374026 2.059264 93.56671 0000000 
2 1447450 3.802393 81.60497 0118132 
3 1820297 4454485 n12749 0215059 
4 1864655 4448580 7688769 0217175 
5 1851937 5.008402 7608067 0391552 
6 1845n8 5190694 7578749 0564039 
7 1845754 5201023 7576319 0578249 
8 1843370 5.292205 75.665n 0608323 
9 1842044 5.300235 75.61147 0667856 
10 1841518 5.312664 75.59399 0678160 
20 1840369 5.338788 75.54837 0709150 
30 1840360 5.338978 75.54798 0709437 
40 1840360 5.338979 75.54798 0709437 
50 1840360 5.338979 75.54798 0709437 
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Table 7.12 
Ghana 
Variance Decorrposllon ofDRER: 
Penod OLRER OTOT OLGOP OCPI 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 99 22>19 0001026 0739356 0039431 
3 9178688 6049123 1 815716 0.348286 
4 81 89119 1523435 1855253 1.019204 
5 79 84971 1676533 1832927 1.552028 
6 79 60024 1872209 2047608 1.630054-
7 7859410 17 65327 2152798 1.599834 
8 7856303 17 67619 2 151555 1609219 
9 7824664 17 98373 2 171489 1.598142 
10 77 89774 1831735 2194113 1.590803 
20 77 6&164 1853115 2201576 1.582632 
30 77 67886 18 53661 2202032 1.582501 
40 n 67878 1853668 2202038 1.582498 
50 77 67878 1853668 2202038 1.582498 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGDP. 
Penod OLRER OTOT OLGOP OCPI 
1 0054242 1014723 9893104 0.000000 
2 0743711 0812915 9604688 2.396491 
3 0775243 0834129 9598776 2402868 
4 1344098 0798049 91 30991 6.547940 
5 1 797861 0737989 8763495 9829200 
6 1 795214 0826541 8741970 9958543 
7 1 881476 0874156 8689533 10.34903 
8 1 895468 0873849 8649383 1073705 
9 1 901278 0935079 8642082 1074282 
10 1905l15 0958430 8637549 1076016 
20 1930060 1002018 8630373 1076339 
30 1931306 1002842 8630258 1076328 
40 1931316 1002858 8630255 1076327 
50 1931316 1002859 8630255 1076327 
Variance Decomposition of DCPI: 
Penod OLRER OTOT OLGOP OCPI 
1 0056742 0013900 1004240 9892512 
2 0039952 0221830 6346481 93.39174 
3 0057\152 0230664 6 175010 93.53637 
4 0077964 0799820 1002115 8910105 
5 0134180 1241606 1311229 84.91192 
6 0154373 1268552 1395381 84.62327 
7 o 38!1l78 1297206 1415865 8415807 
8 0514484 1304043 1431415 83.80732 
9 0514137 1316422 1437934 8379010 
10 0532978 1366402 1437356 8372706 
20 0554051 1412329 1435993 8367369 
30 0554741 1 413531 1435970 63.67202 
40 0554754 1413544 1435970 8367200 
50 0554754 1413544 1435970 83.67200 
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Table 7.13 
Kenya 
Variance Oecorrposltlon ofORER: 
Perlod DLRER DTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 100 0000 0000000 0000000 0.000000 
2 96 71469 1081197 0483933 1720176 
3 9554223 1777260 0586098 2094411 
4 953€672 1804269 0680650 2149382 
5 9531183 1807055 0736448 2144669 
6 9524977 1 817894 0787452 2144882 
7 9518829 1816785 0850260 2144666 
8 9517868 1 816506 0860274 2144537 
9 9513348 1 815747 0907267 2143506 
10 95 13288 1 815733 090n55 2143635 
20 9506142 1 815138 0981145 2142301 
30 9505702 1 815099 0985646 2142231 
40 950$55 1 815094 0988135 2142222 
50 950$52 1815094 0988166 2142222 
Variance Decomposltlon of DLGDP 
Period DLRER DTDT DLGDP DCPI 
1 0040038 0470087 9948087 0.000000 
2 0346307 0949543 9816089 0.543260 
3 2320054 0851474 9644549 0.382085 
4 2278296 0923047 9631186 0486799 
5 266<354 0939153 9594407 0452424 
6 2606365 0962536 9595725 0473846 
7 2801362 0958954 9575433 0485350 
8 2812;42 0965557 9574969 0472113 
9 2873:)03 0963745 9566961 0493843 
10 2907521 0966529 9564982 0476134 
20 2995288 0969332 9554500 0490384 
30 3002351 0969667 9553792 0490061 
40 3002969 0969681 9553721 0490137 
50 3003)11 0969684 9553717 0490136 
Variance Decomposition ofDCPL 
Penod DLRER DTOT DLGDP DCPI 
1 6050434 1738973 0514595 91.69600 
2 5341745 1654847 2544006 9OA594O 
3 5267172 1 635501 2619122 90A7820 
4 517$84 1762533 4347698 8871411 
5 51n427 1 760391 4353931 8870825 
6 5199283 1 756124 5278822 8776577 
7 5 194162 1754339 5377867 87.67363 
8 5194034 1750205 5817633 8723813 
9 5 185820 1748827 5991162 87.07419 
10 5189602 1746908 6154496 8690899 
20 5 180050 1742264 6732275 86.34451 
30 5180068 1741874 6m805 8629965 
40 51800 14 1741844 6781469 8629607 
50 5180012 1741842 6781794 86.29575 
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Table 7.14 
Libya 
Variance Daeol11losltion of DREIt 
Period DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 91 58211 5183911 2807580 0426399 
3 8809871 7893511 3520343 OA87440 
4 8661524 8968851 3474126 0941780 
5 85611158 8583741 4483775 1.232899 
6 8345397 8691016 5727695 2127318 
7 8192215 8800104 5951540 3.326207 
8 81 51757 8767608 5940184 3774841 
9 8147750 8738321 6030962 3753221 
10 8037049 8621443 6564106 4M3363 
20 79 09>62 8523876 7 187541 5.231861 
30 7873307 8522004 7429637 5.315288 
40 7850054 8527513 7527601 5.364248 
50 7849787 8531988 7579341 5.390804 
Variance Decomposition of DLGDP: 
Period DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 0511667 99 48833 0000000 0000000 
2 1 585791 98 18177 0058570 0173867 
3 230()J95 9725841 0271180 0171916 
4 1107880 8768971 1 040481 0191012 
5 127()J58 8203984 3422593 lB32986 
6 1081087 7915564 5048257 4B85230 
7 1079169 7854205 5718670 4B47590 
8 1005399 7688145 5804947 7.249616 
9 9861485 7551887 7362259 7.257384 
10 9969420 7380276 8529509 7.698312 
20 9660012 7249533 9250047 8.587708 
30 9517726 71 89203 1007063 8519618 
40 9433800 71 48734 1064174 8437122 
50 9378530 71 16414 11 03468 8A22651 
Vadance Decomposllon of DCPt 
Penod DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 o 130023 2371840 9749814 0.000000 
2 0518373 1928894 9754435 0.008380 
3 0595271 1838925 9713612 0429679 
4 060&164 1854992 9709194 0447983 
5 0784636 1 601244 9484005 2773869 
6 0945185 1230199 9449561 3.328206 
7 0952432 1213039 9395452 3B80007 
8 0939747 1259892 9327868 4521683 
9 0910028 1336402 9261225 5140718 
10 0839893 1 184239 9263407 5.342000 
20 0831447 1385123 8843384 9.349587 
30 0875200 1772070 8612749 11.22524 
40 0922593 2 123121 64 72126 12.23303 
50 0950061 2370593 8389575 1277559 
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Table 7.15 
Malawi 
Vanance Decomposition of DRER. 
Pertod DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 ODooooo 
2 91 20008 8520121 o 193715 OD86061 
3 6378404 1591853 0176374 0119054 
4 79 69231 1723734 0420295 2650052 
5 8093370 1592632 0692941 2.447036 
6 61 28791 1543066 0691373 2.590052 
7 81 41751 1530262 0727106 2.552163 
6 81 13645 1556145 0764857 2.537239 
9 807al83 1589262 0845360 2.553170 
10 8068518 1566445 0889262 2.561114 
20 8034594 1590550 1191792 2.556766 
30 8004709 1591095 1 494169 2.547795 
40 7983284 1593504 1690868 2.541256 
50 7950094 1595628 1920956 2.532825 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGDP 
Period DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 1803598 81.96402 0000000 0000000 
2 1321792 86.38097 0036997 0364118 
3 1312454 86.36073 005m6 0457009 
4 15 16285 83D8012 0051370 1705653 
5 2243910 75.99394 0045269 1 521693 
6 2085456 7578962 0042515 3313285 
7 21 51909 7520174 0043544 3235625 
8 1969188 75.88104 0039904 4387178 
9 2003297 75.57907 0071074 4316881 
10 1850794 7590583 0067898 5518335 
20 1743874 71.94366 0654150 9963446 
30 16 14716 6867322 2477271 1270234 
40 1492227 65017Zl 5476331 1458413 
50 1369280 61123n 9384662 1579877 
Variance DecomposJUon ofDCPI: 
Period DLRER DlGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 2274352 1.321648 96 40400 0000000 
2 8447009 1.231358 9022941 0092221 
3 9594910 3D36989 86.25269 1115413 
4 1086608 4.504120 8328225 1347546 
5 1236644 3032306 8320076 1400493 
6 1408815 29sn33 81.50644 1 447681 
7 1332820 5.308630 7910761 2255561 
8 1306537 6.377083 7810065 2456903 
9 1235839 5709850 7947686 2454900 
10 1304277 5.812133 78.59872 2546362 
20 1243787 1171413 72 12528 3722729 
30 1297095 15.37052 67.88840 3770130 
40 1295541 1971623 63.64507 3683288 
50 1352918 22.86918 6006460 3537048 
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Table 7.16 
Mauntania 
Variance Oeco""osltJon ofDRER: 
Penod DRER DLGOP DCPI DTOT 
1 100 0000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9220094 0034048 2997328 4707687 
3 9090781 0033285 2982492 6.076414 
4 8977433 0152517 3257468 6.815686 
5 8904067 0338498 3463688 7157147 
6 8671192 0442076 4528148 8.317860 
7 8497070 0436736 5275027 9.317536 
8 84 95123 0446547 5310084 9.292142 
9 84 21400 0447181 5527588 9.811228 
10 8305209 0553404 5538266 1085624 
20 8070322 0820176 6531552 11.94506 
30 8055187 0869005 6553504 12.02562 
40 8052563 0893130 6554623 1202842 
50 8051226 0907434 6555174 1202513 
Varlance Decomposllon ofDLGDP 
Penod DRER DLGOP DCPI DTOT 
1 4029372 9597063 0000000 0.000000 
2 5657466 9279073 1 538361 0.013448 
3 5935396 91 91653 2099748 0.048327 
4 5008943 9220070 2749849 0.040509 
5 5823418 9128303 2725210 0168344 
8 5254866 9016034 4295524 0289273 
7 8250041 8904322 4415806 0282935 
8 6429953 8860258 4561590 0405877 
9 6363059 8852145 4647661 0A67832 
10 5910077 8894591 4705509 0429500 
20 5279661 88 72453 5511956 0483857 
30 5032566 8869474 5793622 0479076 
40 4927107 8868888 5916212 0467801 
50 4870348 88 68829 5980098 0461260 
Yartanca O&compositlon of DCPt 
Penod DRER DLGOP DCPI DTOT 
1 0353321 1247697 9839898 0.000000 
2 3175112 1 512653 9397208 1.340151 
3 4243778 1447032 9299649 1.312705 
4 4482235 3213600 9076611 1.538055 
5 5816274 3539791 8907741 1.566521 
6 71501 09 4210535 8692842 1712940 
7 7132943 4414395 8671777 ,1734889 
8 7879152 4724365 8568513 1711357 
9 787Zl76 4782168 8563420 1710860 
10 8197952 5402151 8468472 1715179 
20 811:?SS2 7680671 8248977 1 715609 
30 8042429 8895653 8136502 1.696897 
40 8001207 9579465 8073386 1.685470 
50 7978384 9965412 8037742 1.678783 
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Terms of trade shocks accounted for about less than 1% of real exchange rate 
fluctuatIOns in Algena to 19% in Ghana, among the floatmg countries. The results for 
countries hke Algeria, Malawi, Mauritius, NIgeria, South Afnca, Tanzania and Zam-
bIa suggest a lower contribution of tenus oftrade to the real exchange rate volatlhty 
that could have been suggested by the theory. 
Percentages of output vanations that are attributable to tenus of trade shocks 
are generally hIgher in pegging countnes than m floating reginles. Only three coun-
tries among the peggers that recorded lower contributions of tenu of trade shocks 
to their output variations than real exchange rates. These are Cameroon, Ethiopia 
and Mauntania. Some countnes WIth flexible exchange rate regunes recorded lower 
volatility of output due to terms of trade influence. However, Algeria, Malawi, Nige-
ria South Afnca, Tanzania and Zambia have recorded higher volatJ1ity of output due 
to terms of trade shocks than their real exchange rates. As these countries are floaters, 
it is expected that the effects of tenns of trade would have been larger on real ex-
change rates than on output. Lookmg at their mam tmports of the reveal that the 
dominant commodtties are manufactures, machinery and transport eqwpment. These 
categories of goods constitute about 40 - 65% of these countries imports (WTO Data-
base, 2008). The products' prices tend to be ex ante sticky in consumers' currencies 
and therefore vanations in exchange rates may not induce 'expenditure switching', 
but instead mcreases ex post mark ups on the home imports (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1995). 
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Table 7.17 
Mauritius 
Variance Deco"",osltlon of DRER. 
Period DlRER OLGDP DCPI DTOTT 
1 1000000 0.000000 0000000 0.000000 
2 9873795 0221082 0242114 0798851 
3 94 68292 0.28&192 0805182 4.226801 
4 9245790 OB85861 2484830 4171407 
5 9199080 OB76804 3405247 3727149 
6 91 81059 1212974 3355781 3.620858 
7 9155774 1.28:!i52 3366263 3792450 
8 910rnO 1.279457 3642095 4.000747 
9 90 85985 1.294640 3863567 3.981746 
10 9075652 1.29:1)56 4001339 3949081 
20 9045734 1.333728 4251096 3.957834 
30 90 43890 1.340011 4253467 3957724 
40 9042672 1.362675 4253045 3957581 
50 90 41659 1.373258 4252724 3957426 
Variance Deeomposllon ofDLGDP. 
Period OLRER DlGDP DCPI DTOTT 
1 6511575 9348843 0000000 0000000 
2 6655265 92.58385 0759013 0.001853 
3 8050500 88.54551 2534320 0.869671 
4 11 52003 8260087 3956867 1.863233 
5 1037672 8160366 6480394 1.539226 
8 9898814 80.32)72 8572457 1.208005 
7 1029336 7838468 9258793 2083162 
8 11 00057 77.65111 8822792 2.525525 
9 1079432 77.67914 8933404 2.393137 
10 1053611 78.35799 8968897 2137003 
20 12 38008 7800050 6901019 2713394 
30 1297191 7843127 5842957 2747861 
40 1334165 786$45 5234390 2788516 
50 1356653 7876702 4858394 2.810052 
Variance Decomposition ofDCPL 
Period OlRER DlGDP DCPI DTOTT 
1 0055967 3.015316 9692872 0.000000 
2 0873961 2B81739 96.23437 0.009932 
3 0798916 2927260 93.35381 2.920018 
4 0831238 2927580 92.96863 3.272551 
5 1243852 2.966588 91 98810 3801464 
6 1247325 3107155 9140403 4241492 
7 1292815 3220896 9124679 4239698 
8 1317206 3.263811 9115839 4.260588 
9 1 316516 3.295484 9108697 4.301032 
10 1 318309 3403630 90.98031 429n54 
20 1336760 3.568006 90n474 4.320497 
30 1344096 3.613962 9072207 4.319672 
40 1350206 3646949 9068345 4.319394 
50 1355228 3674315 9065156 4.318892 
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Table 7.18 
Morocco 
Varla nee Decoft1)oslUon of DRER. 
Period OLRER DlGDP OCPI OTOT 
1 100.0000 0000000 0000000 0.000000 
2 98.28220 0695926 1.012613 0009263 
3 94.21412 3.231971 0.975035 1.578872 
4 9397078 3.225261 1192983 1610979 
5 9371270 3491876 1186390 1609029 
6 9368426 3491523 1196437 1627ITe 
7 9352712 3647362 1198432 1.627085 
8 9348159 3.670664 1.203379 1.644370 
9 9342561 3722761 1.208246 1.643380 
10 93.39175 3749166 1.208780 1.650300 
20 93.31542 3.812175 1.215249 1657158 
30 93.31293 3.814217 1.215394 1657460 
40 93.31285 3.814280 1.215400 1.657466 
50 9331285 3.814282 1.215400 1.657467 
Variance Decomposition of DLGDP: 
Period DLRER DLGOP OCPI DTOT 
1 1073697 9892630 0.000000 0.000000 
2 1 153786 88.35130 2115150 8.379768 
3 4203313 8390911 4643580 7.243998 
4 6966257 8089755 3.997950 8138238 
5 6665981 80.20024 4.992204 8141579 
6 7468251 79.88299 4.539547 8109215 
7 7381986 7913386 5.029269 8454883 
8 7723691 79.22129 4.825754 8.229269 
9 7757421 7874142 5010710 8490448 
10 7847074 78.85427 4.962385 8.336272 
20 8013112 7846453 5041434 8460928 
30 8018151 7847941 5042341 8460096 
40 8018301 7847906 5042423 8460214 
50 8018306 7847906 5042423 8460213 
Vartance Decomposition ofDCPt 
Pertod DLRER DLGOP OCPI DTOT 
1 13.64702 1359632 8499335 0000000 
2 13.68295 1494391 82.32268 2499972 
3 16.34672 2.228973 78.94712 2477184 
4 16.62648 2.315496 78.53161 2.526410 
5 1646896 3.230653 7768262 2617569 
6 16A524O 3.232463 77.63476 2680360 
7 1645787 3529955 77.33953 2.672647 
8 1646661 3.558389 77.27205 2702950 
9 1645439 3681710 7716503 2698868 
10 1645840 3727941 7710186 2713798 
20 1644809 3.861661 7696482 2725423 
30 1644797 3.865739 7696030 2725988 
40 1644796 3.865873 7696017 2725999 
50 16M796 3.865877 76.96016 2726000 
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Table 7.19 
Nigena 
Variance Decofl1)oslUon ofDRER: 
Period DLRER DTOT DLGOP DCPI 
1 100 0000 0000000 0000000 0.000000 
2 96 25331 896E-05 1366203 2.380396 
3 9313232 0130117 3348704 3.388854 
4 9287316 0173922 3510269 3442644 
5 9146302 0184144 4748091 3604744 
6 90 99156 0349819 5037465 3621160 
7 9028250 0384604 5686668 3646230 
8 8992076 0453021 5995105 3631114 
9 8966210 0455856 6207031 3675011 
10 8932471 0497891 6513379 3664024 
20 88 58604 0563305 7142046 3708607 
30 88 51520 0570795 7203398 3710609 
40 8850000 0571308 7208750 3710938 
50 8850051 0571362 7209171 3710956 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGDP: 
Period DLRER DTOT DLGOP DCPI 
1 3450033 4810281 91 73019 0000000 
2 6093556 5750927 8814441 0011109 
3 4766440 4859039 8655517 3.819350 
4 529!1607 6227635 8515112 3324735 
5 5110060 5795905 8459306 4.500077 
6 5621192 6418499 8384110 4119211 
7 5522539 6 311010 8352072 4645732 
8 5692838 6483192 8331384 4.510132 
9 569!lJ09 6524173 8305105 4729766 
10 5738291 6533109 8300303 4725569 
20 5846290 6684877 8255021 4.918620 
30 5851M8 6695380 8252017 4.928466 
40 5858612 6696055 8251719 4.930239 
50 5858604 6696167 8251694 4930292 
Variance Decomposition ofDeP!: 
Period DLRER DTOT DLGOP DCPI 
1 0468308 0011704 3370095 9614989 
2 o 73!1666 0864792 5599553 9279909 
3 1542164 1083572 1493025 68.56454 
4 1544561 1579249 1466108 68.31406 
5 1469159 2363337 1816637 8477870 
6 1468757 2387726 1815699 6476771 
7 1445183 2482894 1987451 6318276 
8 144!1669 2554345 199884B 6297048 
9 1435103 2561105 20 85498 6222489 
10 1434549 2650248 21 10471 61.89954 
20 14 10097 2764017 22 47631 60.60170 
30 1414689 2776500 2257709 6049952 
40 1414544 2m462 22 58821 6048889 
50 1414534 2m545 22 58894 6048817 
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Table 7.20 
Senegal 
Variance Decomposition ofDRER: 
Penod DLRER DLGDP DCPI DroT 
1 100 0000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9978820 0051988 o 150014 0009794 
3 9252587 1184314 4125718 2184101 
4 9169421 1709787 4310659 2285344 
5 90 61634 3105806 4038890 2238960 
6 90 04649 3563713 4002351 2387444 
7 8972296 3550873 4200719 2525444 
8 8950441 3585978 4368818 2540797 
9 8942317 3624932 4341137 2610763 
10 8856194 4559174 4285656 2593228 
20 8776880 5247436 4355649 2628113 
30 8750053 5467782 4386498 2645191 
40 8738336 5555519 4404304 2656814 
50 8733601 5589471 4412026 2662491 
Variance Decomposition of DLGDP: 
Penod DLRER DLGDP DCPI DroT 
1 1419880 9858012 0000000 0000000 
2 1 198216 96 80316 1 899314 0099313 
3 1282327 8880301 9821745 0092921 
4 1690258 8814940 1000260 0157539 
5 1680883 8804886 9978332 0291921 
6 1 816460 8746746 9899169 0816909 
7 1764216 55 90358 1154224 0789969 
8 1666879 8662378 1073011 0979237 
9 1678752 8587247 1148457 0984208 
10 1695741 8602356 1098537 1295331 
20 1653378 84 00753 1192410 2414994 
30 1610237 8307666 1234135 2971754 
40 1 592729 8268109 1251626 3209913 
50 1 585862 8252224 1258632 3305574 
Variance OecomposttJon ofOCPI. 
Penod DLRER DLGDP DCPI DroT 
1 0457262 9928793 8961394 0000000 
2 0309654 3309146 6028722 6311665 
3 0356201 3377232 58 97257 6898907 
4 0608026 3383949 58 53370 7018782 
5 0589935 3247364 60 18231 6754122 
6 0752776 3358524 5771004 7951943 
7 0791570 3379981 5748658 7922035 
8 0998230 3423707 5657461 8190088 
9 0997842 3437472 5646656 8160873 
10 1 030271 3579705 5506644 8106240 
20 1166749 3946865 5173949 7625109 
30 1 180639 4069815 50 57976 7541446 
40 1179911 4111786 50 13564 7566592 
50 1 178726 4126890 4996330 7589077 
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Table 7.21 
South Africa 
Varfance Decomposition ofDRER 
Period OLRER OLGOP DCPI DTOT 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 8279198 3899158 8580144 4728718 
3 81 54070 3796097 8683457 5979750 
4 n 59511 3497539 1113323 7174124 
5 72 20122 7487659 1361097 6700152 
6 7236823 7528956 1348031 6822504 
7 7143204 8442273 1361825 6507435 
8 7141632 8479600 1360054 6503539 
9 71 19438 8730483 1359426 6480903 
10 7099748 8806128 1373521 6461180 
20 7088834 8903375 1374659 6461699 
30 70 88806 8903679 1374655 6461713 
40 7088806 8903680 1374655 6461713 
50 7088806 8903680 1374655 6461713 
Variance Oecomposllon ofDLGDP: 
Per10d DLRER DLGDP DCPI DTOT 
1 1020533 9897947 0000000 0000000 
2 1471877 9294129 0282200 5304628 
3 2199955 8816937 3732240 5898437 
4 2183975 8705136 4760761 6003902 
5 2332065 8302569 8945294 5696949 
6 2895565 7985862 1171715 5528667 
7 3563636 79 18148 1176616 5488729 
8 3606489 7880397 11 91692 5672618 
9 3702216 78 63187 1201382 5652091 
10 3885082 7856623 11 93232 5616371 
20 4030981 7840141 11 96486 5602748 
30 4033244 7839846 11 96584 5602454 
40 4033294 7839840 11 96586 5602445 
50 4033295 7839840 1196586 5602445 
Vadance Decomposition ofDCPl' 
Penod [x'RER DLGIlP DCPI DTOT 
1 0107367 0153083 9973955 0000000 
2 5038889 0512605 9308504 1363469 
3 8048507 0462476 8578174 5707274 
4 1128489 0448734 8217619 6090195 
5 1272187 2465472 7890573 5906920 
6 1349214 3078351 7764311 5786398 
7 1359646 3069353 7755650 5m679 
8 1361305 3107437 7750554 5773970 
9 1360001 3262231 77 36984 5767917 
10 1359895 3283191 77 35002 5767846 
20 1361935 3306627 77 30691 5767108 
30 1361969 3307401 77 30589 5767020 
40 1361969 3307413 77 30587 5767018 
50 1361969 3307413 77 30587 .5767018 
244 
Table 7.22 
Tanzania 
Variance Decomposition ofDRER 
Penod DlRFR DLGDP IJCPI mar 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9746296 1058820 1.2641a! 0214111 
3 9395262 I 564035 1995783 2487564 
4 9047332 2.369692 2.345725 4811262 
5 8997224 2.579763 2744107 4703892 
6 8718804 3038735 2004698 6968530 
7 8569673 3550797 2986956 7765521 
8 85404a! 3777588 3a!5452 7732879 
9 8494733 3721983 3219954 8110734 
10 8451889 3726583 3461939 8292591 
20 8317103 3940243 4616628 8272094 
30 8263082 3990749 5136960 8241410 
40 8236400 40655SO 5.333078 8237373 
50 8217413 4 I496~ 5436006 8240253 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGDP: 
Penod DlRFR DLGDP IJCPI mar 
1 0642788 9935721 0000000 0000000 
2 2552132 9739619 0029812 0021871 
3 1342540 8185643 0181094 4.537074 
4 28.03717 66.91545 0620248 4427128 
5 21 861 a! 6~84000 0544138 IQ75478 
6 1937393 6~75346 0473457 14.39915 
7 1986358 6442395 0.551696 1516071 
8 2025698 6Q5S868 0724574 18.45977 
9 1&81528 6353151 0678643 1~97456 
10 18.28555 63.27118 0625969 1781730 
20 1942626 6158855 0880531 1&10466 
30 1913210 6154867 0883691 1843554 
40 1910135 6141213 0894551 1859198 
50 1908798 61.36519 0883800 18.66294 
Variance Decomposition of DCPI 
Penod DlRFR DLGDP OCPI mar 
1 0001525 0031588 9996689 0000000 
2 2197849 0065220 9773692 952E.()6 
3 2205182 0084407 9761615 0094258 
4 3 164305 0167412 %31154 0.356739 
5 1913791 0119891 9773917 0.227147 
6 2594269 0187936 9~96287 0254920 
7 2664177 0187601 96.89374 0254484 
8 3195625 0254345 9~S878 0291255 
9 2.533648 0388132 9~76143 0316791 
10 3063617 0.555237 96.06619 0.314951 
20 4881381 2275266 9226584 0577516 
30 6131593 4883275 8785159 I 133545 
40 7298848 7156468 8382105 1 723633 
50 8021137 9065539 80.61459 2238731 
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Table 7.23 
Tunisia 
Variance Decomposition ofDRER: 
Period DIRER DLOOP DCPI mOf 
1 lOO 0000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9744291 0105088 2235915 0.216082 
3 9340771 3708078 2588287 0295920 
4 8967990 7557275 2489225 0.273595 
5 8~65216 8601161 2469828 0.276856 
6 8788095 8784372 2.554171 0780502 
7 8753103 8830859 2.571773 I 066337 
6 8742155 8816977 2696450 1 065019 
9 8697638 9170743 2774088 1078790 
10 8M53S3 9507858 2763799 1074811 
20 8~05019 9732301 3015022 1.202490 
30 8578354 9870439 3079165 1.266852 
40 8568799 9920412 3097325 1.294272 , 
50 8564743 9941950 3105000 1.305619 
Variance Decomposttlon ofOLGDP: 
Period DIRER DLGDP DCPI mOf 
1 3.309662 9M9034 0000000 0000000 
2 2928252 9653970 0.206354 0325691 
3 30:'55658 9547310 0891720 0579527 
4 2479016 9441646 I 604373 1 500149 
5 3870075 8595295 5 117381 5059595 
6 4085320 79792'77 1162275 4498957 
7 4193466 7~742oo 1085022 8.214317 
6 4653886 7511961 1300633 7.220172 
9 4523700 7375046 1268469 9041148 
10 4.282894 7497212 12.32990 8415083 
20 4487038 6~50794 1462144 1238358 
30 4510532 6689414 1503080 1356453 
40 4510925 6631457 1516685 1400765 
50 4510947 6608809 15.21982 14 I 811S 
Variance Decomposition ofDCPI: 
Period DIRER DLOOP DCPI morT 
1 6722831 0005671 93.27150 0000000 
2 5406695 0048659 94.53741 0007235 
3 6925430 0066754 9299266 0015155 
4 1169462 0170560 8~12152 0013299 
5 1511372 1934349 8289062 0061315 
6 1550782 4332627 8Q09977 0059784 
7 1545760 4406879 8006371 0071809 
8 1573725 4776122 79.28362 0.203011 
9 1582297 4745793 7902322 0408015 
10 IS 87411 4740369 7&97596 0409554 
20 1552942 6775515 7~73734 0951731 
30 1540719 7.288910 76.08290 1.220998 
40 1535502 7508845 7580184 1.334294 
50 1533316 1.599310 7S 68625 1J81283 
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Table 7.24 
Uganda 
Variance Decomposition ofDRER' 
Period DU<ER DLGDP DCPI Drar 
1 100 0000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9~8631O 0402186 2.251194 0482919 
3 8708702 1.506615 1986193 9420177 
4 8529192 1640925 1933903 1113325 
5 8333987 I 921341 1887839 12.8S09S 
6 81~9022 2156532 1887788 1406546 
7 8IE0732 2.244735 1967403 13 88055 
8 8149327 2447579 2013820 1404533 
9 8049207 2706339 1987481 1481411 
10 7991966 3 169936 1968104 1494230 
20 7&57124 4.244259 1984210 1520029 
30 7797864 4933672 1980839 1510685 
40 7763998 5339496 1978781 1504174 
50 7743684 5583197 1977695 1500227 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGOP 
Period DU<ER DLGDP DCPI Drar 
1 1667337 9833266 0000000 0000000 
2 0687267 9919394 0(92690 00261Ql 
3 3536603 9M0936 033(952 0123087 
4 4382730 9405784 0688580 0870852 
5 3922890 90S66&l 1 807739 3702574 
6 3341891 8925693 2354142 5041037 
7 4077385 88.48777 2358672 5076168 
8 3960005 8923071 2164623 4644662 
9 3907610 8902827 2451375 4612746 
10 3738160 89.36590 2.551562 4.344374 
20 3686266 9061993 2272637 3421167 
30 3569154 9118787 2190925 3052054 
40 3514798 9146601 2148056 2871138 
50 3485634 9161663 2124576 2773163 
Variance DecomposltJon ofOCPI: 
Period DU<ER DLGDP DCPI Drar 
1 0270023 2.558321 9717166 0000000 
2 0271S71 5446608 92.25505 2026776 
3 1040747 6166471 8711986 5672919 
4 1696929 6889591 85.23018 6183295 
5 2428125 7.311937 8356409 6695847 
6 2A27764 7.500177 8324994 6822118 
7 2.507481 7470636 8319868 6823201 
8 2607371 7497910 8310758 6787137 
9 2606491 7511184 8309582 6786504 
10 2614863 7.502950 8304558 6836608 
20 2656425 7626468 82.84978 6867328 
30 2656500 7Ji16722 82.80259 6864183 
40 2656480 7707745 82.77378 6861993 
50 2656517 7716557 82.75629 6860634 
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Table 7.25 
ZambIa 
Variance OecomposltJon ofDRER: 
Period DIRER DLODP DCPI DrOTT 
1 1000000 0000000 0000000 0000000 
2 9907144 0410227 0005908 0.512427 
3 9793423 0410023 0867045 0788700 
4 97.35522 O..5096a1 1260033 0875137 
5 9587059 1.525804 1.344124 1.2>8834 
6 9561974 1.536213 1346736 1497316 
7 9514917 1793669 1406064- I 651097 
6 9494110 1891230 1423576 1744092 
9 9433583 2.506928 1424020 I 733226 
10 94.21034 2.521029 1428462 1.840173 
20 92.25139 4151039 1408348 2 183226 
30 9102714 .$ 156365 1394182 24223~ 
40 90.27075 S 773354- 1385166 2510732 
50 8978255 6172367 1379355 2665732 
Variance Decomposition ofDLGDP. 
Period DU<ER DLGIlP DCPI DTOTT 
1 0.384517 99 61548 0000000 0000000 
2 6922568 8787261 0025528 5179291 
3 11 47237 8216809 0042207 6317335 
4 11 38042 8099751 0.249362 7.371710 
5 9039660 85.68980 0128619 5041858 
6 9739269 80 87499 0.240135 9145604 
7 13 88104 7645410 0219941 9444918 
8 13 67560 75.33386 0.333331 1065721 
9 1298440 'n54387 0.337124 9134602 
10 1265135 76.os233 0.342337 1095398 
20 1629442 70.51014 0427467 1276797 
30 1671239 6956666 0446588 13.26437 
40 1724211 68 71053 04584~ 13.58895 
50 1739683 68 40287 0464031 1373626 
Vartance DecomposltiCl"l of OCPI: 
Penod DU<ER DLGIlP IlCPI DI'OTT 
1 0071819 0.119552 998(l!63 0000000 
2 0139600 0.1(B472 9957958 0111344 
3 0203903 0.181961 9909410 0520032 
4 0687652 0.184611 98.58780 0539937 
5 o 9(l!802 0.191639 98.08341 0.816~6 
6 0942742 OJ95162 9703539 1826709 
7 0983213 0.199061 96.90094 1856786 
8 1005592 0222132 %67455 2097725 
9 1007806 0250726 96.44591 2295558 
10 1027192 0285972 9633429 2352042 
20 1041481 0331321 96.19395 2427250 
30 1049509 0373390 96.14141 2435(1)1 
40 1055895 0391673 %11200 2440430 
50 1059335 0.404115 9~09356 2442994 
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7.8 Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results for most of the countries analysed 
above do not seem to support the view that flexible exchange rate regune is supenor 
to fixed regime, when It comes to tenns of trade shocks. Some authors argue that 
superionty of flexible exchange rate may not be possible m the presence of slow 
exchange rate pass-through. The rum this sectIon of the chapter is to investigate 
existence of slow exchange rate pass-through m these countries. 
Economists had expected to see a strong relatIOnship between the national price 
levels and exchange rates at the begimIing of the floating era. Exchange rate policies 
are based on this assumption. For example, the theoretical expOSItion that a coun-
try that maintains a floatmg exchange rate regime could handle tenns of trade shocks 
better than a country that has a peg exchange rate regime. However, there is a lIttle ev-
idence that supports this view at both aggregated and individual traded goods. Some 
of the results m the precedmg section do appear to support this argument. There is ar-
gument in the lIterature this could be due to low exchange rate pass-through. The aim 
of this extension IS to investigate the role of exchange rate pass-through in these coun-
tries wlule adjusting to a term of trade shocks. Exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) is 
defined as the percentage change m domestIc currency Import prices as a result of a 
percentage change in the exchange rates between the exporting and importing coun-
tries (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). When a 'one-to-one response of import prices to 
exchange rates is recorded, this is known as a complete ERPT. 
Dombusch (1987), in a semmal work demonstrates how mcompleteness in 
ERPT can occur. Subsequently various authors have suggested causes of this m-
completeness. CorsettI and Dedola (2002) for example, attnbuted tlus problem to the 
activities of imperfect competitive finns that lead to 'pricing-to-market'. Burstein, 
Neves and Rebelo (200) IdentIfied a role for the domestIc content in chain of dis-
tribution of traded goods as the main cause. Others emphasize the importance of 
non-traded goods in domestic consumption m response to exchange rates changes 
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(Betts and Kehoe, 2001; EIchenbaum and Rebelo, 2002). Price adjustment at the 
consumer level was also mentioned as the causes of slow ERPT by Engel (2002a and 
2002b). 
7.9 Empirical Model 
Following McCarthy (2007), Ca'Zorzi et al (2007) and BIllmeire and Bunato (2004), 
this analYSIS is carned out withm a stationary V AR framework as explained m section 
54. A stationary VAR model of six variables is used; oil prices (enl,), output (y,), 
exchange rates (e,), import prices (~mPt), consumer price index (qn,) and interest 
rates (~,). The exchange rates and the two price variables of import and consumer 
prices are the key variables in this study. The output and oil variables are included 
in order to capture effects of the real side of the economy. Interest rates are to take 
care of money market mfluences as well as impact of monetary POliCIes. The or-
der of the variables is as above. The recursive identlficatIon scheme means that the 
identified shocks, contemporaneously, influence therr corresponding variables and 
vanables that are ordered before. Therefore, It makes sense to order the most exoge-
nous variable first. Oll price shocks could affect all the remaming vanables in the 
system, contemporaneously, but they are not affected, contemporaneously, by any of 
the other shocks. Output and exchange rates are ordered next based on assumption of 
a contemporaneous effect of demand shocks on exchange rate and at the same time 
lmposing a time lag on the impact of the exchange rates on output. Import pnces 
come before consumer prices so as to allow for contemporaneous impact of import 
price shocks on consumer pnces, but not the opposite. The mterest rate is ordered 
last to let the money market, and especially monetary policy, to respond contempo-
raneously to all variables in the system. A stationary VAR, although is CritiCISed for 
overlookmg long-run relationship between the variables, is preferred as the analysis 
here is interested on the short run dynamics. 
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7.10 Data and Results 
Based on the model explained above, A V AR model with SIX variables IS estimated 
for all the countries covered in the first part of the chapter. The data sourced from the 
IMF Internatlonal Financial Statistics Database and cover 1980 : 01 to 2005 : 04. 
Impulse responses of CPI and import prices to exchange rates are estimated 
over a ten quarter horizon. Figure 7 23a and 7 23b report responses of CPI to in-
crease in exchange rates. The exchange rates are defined as a price of domestic cur-
rency in terms of foreign currency. Thus rise in exchange rates denotes depreciation 
of the domestic currency. As the results indIcate domestlc prices have responded to 
1% depreciation by an inslgntficant nse in Algeria, Bemn, Botswana, Kenya, Libya 
and Uganda. However, Ghana and Morocco recorded a negatlve but insigntficant re-
sponse. A significant negative response of CPI to 1% depreciation of the domestic 
currency is noted in Cameroon, Central Afnca, Gabon, Ethiopia, MalaWI and South 
Afnca. The remammg countries of Egypt, EthiopIa, Mauntama, Mauritlus, Nige-
ria, Senegal, TanzanIa, Tunisia and Zambia, the CPI seems to be non-responsive to 
exchange rate changes. 
Results for Import prices suggest a different pattern from that of the CPI Alge-
ria's import prices did not respond at the beginnmg of the shock, but from the second 
quarter, the import prices rose by about 2.5% and remains constant up to the tenth 
period. Gabon's import prices did not respond to exchange rate changes immediately 
after the shock, but an Insignificant positive rise IS observed by the second quarter 
and became negative from the sixth quarter. Ghana has indicated a positlve response 
of 0 02% at the period contemporaneous to the shock and rose to about 0 05% ID the 
second quarter before reverting to 0.02% in the fifth quarter. W1nle in Uganda, import 
prices did not respond to exchange rate changes at the beginning of the shock, but a 
significant negative response becomes apparent by the fifth quarter and increased to 
about 0 35% by the tenth quarter. 
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In the remaining countries, apart from Mauritius that exhibIt an insigmficant 
negative response, the response is generally not sIgnificant. On the whole, the results 
suggest that ERPT is very slow in these countries, wruch accounts for the failure 
of nominal exchange rates to induce expendIture switcrung in these countries. The 
results are similar to other findings in developing countries, particularly that of Be-
laisch (2003), who mvestigates ERPT in Brazil and found that there eXIsts a hrruted 
pass-through. The findIngs, therefore, support argunlents by Engel (2002) and Obst-
feld and Rogoff (1995) that where prices are fixed ex ante in consumers' currencies, 
nommaI exchange rate variability could not achieve relative price adjustment. 
7.11 Conclusion 
Using a structural VAR model, first part of this chapter investigates how African 
countnes cope with terms of trade shocks under different exchange rate reginles. 
Principally, two regmIes were considered' fixed and flexible. In general, the effects 
of terms of trade shocks to output fluctuation are moderately significant, accounting 
to about 30% in some countries. In peg regmIes, effects of terms of trade shocks are 
larger on output than on the real exchange rates. Impacts of terms of trade shocks 
in fleXIble reginles are expected to be larger on the real exchange rates than on the 
output. Only results for Ghana and Uganda are consistent WIth that. The remainmg 
flexible countries rud not behave accordIng to the theoretical pred!ctlOns, which lead 
to further investigation on the degree of exchange rate pass through m these countries. 
The analysis shows that the inIpulse responses of CPI and inIport pnces to exchange 
rate variation suggest the ERPT is at best very slow in these countnes. The lffiplica-
tion is that flexible exchange rates would not result in relative pnce adjustment, since 
expendIture switching cannot be achieved (Enge!, 2002). 
Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
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This thesis explores exchange rate policies in Afnca. The first empirical chap-
ter, preceded by a literature revIew, looks into exchange rate regimes, where the coun-
tries' reported regimes (de jure) are verified in order to check If the dejure regimes 
are the same with the de facto regimes (what the countries do) An econometric 
model developed by Frankel et al (2001) was used along with structural break test of 
Bai-Perron and Harvey-Leybourne-Taylor, for that purpose. The chapter's findmgs 
suggest that the (de jure) reported regimes are m general not the same as the actual 
(de facto) regime operated by the countries". The notion of 'fear of floating' high-
lighted by Calvo and Remhart (2002) is supported here, as countries reported floatmg 
regintes, but the results indicate they are not floatmg. For example, Nigeria reported 
floating regune for the sub-period of 1999-2005, however, the finding suggest that 
the de facto regime was a basket peg. Similarly, 'fear of pegging' elaborated by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) also seems to exIst among some of these Afncan coun-
tries. This is, partIcularly, the case with Algeria, Morocco, Nlgena and Tanzania, 
who have, during one penod or the other, reported peggmg regune, but the results in-
dicate floatIng. The findmgs, therefore, demonstrates inadequacies of the use of de 
jure regimes in empirical analysis, as it may not be the same as the de facto regime 
and may consequently lead to an erroneous conclusion. 
Chapter four dtscusses exchange rate interventions and uses threshold cointe-
gration to examine relationship between reserves and exchange rates. This follows 
the work of chapter three, in which exchange rate regimes are verified. It was noted 
in the chapter that much of empincal work carned out in the field of regune verifica-
tion used reserve volatility as a vanable that proxies for exchange rate interventlon. 
However, this practice was critiCised on the grounds that reserve changes, particu-
40 Please refer to table 1 1 for delaJIs 
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larly in developing countnes cannot be for intervention actiVItIes alone. As valid 
as the argument seems, there is no empirical work that investigates relationship be-
tween exchange rates and reserve changes. The chapter, therefore, fills the gap by 
exploring long-run relationship between reserve changes and exchange rates, utiliz-
mg the threshold techruque of Fomby (1997) and, particularly, its extended versIon 
by Hansen and Seo (2002). The results reject the existence oflmear cointegration in 
favour of threshold cointegration. 1bis shows that as intervention does not occur con-
tinuously, but only when the exchange rate has reached, or is about to reach, a certain 
threshold. The results further suggest that the thresholds vary from country to coun-
try and to a large extent reflect regImes that the countries operate. Countries WIth 
flexIble exchange rates tend to have higher threshold than those WIth fixed exchange 
rates. 
The results suggest that interventIons by authonties are influenced, in addition 
to the exchange rate regime operated, by availability of foreign reserves and level 
of exchange rate volatility. The non-lmearity suggests that official mterventIons in 
foreIgn exchange markets are such that nominal exchange rate movements are asym-
metnc. 1bis is because negatIve deviations (appreciatIon) tend to persist longer than 
positive (depreciation). This explains behaviour of the monetary authontles found m 
other srodies. For example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found that monetary authori-
ties are more inclined in tolerating currency appreciation than depreciation. 
Chapter five investigates long-run real exchange rates determinants in eleven 
African countnes. It uses Johansen comtegration technique on a trade relatIon model 
Traditional determmants of real exchange rates in developing countries that include 
GDP, interest rates and country risks are explored and found to be significant. Long-
run relationsJnps were found in all the countnes, as signified by rejectIon of non-
existence of cointegration in favour of Its eXIstence The adJusttnent coefficients vary 
from one country to another as well as from one vanable to another. 
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Speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate to its long-run eqwhbnum varies 
from country to country. In Algeria, Kenya, Nlgena and Tanzania, it takes between 
one year and one and a half year for the real exchange rate to adjust to its long-run 
eqwlibrium, if there are no further shocks. The period in Tunisia and Botswana, 
however, is between eight to twenty years. Thts indtcates that, although in some 
countries, the real exchange rate takes a short period to revert back to its equilibrium 
level that may not require any action from the authorities, in others there may be need 
for an action, probably in form of devaluations. 
African exchange rates have been very volatile, especially from the 1980s. This 
period coincides with introduction of a more flexible exchange rate reginte ID the 
continent. Exchange rate volatility can have implication for IDternational trade and 
macroeconomic variable, like output. Chapter six deals with sources of real exchange 
rate fluctuattons ID nine" African countries. The theoretical framework is based on 
a stochastic open macroeconomic model of Clarida and Gali (1994) that identifies 
three shocks to the economy, demand, supply and monetary shocks. Relative con-
tribution of each type of shocks to the movement of relattve output, relattve prices 
and relative exchange rates is exammed in the model. It was dtstmguished that some 
shocks do not have long-run effects, which fonns the main identifying strategy in the 
empirical structural VAR. Monetary shocks have no long-run impact on output and 
real exchange rates and demand shocks have no long run effects on output only. The 
estimation, based on this assumption, was carried out within a tri-variate structural 
VAR model WIth relative exchange rates, relative output and national price levels as 
exogenous variables. The resnlts indtcate that the most important source of real ex-
change rate fluctuations is the demand shocks. However, there are countries where 
supply shocks have significantly contributed to real exchange rate volattlity, like ID 
Algena and Ghana. 
41 Please refer to table 1 1 for det81ls 
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Financial systems of these countries, except in South Afnca are relatively un-
derdeveloped. It is therefore, not surpnsmg to find that nominal shocks have con-
tnbuted least to real exchange rate fluctuations in the countnes. In addibon, the less 
importance of nominal shocks to real exchange rate variations suggests that mone-
tary policies that ann to influence the behaviour of real exchange rates may not be 
potent in these countnes. This questions, specifically, aspects of these pohcies that 
seek to promote competitiveness 
Terms of trade shocks have been identrlied as an important exogenous influence 
that affects the developing countries' economic performance. About 50% of out-
put volatility in developing countnes has been attnbuted to terms of trade shocks'2• 
Role of exchange rates in adjustment process by countnes faced with t=s of trade 
shocks dates back to the 1950s. Some of the theoretica1literature argue that nominal 
exchange rates could act as a shock absorber to an economy that is faced WIth real 
shocks. The argument in favour of flexible exchange rate regime presupposes that 
countries WIth floating regime would expenence a smoother adJusbnent in the face 
of exogenous real shocks, hke terms of trade, than countries WIth peg regimes. It is 
this among others that the structural adjustment programmes adopted by these coun-
tries have element of flexIble exchange rate arrangement. Afncan countries, being 
exporters of primary products, t=s of trade shocks are frequent in these countries. 
Chapter seven InVestIgates how twenty two·3 Afncan countries cope with terms of 
trade shocks under different regnnes. The findings suggest that effects of terms of 
trade shocks are significant, as they contnbute to about 30% of output variatIons. Ac-
cording to the theoretical argument, impacts of terms of trade shocks would be larger 
on output than on exchange rates in countries that have fixed exchange rate regime 
and the opposite in countries with flexible system. However, the results, apart from 
that of Algeria and Ghana, do not seem to agree with that. Thus, necessitating fur-
42 Reference IS to Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002). 
43 See Table 1 1 for detaIls 
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ther investigation on degree of ERPT in these countries. Consequently, a model of 
ERPT, based on a six variable V AR was estimated for each country. The results show 
that ERPT is very low ID the countries, which explains faIlure of nommal exchange 
rates to act as a shock absorber. 
The study indIcates that exchange rate regime do not matter much for terms of 
trade shocks. As no partIcular regune is favoured ID face of terms of trade shocks, 
these countnes should base their regime choice on economic situation that prevaIis 
at the time and change it whenever, the SItuation changes As Frankel (1999) put 
it 'appropriate exchange rate regime varies depending on the circumstances of the 
country in questIon and dependIng on the crrcumstances of the time period ID ques-
tion'. However, authorities should be cautious not to create credibility problem. 
The thesis has, generally, analysed some aspects of African exchange rate poli-
cIes that included appropnateness of de Jure regimes, foreign exchange mterventions, 
determinants of real exchange rates and sources of real exchange rate fluctuations. 
Terms of trade shocks and exchange rate regunes and presence of exchange rate 
pass-through are also covered. Other areas of exchange rate policies that need to be 
explore, partIcularly on the most appropriate regimes for the countries include impact 
of exchange rates and regimes on macroeconOlntc variables such as output, employ-
ment and inflation, as well as, exchange rate and current account adjustment in these 
countnes. 
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